ERKKI KOORT ⟩ Russia's military plan on the western border – perfect strategy or Potemkin village?

Russia is establishing new military units on its western border, but its ability to man and equip them is questionable. Heavy losses in Ukraine are forcing Russia to build up reserves, and some of Moscow's rhetoric is as hollow as the rockets at the Red Square parade. Photo: Dmitri Lovetsky

• Russia's military industry production capacity does not reach USSR levels.
• Moscow is currently accumulating supplies more for defense.
• Vigilance regarding Russia's actions must not waver for a moment.

Increasingly alarming messages are coming from across our and Finland's borders with Russia, with Russia working to restore its military capabilities. What to pay attention to and how to interpret these developments is discussed by Erkki Koort, security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences.

Russia has now been waging a war with Ukraine for 11 years. After the capture of Crimea, fighting began in eastern Ukraine. It was mainly the special forces that were hardened and trained there, while the air force and navy played an almost negligible role. In order to train forces other than the special forces, Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war. A large part of the Russian military police personnel also rotated through Syria, and in total some 20,000 of them were involved there at various times.

That didn't help, because the war launched against Ukraine in February 2022 showed that it was not a special forces operation in eastern Ukraine, nor was the experience gained in Syria of much use.

The deranged Putin essentially directed all forces to subdue Ukraine. That wasn't enough, as the emerging drone warfare caused an enormous loss of combat vehicles. Soon, there was nothing left to send to the front but 1950s-era T-55 tanks and other gear from that period. Factories couldn't produce enough tanks or shells. Even for attack drones, they had to turn to Iran. It's ironic that a country whose aviation sector has been under sanctions since the 1980s was able to produce them, but Russia could not.

In addition to the air force, the Syrian civil war was also important for training the Russian military police. However, it turned out that the experience gained in Syria was not much use to any branch of the armed forces in Ukraine. Pictured: Russian military police patrolling Qameshli airfield in northeastern Syria on March 4, 2020. Photo: DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP

New bases

Information has now been published in the media indicating that Russia is establishing new military bases near the Finnish border and renovating old ones. There is no doubt that this is true, but it is important to consider the context – why Russia is doing this and why it is happening right now.

In four, five, or even six years, the Russian army will not have the same amounts of weaponry it had just three years ago.

In 2023, Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Sweden had been neutral for a couple of centuries prior to that, and during the entire Soviet era, Russia had a special relationship with Finland. Therefore, it is entirely logical that Russian defense planners, faced with this new reality, had to make a decision to build new military infrastructure along the borders of NATO member states. Second, a large portion of the personnel of the military units located near the Finnish and also Estonian borders are still deployed in Ukraine. The best time to renovate barracks is precisely when soldiers are not loitering around the premises.

Satellite images of the area show a greater presence of military equipment than before. This may be partially true, but we shouldn't let it get us down. First, the Russians are very skilled in the use of all sorts of decoys – it's in their blood – and the expressions «Potemkin village» and «painting the grass green» should come as no surprise to us. This was vividly demonstrated by the Ukrainian drone strike on June 1, after which the affected locations were quickly cleaned up and new aircraft were brought in, about which there is no information regarding their airworthiness. Inflatable or wooden mock-ups have also been used frequently in the past.

he expression «Potemkin village» refers to presenting things as significantly better than they actually are. In Russia, this has centuries-old traditions. Pictured: the former burial site of Prince Grigory Potemkin in the Catherine II Cathedral in Kherson, Ukraine. As they retreated, the Russians took his remains with them. Photo: Andreas Wolochow/Shutterstock

It is not impossible that more equipment has indeed appeared at Russian military bases. Several sources have claimed that all the equipment being produced is no longer going to the Ukrainian front, but to warehouses for the next offensive. On this basis, predictions have been made as to the time horizon in which Russia might plan a new attack.

Reaction reflects production capacity

Russia has ramped up its military-industrial production capacity and is now producing several times more. Despite shifting its economy onto a war footing, Russia is currently unable to produce anywhere near what the Soviet Union once could. Between 2022 and 2024, a large portion of the world's largest mobilization stockpile – created during the Soviet era – was destroyed in Ukraine. Some of it had been stolen or had rusted away. Replacing that today is impossible, even if Russia's military industry were to operate 25 hours a day. By the way, the size of the country is not an advantage in this race, as the equipment must be spread across an enormous territory.

Before Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk Oblast in August 2024, the Russian leadership was relatively confident that they could commit all their resources to capturing Kyiv, believing no one would dare attack Russia. It became clear, however, that military occupation on Russian soil is possible without a nuclear war.

However, the fact that Russia is producing more is undeniable. Just as it is likely that not everything immediately goes to the front lines anymore. Still, one nuance is being overlooked in all of this: why isn't everything going to the front? The explanation is actually quite simple. There have been various moments in the current war when both countries have been at their «breaking points». Apparently, at some point, it was realized in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff that Russia could not create a situation where there were no reserves left to defend the country.

This shift was driven by two factors. The first was the appointment of the new defense minister, Andrei Belousov. The replacement of long-time minister Sergei Shoigu triggered movement within the leadership, and the subsequent large-scale purge of generals allowed to create the conditions for change. The second reason was Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Prior to that, the Russian leadership had been relatively confident that they could commit all their resources to capturing Kyiv, believing no one would dare attack Russia. It became clear, however, that military occupation on Russian soil is possible without a nuclear war.

In May 2025, the UN panel of experts monitoring North Korea sanctions reported that Russia had received nine million shells from North Korea since the beginning of 2024. In addition, approximately 100 ballistic missiles had been supplied. Furthermore, 10,000 – 12,000 soldiers had been deployed. Regarding shells, the figure had been previously estimated at three million. However, the actual number is three times higher. This indicates serious production problems in Russia's military industry.

Another example of the issues is Russia's response to the Ukrainian drone strike, which destroyed or damaged up to 40 bomber aircraft. The response has been significantly weaker than expected, highlighting shortcomings in both the air force and missile production. Of course, it is not ruled out that additional retaliation may still occur. However, the much more subdued reaction than anticipated also allows certain conclusions to be drawn. In Russia's operational logic, a response is expected to be swift and brutal. If Moscow is unable to respond immediately, it resorts to rhetoric in the vein of the Kremlin reserving the right to respond at a time, place, and with means of its choosing.

Vigilance must not falter

Despite the growth in military production, Russia is facing serious problems in supplying its troops. The humiliation caused by the drone strikes organized by Ukraine's internal security service, the SBU, was too great for the response to be so weak.

The deranged Putin essentially directed all forces to subdue Ukraine. That wasn't enough, as the emerging drone warfare caused an enormous loss of combat vehicles.

Russia is currently stockpiling tanks and other equipment not for an offensive, but for its own defense, as much of its warehouse contents have been destroyed in Ukraine. After the partial occupation of the Kursk Oblast, it became clear that reserves must be replenished – otherwise, in the event of an attack, Russia would be caught unprepared.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia does not pose a threat or is not preparing for a confrontation with NATO – something that many Russian leaders have stated explicitly. At present, Russia does not have that capability, despite increasing troop numbers (whether on paper or in reality). And it must be understood that in four, five, or even six years, the Russian army will not have the same amounts of weaponry it had just three years ago.