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- The Baltic Defense Line must be visible to the adversary.
- A defensive line completed in peacetime deters and buys time.
- Building it at the last moment can render the entire defense line meaningless.
If, in the coming months, someone comes forward to explain to the public that the construction of the Baltic Defense Line is being delayed so that the adversary cannot see where it is to be built, it is very likely a political smokescreen lacking military logic, editor Meelis Oidsalu writes.
When there was a discussion once again in the media in March on whether Estonia had fallen behind with ammunition procurements and the construction of the Baltic Defense Line, Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur responded not with an answer but with a question: should the public really know the locations of the future defense line and its strongpoints? This was likely a rhetorical counter to critics from a politician under pressure, because from the standpoint of military logic, it is in our own security interest that most of our future defense line is visible to the adversary.
The defensive lines that have emerged along the front line between Ukraine and Russia are visible from satellite imagery. The same will be true for the obstacles to be constructed in Estonia. Wartime additions and obstruction measures to be added to the positions built during peacetime will certainly not be disclosed to the public – doing so would be unwise. However, it is neither possible nor necessary to conceal the main parts of the defensive line or its strongpoints.
Even if the adversary manages to destroy the barrier by firing at it, it will take time – and time is costly. This logic of obstruction is borne out by the practice of the war in Ukraine.
The purpose of defensive lines and obstacles is not so much to stop the enemy, but rather to turn the adversary into a target. Delay, redirect, expose – this is the tactical logic also behind the defensive line Estonia is about to build. If the adversary knows that, for instance, the most easily traversable areas in Southeast Estonia are protected by strong obstacles, they face a choice: either bring in heavy machinery and start removing the obstacles – thereby becoming a slow, stationary target – or redirect their forces elsewhere, to an unhindered area where the terrain is swampy or impassable for other reasons, or movement is even slower. There too, they become a target. We must choose where we want to fight, and a visible obstacle imposes our military will on the adversary.
An obstacle is not just a physical barrier, but a strategic lever. Some obstacles and positions are deliberately built at the last moment. The dragon's teeth, or anti-tank obstacles, are difficult to move, but they are also tools that can be deployed not only for permanent defense but also as part of operational preparation, as can mines. Even if the adversary manages to destroy the barrier by firing at it, it will take time – and time is costly. This logic of obstruction is borne out by the practice of the war in Ukraine.
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Since a defensive line is one of the cheapest ways to increase the cost of attack for the adversary, it is a time-critical development that makes sense to build as much as possible during peacetime. Anything that Estonia cannot do in a week or two should be completed in the near future.
The Baltic states are small in terms of territory, and an enemy could reach deep into the interior within a matter of hours if there are no pre-constructed barriers waiting at the borders. Even if clear warning signs emerge, political considerations may delay the construction of obstacles and the partial mobilization required for it until the very last moment, in order to avoid creating the impression of a so-called provocation.
Furthermore, when construction is rushed, quality tends to suffer: for example, trenches may be dug too shallow or left vulnerable to drone attacks. Any defensive line is only as strong as its weakest link – if there is a gap somewhere, the attacker will find it. Building at the last minute can leave such gaps.
Any defensive line is only as strong as its weakest link – if there is a gap somewhere, the attacker will find it. Building at the last minute can leave such gaps.
Historical cases also show that the early establishment of defensive lines can give a country a critical advantage. For example, Finland, thanks to its fortifications, managed to negotiate a better peace treaty; the Soviet defense at Kursk crushed the German attack. However, the mere existence of a defensive line doesn't guarantee victory. Similarly, no defensive line can protect on its own.
For the Baltic Defense Line to function, a lot of firepower will be needed, because – once again – an obstacle turns the adversary into a target, and that target needs to be destroyed with something. Static defense must be comprehensive (covering a sufficiently large section of the front) and supported by motivated fighters.
Delays in construction can completely nullify the effectiveness of a defensive line. A historical example of this is the so-called Molotov Line, which the Soviet Union began hastily building in 1940–1941 after shifting its western border by seizing territory from Poland and occupying the Baltic states. The Molotov Line was intended to replace the earlier Stalin Line (which followed the former border), but construction was never completed. When Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, many of the Molotov Line's fortifications were still unfinished or unmanned and offered little resistance to the advancing Wehrmacht.
The advance of German troops in the Soviet Union's border zone was therefore extremely rapid – many outposts were defeated in days. Historians estimate that only 15 percent of the planned strongpoints were completed before the war.
It is quite certain that «bunker tourism» will emerge along the entire length of the planned Baltic Defense Line, driven by both journalistic and other interests.
Ukraine's experience shows that if a defense line is not visible and tangible, the adversary may underestimate the country's defensive capabilities, and such a sense of superiority can make the decision to launch aggression easier.
It is quite certain that «bunker tourism» will emerge along the entire length of the planned Baltic Defense Line, driven by both journalistic and other interests. This must be accepted, just as we must get used to the fact that the adversary can observe our structures via satellite imagery. Furthermore, the defense forces are expected to develop force protection principles to ensure, before raising defense readiness, that the defense line has not been sabotaged or, for example, mined.
Citing operational security as a reason for delays in building the key strongpoints of the Baltic Defense Line is a political smokescreen lacking military logic.