KADRI KULLMAN ⟩ It is clear who is to blame for the absurd delays in building the eastern border

On the Estonia-Russia eastern border, within the area of responsibility of the Piusa border station. The photo is for illustrative purposes. Photo: Marko Saarm

• In reality construction of the first section of the border only began in 2020.
• Looking at the current pace, there is no way the 2026 deadline can be met.

The construction of Estonia's eastern border has dragged on for an absurdly long time. The blame lies with the Reform Party, which has (so far!) formed six governments over the ten years spent on building the border, Kadri Kullman, deputy chair of The Right party, writes.

President Lennart Meri said in 1993: «Guarding and maintaining Estonia's border must be done in such a way that it is not only impenetrable but also appears impenetrable to all those who would attempt to cross it illegally.» What now feels like a basic principle of security still has not been realized 34 years after independence was restored.

In 2014, after the abduction of Eston Kohver at the border, the then interior minister Hanno Pevkur promised that a proper border would be built by 2018, in time for the Republic of Estonia's 100th anniversary. In October of the same year, Pevkur wrote in Äripäev that he had made border security a personal priority and stated that within a couple of years, the border would be secure. In reality, construction of the first section did not begin until 2020.

The then prime minister Taavi Rõivas, interior minister Pevkur, and Police and Border Guard Board director general Elmar Vaher visited the southeastern border already in 2014 and decided that clearing and properly marking the border line had to begin immediately—regardless of the ratification of the Estonia-Russia border treaty. This was before Russia's invasion of Crimea. Before Mariupol. Before Bucha.

Now, more than ten years later, the eastern border still remains partially unfinished. Despite the fact that Estonia is a functioning state with a Ministry of Defense, a defense force, the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps, the Police and Border Guard Board, and a defense budget in the billions, we have not managed to establish physical and reliable border defense. For people in Tartu, the border is only about 100 kilometers away. This is not some distant place. It is close to our home.

The internet is full of old articles promising the border would be completed. Every new leader says construction is finally about to begin. Promises were made that it would be finished in time for the republic's 100th anniversary. We were told work needs to start immediately. It was declared a personal priority. Yet today, tenders for the next sections have still not been announced.

The first 23.5-kilometer section in Võru County was finally completed in 2022. Much has been said about how complex that section was: difficult terrain, peatlands, bogs, lakes. These required innovative solutions like floating concrete pontoons and geotextiles. As if it were a surprise that building a border is not just putting up a fence, but also developing the supporting infrastructure. Yes, complex terrain makes the project more difficult, but that is not an excuse. People managed to overcome terrain this difficult already at Vargamäe*.

The internet is full of old articles promising the border would be completed. Every new leader says construction is finally about to begin. Promises were made that it would be finished in time for the republic's 100th anniversary. We were told work needs to start immediately. It was declared a personal priority. Yet today, tenders for the next sections have still not been announced. The cost of the border varies depending on the source. Some mention cuts to the budget. What does a «cut» border even mean? I sincerely hope the border will be as smart and resilient as possible!

This is a critically important national investment that should obviously be a priority. What is holding it back? Is it bureaucracy, indecision, or just political convenience and posturing? Whatever the reason—there is no excuse. Our neighbor has been waging war for three years now. If not before, then at least since then we have known that the border must be physically secured and our defense capability must be practical, not something that only exists on paper.

If the state cannot demonstrate decisiveness in such a situation, then the inevitable question arises: how are decisions made in other areas of life? If a citizen cannot be sure that the state is capable of safeguarding the most basic thing—its own border and territory—then this is no longer just a technical or logistical issue. It is a matter of trust.

When there are doubts about the state's ability to make decisions and take action, people's will to defend their country also begins to crumble. People will not defend it based on orders or slogans alone—defense will emerges when they see that the state firmly stands behind them. That they can trust their country. That the border is in place. That leadership is clear. That promises are kept.

Did we bite off more than we can chew?

We can see the same sluggish pattern in the Baltic defense line, which—under Estonia's lead—was supposed to establish a series of strongpoints along the border. Cooperation with the other Baltic states is certainly good and crucial. But in reality, Estonia still has not even established the exact locations for the planned posts, no budget has been set, and—typically for Estonia—talks with landowners have not even begun. Against this backdrop, it feels like we took on a new task before finishing the previous one. There is still no defensive border barrier. Latvia and Lithuania are moving faster than we are. Is that not embarrassing? Are those responsible not ashamed that the state is unable to carry out critical security investments, even though in political rhetoric they are said to be top priorities?

At the current pace, it is impossible to meet the 2026 deadline. If construction drags and funding remains uncertain, we will remain for years in a situation where our eastern border and the defense line are incomplete. This is not just embarrassing—it is dangerous. Border guards and defense forces are expected to operate in conditions that do not meet today's security needs.

Ammunition without infrastructure is like gasoline without a car. Defense capability must be a whole: weapons, positions, movement routes, obstacles, supplies.

National defense without a border is not national defense. The misplaced focus in defense spending is obvious. Granted, 1.6 billion euros for ammunition investments and five percent of GDP for defense sounds impressive—but if the border is physically unprotected and the dragon's teeth are sitting in a warehouse instead of in the forest, they offer no protection at all. Ammunition without infrastructure is like gasoline without a car. Defense capability must be a whole: weapons, positions, movement routes, obstacles, supplies. That seems logical and does not even require military expertise.

By now, our country has been independent for 34 years. We have every possible structure—the Ministry of Defense, the defense forces, the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps, the Police and Border Guard Board—and billions are being allocated to the defense budget, yet the eastern border and its defense structures only remain partially built, therefore we have to ask: why?

I—and above all, my grandchildren—live twice as close to the border as Tallinn is from Tartu. I believe that is reason enough to ask: what is going on?

The land border between Estonia and Russia is (only) 136 kilometers long. Admittedly, part of it runs through difficult, marshy, and hard-to-access terrain that requires special technical solutions. But if people in Vargamäe* knew how to manage it back then, surely it is possible today as well. It all comes down to priorities.

* Vargamäe – a farm in A. H. Tammsaare's «Truth and Justice», one of the foundational works of Estonian literature, where the protagonist struggles to cultivate harsh, swampy land.