ERKKI KOORT ⟩ There's also good news on hybrid attacks by Russian special services

According to a report published by the Financial Times, Russia is planning to launch major hybrid attacks in Europe. In fact, Russia has been constantly mounting such attacks, but this has not brought with it any major problems. Pictured: the ruler of Russia, Vladimir Putin, with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu celebrating the victory in World War II. Photo: Alexei Nikolsky/Sputnik/Kremlin Pool Photo via AP/Scanpix

• Russian hybrid attacks have been taking place in Europe for a long time.
• The attacks' relatively cheap price is a temptation to mount them.
• Russia's tendency to over-exploit its tools sees them backfire.

​The article published in the Financial Times (FT) saying that Russian special services are preparing large hybrid attacks against Europe turned out to be a surprise for many. In reality, Russians have not stopped their hybrid attacks for a moment, writes Erkki Koort, a security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences.

The FT article that the discussion builds on is based on the assessments of three special services. It is often not a question of whether special services have information on certain trends, but of how reliable and urgent certain information is considered to be. In recent history, the Hamas attack on Israel is one such case.

The story published in the FT more likely confirms a recognition of the growing threat from Russia in Europe, rather than a serious and crucial change in Moscow's activities.

The fear cultivated by Moscow works, because in some layers of the collective European consciousness qualities and capabilities are attributed to Russia that it ceased to possess long ago, and perhaps never did.

According to the published data, infrastructure is going to come under a major attack. This isn't much of a surprise, considering that the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up back on September 26, 2022. In 2023, the gas pipeline connecting Estonia to the outside world ruptured, along with several other cables. There have been numerous reports of individuals monitoring or sabotaging railway lines.

The fear cultivated by Moscow works, because in some layers of the collective European consciousness qualities and capabilities are attributed to Russia that it ceased to possess long ago, and perhaps never did.

Most recently, Polish security services a few days ago apprehended a suspect allegedly involved in espionage and planning of specific actions. Likewise, Russia has continually carried out cyber attacks against infrastructure objects and their control systems. Many cyber attacks likely go unnoticed, with victims unaware that Russian special services were behind the disruption of a process or a service. However, there is one good news in this: the capabilities of Moscow's special services are not at the level that was feared.

In addition to cyber attacks, physical attacks are constantly being carried out, including eliminations. We are most affected by the attack on the car of the Estonian minister of the interior and a journalist from Russia. Of course, there are also the attacks on opposition members in Lithuania and the assassinations in Spain, Berlin and elsewhere.

Does Europe understand?

The simple answer is that it doesn't. We sometimes like to believe that countries consider the same threats important and existential. However, this is far from the case. If the threats are not assessed in the same way by societies and states, there is no point in assuming that all security services in Europe or NATO operate on the basis of some common understanding.

Russia is trying to exploit disagreements and differences of opinion to its advantage and consistently cultivates fear of itself. This works, because in some layers of the collective European consciousness qualities and capabilities are attributed to Russia that it ceased to possess long ago, and perhaps never did.

There is a case for believing that Russia's attacks in Europe would deal a blow and turn everyone against it. It is possible that these actions would relegate it to the status of an even greater pariah. However, this may not be the case, because so far nothing of the kind has happened.

Many countries, including in Europe, are not taking very resolute measures, or at least experience to date does not show it. Russia's actions in blowing up ammunition depots in Czechia and Bulgaria have not received very definite responses. The response to the poisoning of the Skripals in the UK also remained relatively toothless. This was despite the fact that in its aftermath, the police there reopened dozens of criminal cases in which people linked to Russia had died and the circumstances of the deaths were suspicious.

Although the war in Ukraine has temporarily constrained Russia's ability to wage hybrid warfare, it has not disappeared entirely. Moscow's military operations consume significant resources and have inflicted losses on special services personnel, but the machinery is slowly being reorganized.

Many (cyber) attacks likely go unnoticed, with victims unaware that Russian special services were behind the disruption of a process or a service.

When the Kremlin realized in February and March 2022 that the West had not completely abandoned Ukraine, there was a renewed focus on planning hybrid attacks. In other words, the worse things get for Russia on the battlefield, the more they concentrate on hybrid warfare. The arrival of US assistance in Ukraine undoubtedly signifies preparations for a deteriorating situation on the battlefield.

Many (cyber) attacks likely go unnoticed, with victims unaware that Russian special services were behind the disruption of a process or a service.

While Europe does not see us as a party to the conflict, in Moscow's narrative we are. One manifestation of this was Russia's extremely painful reaction to the UK's announcement that Ukraine can use the weapons provided by the UK to attack Russian territory. According to the Kremlin, this makes London a party to the conflict. However, Moscow has in the past tolerated the use of these weapons to attack Crimea, even though it also considers it its own territory. Or does it not, according to their current interpretation?

We need to keep in mind that Russia has been constantly conducting hybrid attacks and will certainly continue to do so in the future. One reason for this is the relatively low cost of such attacks, and secondly, the difficulty of attribution. The targeted country cannot respond in kind, and it is often impossible to identify the orchestrators.

However, there's still one piece of good news in all of this. Russia mostly tends to go too far in its designs, ending up in excesses. In other words, in their exploitation of the so-called fear factor, they go on pushing ahead but forget to stop at the right moment.