MARTIN EHALA ⟩ Putin's influence on the integration of Estonia's Russian-speaking community

Putin's identity politics in all its glory during the announcement of the presidential election results on March 18, 2024. Photo by Gavriil Grigorov Photo: Gavriil Grigorov

• The acquisition of Russian citizenship among Estonia's Russian-speaking community has grown.
• Younger generations have increasingly renounced Estonian citizenship in the last ten years.
• The share of dissatisfied individuals among Russian-speaking Estonians is higher than ever before.

Social scientists often describe the integration of Russian-speaking Estonians as a bilateral process, dependent also on ethnic Estonians' readiness to accept Russians into their midst. Martin Ehala, editor of Fookus, suggests this view is oversimplified.

Integration, in fact, involves three parties, the third being Vladimir Putin himself, or more specifically, his identity politics. Estonian citizenship data vividly illustrates this point.

Number of Russian citizens is growing

An analysis of the citizenship dynamics among Russian-speaking individuals in Estonia based on three census data (2000, 2011, 2021) reveals significant trends, particularly when breaking down the data by generations and observing the changes in the number of Estonian and Russian citizens in each generation over two decades.

Generations are categorized into six, starting with the oldest, the Stalin-era generation, comprising individuals born before World War II. This group initially had a higher count of Russian citizens, though it has largely diminished over the last 20 years (refer to chart).

This trend of the number of Russian citizens increasing over the past 20 years also characterizes younger generations who are not yet nearing the end of their natural lifespan.

The post-war generation comprises people born between 1941–1955. At the time of the 2000 census, they were aged 45–60, and by the 2021 census, aged 65–80. This generation too has seen a decline over the last decade due to natural mortality, resulting in a decrease in both Estonian and Russian citizens compared to 2011. Importantly, between the 2000 and 2011 censuses, the share of Russian citizens in this generation rose by 26 percent.

Changes in the acquisition of Russian citizenship based on data from three censuses in six generations of Russian Estonians. Photo: Martin Ehala

This trend of the number of Russian citizens increasing over the past 20 years also characterizes younger generations who are not yet nearing the end of their natural lifespan. The percentage increases are staggering: in the generation born during the Thaw (1956–1970), the share of Russian citizens increased by 36 percent between the censuses; in the generation born during the Era of Stagnation (1971–1985) by 35 percent, in the post-Soviet generation (born 1986–2000) by a notable 46 percent, and in the youngest, the 21st-century generation (born 2000–2011) by 7 percent.

Although the absolute numbers are not exceedingly high (none of the four younger generations have as many Russian citizens as the two older generations once did). The younger generations' shift towards Russian citizenship does not make up for the decline in Russian citizens among older generations (from 86,000 to 81,000 this century). The notable choice of Russian citizenship by many young people born after Estonia's re-independence, along with the increasing trend, warrants an explanation.

Number of Estonian citizens in decline among the Russian-speaking community

It appears that the increase in the number of people with Russian citizenship during the interval between censuses is not only because stateless individuals have opted for Russian citizenship, but there is also a noticeable trend of renouncing Estonian citizenship, particularly in the post-Soviet generation. However, the pattern is more complex.

Acquisition and renunciation of Estonian citizenship based on data from three censuses in six generations of Russian Estonians. Graph by Photo: Martin Ehala

At the start of the 21st century, younger generations were actively acquiring Estonian citizenship – between 2000 and 2011, it increased by 32 percent in the post-Soviet generation and by 20 percent in the Stagnation Era generation. In contrast, between 2011 and 2021, there has been a slight reversal in all generations, with the largest in the post-Soviet generation at 9 percent. Notably, even the youngest generation, whose members automatically obtain Estonian citizenship if their parents are stateless permanent residents of Estonia, experienced a slight decline (1.5 percent).

It is important to note that all generations of Russian descent have decreased in size over 20 years, likely due to emigration. Changes in national self-identification among some individuals cannot be ruled out, either. Considering these factors, the renunciation of Estonian citizenship in the post-Soviet generation drops to about five percent, and in other generations, the decrease is likely not due to renunciation of Estonian citizenship.

Factors behind integration dynamics

The integration of Russian Estonians has undoubtedly depended on both Estonia's integration policy and Estonia's broader success story. However, as Ilmar Raag points out, for the Russian-speaking community in Estonia, integration means choosing between the Estonian and Russian identity narratives. Putin's identity politics might be a stronger factor than Estonia's integration policy and economic success combined.

When it comes to the integration of non-ethnic Estonians throughout the entire history since Estonia's re-independence, it can be observed that integration was most active when Russia was relatively chaotic both economically and socially, while Estonia was developing rapidly in all areas – namely, in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was also a time when Russians had little to be proud of – the Soviet Union had collapsed, the project of communism had failed, and the horrific crimes of totalitarianism had been exposed to the public.

