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- If Estonia were to end up in a war, it would happen like in World War I or II – regardless of our ow
- A hybrid attack is not some silver bullet for the adversary that will crush us immediately.
- We must prepare for the worst and hope for the best.
Bloomberg has been hard at work on threatening with war. Edward Lucas, through Delfi, tries to alleviate the tension caused by such articles, but we'd also like to add some thoughts, security expert Ilmar Raag (The Right) writes.
The first and most important thought is this: as things stand today, we are engaging in thought experiments stemming from our inability to stop Russia's aggression in Ukraine. We are therefore projecting our fears further afield, although Russia does not yet seem to have the strength to expand the war. For this reason, let's approach Bloomberg and others with reasonable skepticism.
Myth 1 – Russia will attack Estonia. As the analysis cited by Bloomberg also points out, Russia is absolutely not interested in what Estonia's comments are. This was evident already from a study from years ago of the scale of Russian information operations, which showed that Russia is primarily focused on confronting major powers. Figuratively speaking, for every 1,000 information attacks aimed at a country like Germany, Estonia receives about two or three. Also, all plausible scenarios describing a potential war in the Baltic states tend to begin outside of Estonia. The gloomier conclusion from this myth is that if Estonia were to end up in a war, it would happen like in World War I or II – regardless of Estonia's will. Even if Estonia were neutral, as it was before World War II, that would not save us if somewhere else in the world powerful men lose their grip on reason.
Myth 2 – Russia could quickly seize Toompea or Narva with an airborne assault and then implement a Crimea-style scenario, with Estonia unable to do anything.
This scenario is flawed primarily because the events in Crimea in 2014 have been misinterpreted. The most crucial aspect of what happened in Crimea was that, by the time the media published images of the «little green men,» Russia already had nearly ten times more troops in Crimea than Ukraine did. Estimates suggest that Russia had between 20,000 and 25,000 soldiers there. At the same time, Ukraine had only about 5,000 combat-ready troops across its entire armed forces. This means that, from a military standpoint, an attack was not particularly meaningful.
The Russians had arrived in Crimea thanks to the naval base treaty, so that in addition to the permitted standing Russian contingent, some 10,000 additional troops had arrived as part of an exercise. Such a number cannot be brought into Estonia so unnoticed. Instead, in our region, a hybrid attack is defined as a rapid operation by a battalion or, in extreme cases, a brigade.
«Even if some kind of airborne operation or diversionary attack managed to seize, say, Toompea, it would by no means signal the end of the war in Estonia.»
Since 2014, variations of the Crimea scenario have been played out everywhere around the world. This has also been done in Estonia. The most crucial point of choice lies in the use of time. If the government knows that it can isolate a potential hybrid seizure of territory, it can also freeze the conflict, as is usually done in a hostage crisis. However, if a hybrid seizure cannot be isolated and it can be assumed that the hybrid attackers can constantly resupply themselves from across the border, then it is better to counter-attack immediately, because there is nothing to lose. This is precisely the argument used today to criticize Ukraine's actions in 2014 in Donbas, where they rather tried to negotiate with Russian special forces and wasted too much time. (This is not my argument, and let's not dwell on it here.)
Therefore, even if some kind of airborne operation or diversionary attack managed to seize, say, Toompea, it would by no means signal the end of the war in Estonia – rather, it would mark the beginning. At least according to the DNA of the Kaitseliit, we will fight anyone attempting a coup, no matter what. Such an order would be imperative for me too. A hybrid attack is, by nature, a bluff – the adversary tries to convince us not to escalate and to accept the situation, while in reality, they themselves are not prepared to escalate either. In response to the adversary's bluff, we impose a dilemma: we force them to choose between a full-scale war with NATO or pulling back. And this must be stated clearly in advance: we can no longer be defeated easily.
Models of hybrid attack have indicated in the past that there will be attempts to use some kind of local fifth column in any case, even if it is not yet organized today. This, in turn, means that even in the case of a small and modest hybrid attack, we have to go through a chaos in which, in the meantime, nobody understands anything. The most important thing is that, as things stand today, Estonia is still capable of coming out of a hybrid attack alive in the end. Therefore, a hybrid attack is not some silver bullet for the adversary that will crush us immediately. We are ready for it.
Myth 3 – The root cause of Russian attacks is NATO expansion. This is false. While confrontation with the West is certainly a source of sleepless nights for the Kremlin, if Russia were to move forward with any real war plans, it would have no other option than to rely on the empire-minded minority within the local Russian-speaking community. According to FSB internal documents, even just eight percent of the population's support would be sufficient.
This, however, means that, in addition to the demand for NATO's expulsion, the main political demands would concern the situation of the Russian minority in the Baltic states. Just listen to what Lavrov or Zakharova say. If you look at how the Russification policy is being implemented, for example, in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where the Russian population was in the minority before the war, it is essentially impossible that Russia would try to establish some kind of occupation regime in the Baltic states without this entailing an improvement in the position of Russians in society.
«In real terms, Russia's political program in the Baltic states would revolve around Russification.»
At the very least, this means amending the Citizenship Act, amending the Language Act to make Russian an official language, restoring Russian-language education and giving the Orthodox Church preferential treatment over other denominations. Therefore, in real terms, Russia's political program in the Baltic states would revolve around Russification, because Russia is a rather extreme nationalist state as it stands today. This point must also be at the center of our internal reflection.
Myth 4 – Estonia would have no chance against Russia in battles on Estonian soil. This is not true, and has been demonstrated by the Ukrainians, who at the beginning of the war often had weaker weapons than we have today. Yet they stopped the Russian war machine. Primarily, this opinion arises from the unrealistic assumption that Russia would put all its tanks and all its artillery into action against Estonia.
This is highly unrealistic, and in addition, Estonia's terrain plays in our favor – it is not suited for the conduct of warfare with heavy machinery, nor even significantly for drone warfare. Figuratively speaking – just because there's a single road through the forest doesn't mean the Russians could push an entire division through it at once. In the end, they'd still have to move one after another. Estonia's only truly serious problem is supply over the sea.
And finally, let me repeat the main point. All this talk about Russia launching a continuation war westward is currently somewhat driven by political trends. With the upcoming NATO summit, it's simply fashionable to talk about it, but in reality, the situation hasn't actually worsened. I understand my thoughts have been a bit scattered as well, so I'll sum it up in one sentence – we must prepare for the worst and hope for the best.