MART KULDKEPP ⟩ In troubled times, this is what the Baltic states can rely on

The K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer. Photo: Ain Liiva

• The Baltic states need to admit their past lack of caution.
• We can set an example to others with our will to defend ourselves.
• A Russian threat on another front is possible.

In a changed security environment, where the United States can no longer be regarded as an unconditionally reliable ally, the success story of the Baltic states has begun to waver, historian and columnist Mart Kuldkepp writes.

After February 24, 2022, Russia's neighbors in Eastern Europe could indeed beat their chests and tell the Western world — which had been accusing them of Russophobia since the Soviet collapse — «We told you so!» (Thankfully, this opportunity was not overly abused.) But today, after decades of foreign policy rooted in transatlantic orientation, the Baltic states have little choice but to admit their previous lack of caution, and save whatever can still be saved.

The same, of course, applies to many other European countries, including the United Kingdom, but also Denmark, known for its pro-American leanings, which now finds itself, at least rhetorically, having to confront territorial aggression from the Trump administration.

Meanwhile, France and Germany are emerging as Europe's new security leaders. France never allowed its defense dependence on the United States to deepen to the point where managing the risks would be impossible. Now President Emmanuel Macron has the chance to reap the benefits of a policy long regarded as irrational. Germany, which for years showed passivity on security issues, has in recent weeks surprised with its decisive action, both in terms of funding and setting the necessary political priorities.

Estonia has decided to raise defense spending to five percent of GDP starting next year, with Latvia and Lithuania making similar pledges. Whether this will allow the region to establish the same kind of moral leadership it has held since 2022 regarding support for Ukraine is rather questionable. More likely, the Baltic states' ability to set an example — and deter Russian aggression — will depend on something a bit more abstract, something best described as will to defend themselves.

For Estonia and the other Baltic states, the challenge is not only to deter Russia but also — as so often before — to overcome their allies' skepticism and possible defeatism.

At the same time, readiness to defend oneself is something that, regrettably, seems less deeply rooted in Estonian society than the security situation currently demands. Even keeping society functioning at all through so-called fear-mongering is difficult for politicians — let alone maintaining or increasing their popularity. This is human nature. Let us remember that even on the eve of the War of Independence, many Estonians initially dismissed talk of the Bolshevik threat as unfounded scaremongering — after all, how could a new wave of war and violence follow the collapse of the repressive Russian Empire and a world war that had ended with the victory of the Allied powers defending nations' right to self-determination?

Alongside the United States, many in Western Europe now believe that the Russia-Ukraine war will likely end in something other than the complete defeat of Russia. But unlike the new US leadership's naivety, they are not denying that further Russian aggression elsewhere is possible — even likely. For Estonia and the other Baltic states, the challenge is not only to deter Russia but also — as so often before — to overcome their allies' skepticism and possible defeatism.