ERKKI KOORT ⟩ Putin can't help but go too far again

Vladimir Putin has relished the US president's naivety towards him, but his overconfidence and misdirection can backfire painfully. In the photo: Putin speaking at the 2024 year-end meeting with the press. Photo: Alexey Pavlishak

• Russia has managed to reduce isolation.
• Moscow is trying to keep the US engaged in the process through misdirection.
• Over-strategizing works to the Kremlin's disadvantage.

Russia has been able to return to world politics, and this opportunity was offered to it by the change of power in the US. Despite the opened opportunity, the Kremlin is once again overdoing it, Erkki Koort, security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, writes.

When the war in Ukraine became a large-scale aggression in 2022, Russia found itself largely isolated. In March and April, the stories in the news were mostly about President Putin or Foreign Minister Lavrov discussing the situation and cooperation with the rulers of some of the states they themselves had created, such as Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The ruler of Belarus remained loyal, and the Central Asian countries also returned after the initial shock, albeit cautiously. True, the German chancellor and the president of France also called. But things weren't going well.

Central Asia had also been shocked by the deployment of Russian troops to Kazakhstan (although at the latter's request) and the countries there were anxious about the future actions of these troops. The troops were quickly withdrawn, but the anxiety remained because most of these countries belonged to the CIS, and previously Ukraine, too, used to have a representative at that table. At these meetings, Putin would boast about bombing Kyiv, inevitably raising the question of who might be next. After all, the paratroopers left Kazakhstan quickly in January 2022 only because the invasion of Ukraine was imminent and they were needed to capture Hostomel airport.

Decreasing clout

Russia's influence decreased in Central Asia, as well as in the Caucasus (excluding Georgia). During the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moscow significantly lost influence over Yerevan but failed to increase it to the same extent over Baku. Clearly, the bet was placed on Azerbaijan as the militarily stronger country, but as a result of the wars, Turkey's influence there grew considerably. The most recent incident was the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over Grozny. Although Putin offered a half-hearted apology, this incident has not been conclusively resolved either. In summary, due to Moscow's over-strategizing, its influence diminished both in Baku and Yerevan.

Until Trump came to power, Putin was largely a pariah in the West, and his influence was limited to countries and partnerships in which he mostly did not play the leading role. In relations with Iran, North Korea, China, and India, Putin was more often in the position of a supplicant.

After Trump's rise to power, Russia found itself in a very favorable position, because the pre-election promise of the US president needed to be fulfilled. It seems that Moscow was even somewhat startled by its own good fortune, as all of a sudden it was acceptable again from the perspective of the West's great and leading power.

Despite the rapprochement between the US and Russia, Putin failed to realize that he cannot ignore Trump's wishes indefinitely.

It was also good news for Moscow that Trump and most of his administration were openly hostile towards the Ukrainian president. Encouraged by such good cards, Moscow lost its vigilance.

The first shock came when it became clear that Europe did not align with the US and began to pursue an independent policy supporting Ukraine. In fact, the Kremlin had already been trying to sideline Europe, because even before Trump took office, Putin's closest advisors had expressed a desire to deal only with Washington. The assumption at the time was that Europe would only follow US orders. This was a false assumption.

New promises

Despite the rapprochement between the US and Russia, Putin failed to realize that he cannot ignore Trump's wishes indefinitely. Moscow's usual tactic was to make promises, talk about international law, and keep creating the illusion that it was Kyiv who was stalling the process.

Moscow enjoys direct contacts with the White House, and the special envoy for Middle East affairs, Steve Witkoff, is already such a frequent guest in Russia that he has become more like Putin's special envoy for US affairs. Not a lot of information has been divulged to the public about what has been discussed or agreed in these meetings.

It is not entirely clear whether special envoy Steve Witkoff represents the US in Russia or vice versa. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov / via REUTERS

The pope's death did not come at a particularly convenient time for Russia, although his earlier statements had generally aligned with Moscow's position. Pope Francis did not unequivocally condemn the aggression, and his stance tended to see both sides as more or less equally responsible.

Although not too much should be expected from the meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy in Rome, it is nevertheless a development that causes frustration in Moscow. First, the presidents established direct contact, which would not have been possible under normal protocol. Second, Russia was not visible, being represented only at the level of the minister of culture. Third, Russia has continued bombing Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, which seems to have drawn negative attention from the US president.

Moscow enjoys direct contacts with the White House, and the special envoy for Middle East affairs, Steve Witkoff, is already such a frequent guest in Russia that he has become more like Putin's special envoy for US affairs.

Although Russia is still in a favorable position when it comes to Trump's point of view, it seems that overly ignoring the process is potentially backfiring on Putin. This has been recognized in Moscow, as the Kremlin has spoken of the possibility of direct contacts with Kyiv – something that was previously ruled out. Putin also reiterated this when announcing the unilateral ceasefire that will last from May 8 to 10. Of course, this is a form of public deception, because in Russia, ending the war is a greater challenge than continuing it.

Putin needs something to show by May 9. This time, not domestically, but internationally. The expressed willingness to negotiate and the announcement of the ceasefire should not be interpreted as genuine readiness; rather, Moscow has come to understand that in order to keep the US engaged and misdirected, they must show initiative and make new promises. This certainly does not mean a willingness to actually fulfill those promises. However, the Kremlin's master has overdone it a bit with excessive self-confidence and strategizing. The coming week will be crucial in terms of new developments.