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- A law enforcement operation is a more reasonable approach for detaining a shadow fleet vessel.
- Was the merger of the Police and Border Guard Board's fleet with the Navy the right decision?
- AgustaWestland helicopters have not shown themselves in a good light under Estonian conditions.
On Tuesday evening, the Estonian Navy carried out an operation in our exclusive economic zone against the tanker Jaguar, which was sailing under the flag of Gabon. Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur has stated publicly that Estonia's primary objective was to ensure the safety of underwater infrastructure, which was successfully achieved, and that the tanker was escorted out of our economic waters.
Of course, it was a vessel belonging to Russia's shadow fleet, from which anything can be expected, and Estonia's reaction was necessary. But was our real goal to detain the ship, as was done in April with the tanker Kiwala, or was the aim merely to scare the Jaguar away from our waters?
We may never know the true objective of the operation, but if we intended to detain the tanker and failed, this is something for Estonian authorities to reflect on. The course of the war in Ukraine has shown that Russia is capable of learning, and it is equally capable when it comes to conducting hybrid operations and protecting its shadow fleet. The first time, Estonia succeeded in detaining the ship because we had the element of surprise: Estonia had enough confidence, political will, and technical capability to carry it out. This time, they were already prepared for our move.
We need to ask critical questions about our decisions on strategic maritime operations capabilities. One conclusion is that we probably need new helicopters.
Postimees believes that we too must learn and avoid resting on our laurels. And our lessons are not merely of a tactical nature, such as how to better conduct a vessel detention operation at sea. We must also ask critical questions about our strategic decisions.
First of all, was the decision to merge the former Navy and Police and Border Guard fleets under the Navy the right one? For several reasons, a law enforcement operation is a more appropriate option for detaining a shadow fleet vessel than a military one – both in terms of public perception and the nature of the required training. Currently, the police do not have vessels of their own, and the entire chain of command for such operations remains somewhat unclear.
This raises the related question of whether our Navy needs to buy new large ships at all. A powerful multi-purpose fleet is something that small Estonia can never afford, and the Ukrainian experience shows that innovative and relatively cheap sea drones are good against a more powerful adversary, if we add to this our already existing coastal defense. One or two battleships would be expensive yet easy targets, unlike hundreds of sea drones.
Our second strategic question concerns what kind of additional maritime law enforcement capabilities we need. Between 2007 and 2011, Estonia's Police and Border Guard Board acquired three Italian-made AgustaWestland AW139 helicopters for its aviation unit. In the first public procurement, the requirement was to select a European manufacturer offering the best price, which excluded, for example, the offering of American manufacturer Sikorsky. As a result, the remaining two helicopters were also purchased from the Italian manufacturer. Unfortunately, these helicopters have not shown themselves in a good light under Estonian conditions, and there have been times when none of them were airworthy.
In Postimees' opinion, it is time for Estonia to get out of the helicopter model trap.
* An allusion to Estonia's national epic, Kalevipoeg, in which the Hedgehog character suggests to the hero that he hit the enemies with boards of lumber edgewise, rather than flat.