Integration was most active when Russia was relatively chaotic both economically and socially, while Estonia was developing rapidly in all areas – namely, in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The turning point came around 2004 when Putin began transforming the victory in World War II into a grand historical act of heroism for the Russian people. This was also the time when Putin's identity politics began to stir around the Bronze Soldier in Estonia. The consequences of this for the integration of the Russian-speaking community fully manifested between the 2011 and 2021 censuses, during which a significant increase in the acquisition of Russian citizenship in younger generations, along with some renunciation of Estonian citizenship, could be observed.

The effects of the war in Ukraine are presently difficult to gauge. Reportedly, there are people seeking to renounce their Russian citizenship, which is not possible under the current circumstances. Among those aged under 50, the number of people with Russian citizenship had not changed by the beginning of 2023. However, some insight is provided by the latest integration monitoring survey.

Integration monitoring data

Traditionally, Estonian integration monitoring has considered citizenship as an indicator of integration. However, the latest 2023 monitoring survey hypothesizes that neither citizenship nor language proficiency accurately reflects the degree of integration, as there are many individuals with Estonian citizenship among the Russian-speaking community who are quite critical of Estonia. The monitoring refers to this group as "weakly integrated, critical, and active." According to the survey, they account for 15 percent, and 60 percent of the group are Estonian citizens, with a higher than average proportion of people with higher education and women in this cluster.

Alongside, there is a considerable number of locally integrated individuals who are satisfied with Estonia, even if they do not speak Estonian. The survey calls them "locally integrated patriots," omitting what kind of patriots they are. This cluster covered 23 percent of the respondents, with a higher proportion in East-Viru County. 26 percent of them have Russian citizenship, 20 percent are stateless, and 37 percent are Estonian citizens.

It is quite certain that obtaining honest opinions from Russian-speaking individuals about their sentiments during the war in Ukraine is difficult, especially if the person has Russian citizenship, as those with views against the state could be deported to Russia. In this regard, people with Estonian citizenship find it easier to express their views, as deportation is not a direct risk for them.

It is quite certain that obtaining honest opinions from Estonian Russian-speaking individuals about their sentiments during the war in Ukraine is difficult, especially if the person has Russian citizenship, as those with views against the state could be deported to Russia.

Therefore, the dynamics of fear might explain why a large portion of Russian citizens and stateless persons appeared generally more positive towards Estonia in the integration monitoring survey than some well-educated Estonian citizens of Russian descent with good Estonian language skills. However, the positive sentiment displayed to researchers could be as far removed from actual sentiment as day is from night.

The latest monitoring survey likely paints an unrealistically rosy picture of the integration of the Russian-speaking community.

Hence, the latest monitoring survey likely paints an unrealistically rosy picture of the integration of the Russian-speaking community. It is highly probable that the so-called "locally integrated patriots" are largely as critical internally as the 15 percent, the "weakly integrated, critical, and active." And together with the cluster of "unintegrated passively opposing" individuals (28 percent), the proportion of dissatisfied and oppositional individuals among the Russian-speaking community is currently 66 percent, or two-thirds.

The future of integration depends on the fate of Russia

Summarizing the impact of Putin's rule's on the integration of the Russian-speaking community, the direct and stark conclusion is that it has hindered integration and increased the proportion of people identifying with Russia in all younger generations to such an extent that it has almost compensated for the Soviet-identified Stalin-era and post-war generations passing away.

Although the younger generations of the community have improved their Estonian language skills, the acquisition of Estonian citizenship has ceased and even turned into more Estonian citizenships being renounced. Meanwhile, the acquisition of Russian citizenship has shown consistent growth over the last 20 years.

Although the younger generations of the community have improved their Estonian language skills, the acquisition of Estonian citizenship has ceased and even turned into more Estonian citizenships being renounced.

The integration of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia thus largely depends on the fate of Putin and Russia. If Putin achieves his goals, even partially, and there is no purge in Russia due to the war in Ukraine, we can expect to see a continuation of increasing opposition in Estonia, intensifying further in response to any stringent policies Estonia might adopt towards its Russian-speaking residents. Temporarily removing the right to vote may not yield the desired result.

A meaningful shift in integration may only arise if the war in Ukraine triggers a reevaluation in Russia akin to that caused by the Soviet Union's collapse—when a dialogue emerges on the war's immorality and its grievous toll on both Russia and Ukraine, essentially putting the Russian chauvinistic and imperialist identity into crisis. Whether and when this will happen is currently impossible to predict.