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- Support for the war is high.
- Economic problems are deepening.
- Even those who favor peace want Russia to win.
Russians may want the war to continue, but they are not willing to fight it themselves, columnist Andrey Kuzichkin writes.
Journalists report that during talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations held in Istanbul on May 16, Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky asked the other side: «We fought Sweden for 21 years. But how long are you prepared to fight?» Given Medinsky's and his boss Putin's tendency to make historical analogies, it is quite plausible the question was indeed asked.
The question is how valid the comparison is between the Great Northern War, fought between Sweden and Russia from 1700–1721, and the Russia-Ukraine war that began on February 24, 2022.
The devil is in the details. But this member of Putin's inner circle (ah, the immortal novel «The Master and Margarita»!) did not advise his friend Medinsky to mention that in the Great Northern War, Russia had allies such as Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, Saxony, Prussia, Hanover and several others. As of today, Russia has only one military ally – North Korea.
More importantly, during the 21-year Great Northern War, Russia suffered 120,000 dead and wounded. In just over three years of the war in Ukraine, Russian military losses have exceeded one million. If that figure is projected over 21 years, Russia could lose at least seven million people. Is the country prepared for such losses? And does Russian society really want the war to continue?
War and peace in Russian public opinion
It is difficult to get a clear and accurate picture of what is happening in Russian society. But some insight can be gained from the Levada Center's surveys, even though it has been declared a foreign agent in Russia. It is the only sociological institution in the country that can be trusted, within limits, given the full control exercised by the security services over such organizations.
One must also bear in mind that Russians are reluctant to speak candidly with sociologists, whom most citizens believe have an FSB agent behind them. But no other reliable, publicly accessible sources exist.
According to a Levada Center poll from April, Russians' greatest fears are illness in their children and loved ones (51 percent), war (48 percent), and old age and poverty (26 percent). Russians still closely follow developments in Ukraine, but interest has declined to 49 percent this year. Among youth (ages 18–24), 35 percent are interested in the war in Ukraine; among seniors (over 55), it is 65 percent.
Russian citizens' support for the «special military operation,» has not changed significantly – 75 percent of Russians support it, while 15 percent do not. Among youth, support stands at 66 percent; among seniors, 82 percent. At the same time, 61 percent of respondents support ending hostilities and starting peace talks, while 30 percent favor continuing the war. Among those supporting continuation, 40 percent are men, 23 percent women, 40 percent seniors, and 18 percent young and middle-aged adults (ages 25–39).
The balance between supporters of war and peace depends significantly on the size of the settlement where the survey is conducted. Moscow is the most pro-war large city – 46 percent support war, and 47 percent support peace. In cities with more than 500,000 residents, 31 percent favor war, and 60 percent favor peace. In small towns with fewer than 100,000 people, 25 percent support war and 66 percent peace. In rural areas, 28 percent support continued war, while 62 percent support peace talks.
Among people with higher education, 32 percent support war and 58 percent peace. Among those with secondary or lower education, 21 percent support war and 70 percent peace.
The balance between supporters of war and peace depends significantly on the size of the settlement where the survey is conducted.
The divide between views on the benefits and harms of the war in Ukraine is also stark: 40 percent say the war has been harmful, 33 percent beneficial. In Moscow, 37 percent of respondents see harm and the same percentage see benefit. In rural areas, 43 percent see the war as harmful and 28 percent as beneficial.
Nearly 30 percent refused to evaluate the war's outcomes. Those who believe the war benefits Russia cite «expansion / reclaiming territory / new regions» (30 percent), «liberating / rescuing / protecting people» (16 percent), or «boosting the economy» (15 percent). Those who believe the war has harmed Russia most often cite «human losses / high death toll» (73 percent) and «economic decline / inflation / falling living standards» (19 percent).
A composite portrait of the average war supporter would be a man over 55 with higher education living in Moscow or a major city. The average peace supporter would be a woman aged 18–24 with a secondary education living in a small town or village. At the same time, 80 percent of those who support peace negotiations and a peace treaty are convinced the war must end in a Russian victory and Ukrainian capitulation.
War resources dwindle, public patience holds
Russia's ability to sustain the war economically is weaker than its society's capacity to endure hardship and life struggles.
Russia's fiscal and economic situation is clearly worsening. This is despite bold claims from Putin, his ministers, and Kremlin-affiliated political scientists and economists about stable GDP growth, successful import substitution, and the minimal impact of Western sanctions on life in Russia.
From January to April 2025, the federal budget deficit was 3.2 trillion rubles, or 36 billion euros (at an exchange rate of 90 rubles per euro). That is 22 billion euros more than in the same period last year.
