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- Estonia must be prepared to take part in a mission to Ukraine alongside its European allies.
- Credible deterrence has always been a cornerstone of Estonia's (and NATO's) defense policy.
- Estonia must not give up its voice while Europe is undergoing such a transformative era.
Which Estonia do you think Putin would be more likely to attack – one that announces it will not send its troops to Ukraine because it is afraid of the Russians, or one that considers doing so self-evident? That is the question posed by Reform Party MP Eerik-Niiles Kross.
Estonia's participation in a European peacekeeping, peace-monitoring, or even military mission in Ukraine would not «multiply the risk» of Estonia being drawn into a military conflict (as Lauri Läänemets claimed) but would significantly reduce that risk.
Even more absurd is Martin Helme's claim that if Estonia joined a European peacekeeping mission, then «we would be starting a war with Russia, a war we are not even capable of fighting, let alone winning,» and that «we would be helping to trigger a NATO–Russia war, and thus a third world war.»
I do not intend to question that both Läänemets and Helme are motivated by a desire to protect Estonia's independence and to prevent a hypothetical attack, which they believe would become more likely if Estonia sent troops to Ukraine following a peace agreement. This position may be understandable psychologically or even politically – it may feel instinctively correct, but it is fundamentally wrong.
Credible deterrence has always been a a cornerstone of Estonia's (and NATO's) defense policy. The idea of deterrence is to constantly convince a potential aggressor that a military attack against us is doomed to fail; that our response would be so damaging that the risk would not be worth taking.
The United States' strategic pivot shifting the center of its security focus from Europe to Southeast Asia has forced Europe to rethink its security policy with increasing urgency. The question of how quickly Europe can rearm to defend itself in the worst-case scenario without the United States, or in the best-case with much less US involvement, requires a quick answer. Not only do Europeans need that answer, the Kremlin is watching closely as well.
Of course the Russians dislike the idea of a coalition of the willing and a stronger Europe, but the United States views this as a precondition for continuing to help defend us.
In the best-case scenario, Europe will pull itself together and gradually replace US capabilities allocated for European defense with its own. NATO has been built over decades around US command systems. European NATO depends heavily on the physical presence of over 100,000 US troops, logistics, communications systems, intelligence capabilities, command structures, pre-positioned equipment and weaponry, and, of course, nuclear weapons. Whether and how much this presence and support will decrease remains unknown, but planning must proceed based on the assumption that it will. The largest reduction is expected to be in physical presence, both troops and weapons systems.
NATO planning structures, and above all the governments of its member states, are now working to find a new balance. Europe's contribution and involvement in its own defense must grow, as US involvement decreases. President Trump has effectively set a measurable target: if European NATO members allocate at least five percent of GDP to defense spending going forward, that will close the gap left by the United States and ensure continued US support.
For the time being, achieving five percent across European NATO may not be easy, but the direction is beginning to emerge through the fog of war. Russia has already protested against «European militarization». «Europe has chosen the path of militarization and become a war party,» the Kremlin said at the end of March when the coalition of the willing met in London to plan support for Ukraine. In short – the Russians obviously dislike the coalition of the willing and a stronger Europe, but the US considers it a requirement for its continued participation in our defense.
A critical period – Europe is searching for a new balance
Does strengthening Europe's defense in such a situation increase or decrease the risk of war?
What increases the risk of war is hesitation and displays of weakness. The risk rises when people say «the great powers will settle things among themselves anyway» or «we must not provoke the Russians». These are signals that tell the Kremlin: the Europeans have lost their nerve, and intimidation works.
The planned peacekeeping mission to Ukraine is largely part of deterrence. At this point, the planning process itself is more important than the outcome (except in the case that the process ends in an admission of weakness).
The British- and French-led process in which Europe is assessing its ability to mobilize military force to help secure peace in Ukraine (which will inevitably come one day) is also a process through which Europe is regaining its independent defense capability and becoming a geopolitical power center again. This is the first time since World War II that Europe has initiated a global security effort without first seeking US approval and without US leadership or direct involvement.
