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Moscow has been busy for decades trying to maintain its influence over territories formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, using both destabilization and direct occupation, Erkki Koort, a security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, writes.
When Russia launched the full-scale attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it seemed a foregone conclusion that gas transit to Europe via Ukraine would end. It did, but 34 months later.
The deal was a win-win for both sides, helping to finance the aggressor, as well as Ukraine to defend itself. It was a pretty absurd situation, where the victim allowed the sale of goods dispatched through its own territory to finance the occupation of itself. Looking at it from the other side, it was no less schizophrenic – the aggressor was paying for part of the repulsion of its own attacks by doing business through the victim. On January 1, 2025, it nevertheless ended.
It seems that some change in the status of Transnistria is possible in the coming few years. What exactly, may become clear already this winter.
In the first months of the hot phase of the war, information kept being leaked to the public that, in addition to establishing a land bridge to Crimea, Russia wanted to go all the way to Odesa. In the former case, this meant the expulsion of Ukraine from the shore of the Azov Sea, which Russia succeeded in doing, and in the latter, the closure of Ukraine's access to the Black Sea.
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Russian troops were supposed to advance all the way to the borders of Romania and Moldova. When it comes to Moldova, the establishment of a land link to the eastern bank of the Dniester/Nistru River, occupied Moldovan land, was important of course. The entity formed there by Russia, Transnistria, or the republic beyond the Dniester, which has been there since 1990, carried an important idea. It was intended to destabilize Moldova, hinder its development and movement towards the West.
When Kyiv became disobedient to Moscow, that foothold was also useful for at least the appearance of Russian forces being stationed next to western Ukraine. However, there is no significant military force there, and if necessary, Ukraine could have quickly militarily suppressed the enclave. However, going there would have meant tying down troops, and considering that it is Moldovan territory, they should have been asked as well.
Russian troops were supposed to advance all the way to the borders of Romania and Moldova. When it comes to Moldova, the establishment of a land link to the eastern bank of the Dniester/Nistru River, occupied Moldovan land, was important of course.
Thus, gas supplies to Moldova were cut off because it was no longer possible to deliver gas through Ukraine. However, Gazprom and Russian propaganda could not resist the temptation to play things bigger. According to Gazprom, the supply was halted due to outstanding debts, which they claimed amounted to 700 million dollars, while Moldova reported the figure as eight million dollars.
The difference in the estimates stems from the fact that Gazprom supplied gas to Moldova within internationally recognized borders, while Moldova only accounted for the part of the territory under the control of the central government. The Transnistrian authorities meanwhile did not pay anyone for the gas consumed. This created an absurd situation where Moscow had created a decades-long territorial problem and then demanded «compliance with international law» when it came to payment for gas supplies.
The territory of Transnistria is just over 4,000 square kilometers, comparable to Harju County. According to data for 2015, it was home to roughly 475,000 people, but its population is now estimated at around a couple of hundred thousand people. A large part of the population has left the enclave for Moldova, Europe, or Russia.
The discontinuation of gas supplies has already put an end to industrial activity in the region, and food production alone continues. There is also a problem with the power plant that used to run on gas. This plant also has a significant impact on Moldova as a whole, as a third of electricity came from there. Similar to some other countries, Moldova had not made any significant preparations in the energy sector or deployed new generating capacities. Overhead power lines also run to Moldova through Transnistria, and little has been done in terms of connections with Europe.
Moldova declared a 60-day state of emergency back in December. It has also been announced that the power plant in Transnistria will switch to coal, but there is only enough coal to last 50 days. If Transnistria completely stops supplying electricity to Moldova, then it will be for a longer period. Electricity usage is already limited, and in certain hours, it is recommended not to use elevators as the risk of getting trapped in an elevator due to a power outage is high.
In any case, a critical moment will come in January or February. Moldova will probably be helped to survive the winter by support from the European Union, as it is unlikely that a country that has just chosen the European path will be allowed to go under. Moldova, on its part, has offered assistance to Transnistria, which refused to accept it. However, there is currently no hope for any help from Russia or Ukraine, as one cannot and the other does not want to provide it.
Regarding Moldova, Moscow has a very simple goal – the presidential election was won by the pro-EU Maia Sandu, but the parliamentary elections are due this year. Whether in March, June, or August has not yet been decided. This aims to influence people to vote against the current regime. Social problems will cause dissatisfaction in any case.
With residents of Transnistria, things are more complicated. Aside from Russia, they have no one else to rely on for help, but none is coming from there. Russia's desire to create an occupied territory to destabilize Moldova has been an altogether successful project for 35 years. By the way, back at the time, its creation was helped by Mikhail Lysenko, who also wanted to separate Narva from Estonia. In Moldova, it worked out.
The region has sought recognition and has worked closely with Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to this end. The latter two regions of Georgia received this recognition from Russia in 2008, following the Russia-Georgia war. They also worked closely with with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. When these were annexed to Russia, there was new hope in Tiraspol, as the region has been applying to become part of Russia since 2006. In 2024, there was a brief rumor that the region would be annexed to Russia, but this remained speculation.
An absurd situation where Moscow had created a decades-long territorial problem and then demanded «compliance with international law» when it came to payment for gas supplies.
Moscow has used energy carriers as a weapon. It has been used to influence countries and create dependency. In the early 1990s, Estonia was also completely dependent on Russian energy, and Moscow used this to exert strong pressure. Now, however, a situation is arising where Moscow's energy weapon is destabilizing Transnistria, which Moscow itself has used to influence Moldova and try to pressure Ukraine through it.
Of course, one should not underestimate the ingenuity and resilience of people in regions like Transnistria, under conditions where Europeans would have long since broken. People in such regions are accustomed to difficulties. However, utility problems pose a major challenge to the authorities in the region, especially when there is no solution in sight.
What will happen next in a situation like this is very difficult to predict now, because there is a lot of uncertainty and, of course, Moscow is not sitting idly by either. However, it seems that some change in the status of Transnistria is possible in the coming few years. What exactly, may become clear already this winter.
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