According to the Russian government, the sharp rise in the deficit is due to declining energy export revenues. Falling global oil prices, Russian companies' logistical and payment issues in oil and gas trade, and Western sanctions have weakened the Putin regime's ability to sustain its war.
In the first quarter of this year, Russia's economic growth rate halved, prompting Putin to admit that «the economy has begun a soft landing.»
The defense industry sector, run by businessmen close to Putin and funded directly by the state, is doing well. But the civilian sector has entered a state of stagnation.
The problems in Russia's economy are more tangible at the regional level than the federal one. For example, in Udmurtia, where defense industries are located, the economy grew 38 percent last year. But in the Kemerovo region, which is Russia's main coal supplier, the economy shrank 15 percent due to a sharp drop in coal demand both domestically and globally.
Many regions are being forced to increase payouts to contract soldiers sent to fight in Ukraine. For example, in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in northern Russia, a contract soldier receives a one-time payment of 60,000 euros.
Russian regions are also required to help rebuild war-torn areas of Donbas that Russia has annexed. To do this, local governments must take out bank loans at 30 percent annual interest. In 2025, regional government debt will reach 32 billion euros. There is money for Donbas, but not for local communities' own urgent needs.
The problems in Russia's economy are more tangible at the regional level than the federal one.
As a result, infrastructure is deteriorating in many regions: bridges collapse, roads crumble, public transport systems break down, and more hospitals and schools are in need of major repairs. In my home region of Tomsk, as of May 2025, 30 percent of residences lack central heating or sewage.
The average monthly wage in Russia has risen to 1,000 euros in 2025. Adjusted for 10 percent inflation, real wages have grown 2 percent. But the cost of living continues to rise. Since last year, the price of butter has gone up 36 percent, fruit and vegetables 25 percent, and dairy products 30 percent. This year, the price of potatoes, a staple in Russian diets, has nearly tripled.
The price surge continues, purchasing power is falling, and Russian debt is rising. 50 million Russians are in debt, with total loans and microloans amounting to 25 billion euros. Utility prices rose 10 percent last year and will increase by another 11 percent this year. Russian household utility debts total 8.6 billion euros; including debts of associations, the figure rises to 16 billion euros.
Yet surveys show only 10 percent of Russians are willing to protest over economic demands. No one raises political demands. Putin's propaganda has done its job: Russian society has effectively become zombified, dominated by the belief that all enemies – external (the West, Ukraine) and internal (the still-surviving liberals, LGBT people, anti-war intellectuals) – must be defeated.
Narratives about Russian greatness, a fortress under siege, and a war lasting to victory have permeated all levels of Russian society via propaganda channels. Infants are dressed in military uniforms, nuns weave camouflage nets for the front, children recite poems on Red Square with lines like «I am Russian and will tear the enemy apart with my teeth.» Veterans of the so-called special military operation sing in church choirs, hold leadership roles in government bodies, and become school principals and members of parliament.
The militarization of consciousness during the war years has brought qualitative changes to Russians' mentality. Most have adapted to the daily reality of war. It is like the body adjusting to an illness – provided that it does not die, of course.
There is latent protest, but it no longer turns into action in the streets. Anti-war activists only remain on social media. At the same time, Russia has few true war fanatics – no one is storming enlistment offices or demanding to be sent to Ukraine. But many prison colonies are empty and even closing because all inmates have been sent to the trenches in Donbas.
Still, the prolonged war is affecting Russians' core values in ways the Kremlin did not intend. Paradoxically, Putin's popularity and the perception of his power as unshakable are starting to erode. For instance, anonymous open polls show that only 61.7 percent of Russians would vote for Putin in a presidential election next Sunday. Just over a year ago, he officially received 87.3 percent of the vote.
Clearly, Putin fatigue is linked to his failure to clearly articulate the goals of the war in Ukraine and a timeline for ending the campaign. Yet people tolerate Putin as one tolerates a terminal illness.
The war can be stopped with sanctions and bombs
When Medinsky said Russia could fight for 21 years, he was both right and wrong. He is right that Russia has the resources for a prolonged war. But he is wrong to underestimate the power of Western sanctions to exhaust those resources. Medinsky has simply forgotten Hegel's law of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative ones: if not the 17th, then the 18th or 19th sanctions package may collapse Russia's war economy.
Medinsky is also right that Russians are willing to let the war continue. But they are not willing to fight it themselves. So, if the war reaches not just Kursk and Belgorod, but every Russian household in the form of mobilization, a death notice for a father, husband or son, a drone flying through the window or a bomb falling on the roof, Russian society may sober up quickly from its patriotic intoxication and demand peace at any cost.