If what is now happening in Europe is seen as a search for a new balance of power between the United States, Europe, and Russia, then it is a process through which Europe is seeking new weight, new roles, and new strength. If this ends in capitulation and the conclusion that we cannot cope, the danger will rise sharply, not just for Estonia, but for all of Europe.
A new balance in NATO, where Europe plays a much larger role and asserts itself, is of absolute existential importance for Estonia. ... If Europe fails here, the future of NATO is deeply in question.
Estonia's national security policy framework describes the country's stance – as a contributor to security, not merely a consumer – as follows: «Estonia supports close and results-oriented cooperation between NATO and the European Union. In maintaining and developing union and alliance relations, we aim to be at the core of decision-making by fulfilling our obligations and contributing to security in various regions around the world.»
If the United States' strategic withdrawal from Europe leaves a vacuum that Europe cannot fill, someone else will.
A new balance in NATO, where Europe plays a much larger role and asserts itself, is of absolute existential importance for Estonia. Estonia cannot afford failure in achieving this balance. If Europe fails here, the future of NATO is deeply in question.
Estonia must not abandon an active role!
Of course Estonia is doing its part as a country. Our defense spending will rise above five percent of GDP next year, our independent defense capability is growing, and our society proves every day that Estonians are ready. In our current situation, only a well-armed, confident country that is prepared to defend itself provides credible deterrence. In addition to deterring Russia, we must also convince the world every day that any attack on Estonia will inevitably lead to war and that is why coming to our «aid» is unavoidable. By the way, this term «coming to our aid» is quite misleading. It signals helplessness. This is not about coming to our aid, but about activating long-agreed and well-rehearsed joint defense plans, in which our and our allies' roles have already been defined.
In much of Western Europe, this is not self-evident. In the muscle memory of Germans and Italians, there is still no automatic reflex that an attack must be met with an immediate and forceful response. That mindset is only beginning to take hold. The primary training ground for that mindset is the planning process for the Ukraine peacekeeping coalition of the willing.
The coalition of the willing (perhaps alongside the JEF) is currently the only process shaping the security architecture of the new NATO. This is where national positions are being clarified and a new world is taking shape. If Estonia chose to stay out of this process, effectively leaving NATO's future for others to decide, it would be the worst possible signal we could send to the Kremlin.
By the way, this term «coming to our aid» is quite misleading. ... This is not about coming to our aid, but about activating long-agreed and well-rehearsed joint defense plans, in which our and our allies' roles have already been defined.
If we expect and almost demand that our European allies «must come to our aid», we must first demonstrate our own readiness to contribute. Why should the British, French, and Germans go keep the peace in Ukraine, if we do not? Because they are bigger? Because it somehow matters more to them than to us? Because their soldiers' lives are less valuable than ours?
If we expect and demand that the new NATO balance should respect and defend our interests and independence, then the worst thing we could do would be to step back from playing an active role in shaping that balance.
In short – Estonia must, of course, be ready to go on a mission to Ukraine with its European allies, if such a mission is launched. By the way, contrary to Helme's claims, such a mission will certainly not violate any peace or ceasefire agreements.
The claim (such as the recent article by Erkki Bahovski in Postimees) that we cannot decide before we know exactly what the mission will be, falls into the same category of hiding. By taking part in the coalition of the willing now, we are shaping the mission together with our allies – its terms, its roles, and its goals.
Deterrence will only be credible, and the risk of war will only decrease, if Estonia unequivocally demonstrates that we are ready to contribute in the new NATO, in Ukraine, and in the defense of our own country. Only then will Europe's chances of success grow. So again: which Estonia do you think Putin would be more likely to attack – one that declares it will not send its men to Ukraine because it is afraid of the Russians, or one that does so without hesitation?