MEELIS OIDSALU ⟩ Politicians' missile defense obsession could end up being unreasonably expensive

Meelis Oidsalu, editor of the «Power and Security» section of Fookus. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• During the war, Ukrainians have managed to take down a negligible portion of ballistic missiles.
• A promise was made to ensure Baltic air defense, but the promise has been partially fulfilled.
• Estonia would be able to defend itself to a certain extent against Russian cruise missiles.

With the increase in defense spending, the defense minister's appetite seems to have increased as well: last week he spoke about the acquisition of ballistic missile defense systems, which were previously considered impossibly expensive, for Estonia. The military air defense bubbles to be established for a lot of money are in real life much smaller and less effective than we think, but politicians like trophy capabilities, editor Meelis Oidsalu writes.

Somewhat unexpectedly, last week we could read on the ERR portal that Estonia is planning to acquire a ballistic missile defense system. Madis Hindre's article mentioned the American Patriot, the European SAMP/T, and the Israeli David's Sling, which the Finns preferred to the Patriot, among other things due to the lower missile price.

Previously, defense against ballistic missiles has been mainly discussed by politicians. Estonia 200 branded this capability as Kalevipoeg's Dome in its Riigikogu election program. The population is psychologically particularly sensitive to aerial threats, because the threat lurking in the sky is often not visible, and attacks come from there quickly and unexpectedly, so the promise to protect against such a threat naturally seems like a better deal than it necessarily is.

According to statistics published by Ukraine last fall, their air defense has managed to shoot down only a fraction of Russia’s ballistic missiles. According to Ukrainian media, Iskander M and North Korean Kn 23 short-range ballistic missiles have been shot down in 5 percent of cases. Ukraine has been more successful in defending against some missile types, but on average, one in ten ballistic missiles is shot down. However, this number must be seen in context, as short-range ballistic missiles are widely used in a frontline area where Ukraine does not have Patriot or SAMP/T systems.

According to statistics published by Ukraine last fall, their air defense has managed to shoot down only a fraction of Russia’s ballistic missiles: on average, one in ten ballistic missiles is shot down.

The costs of acquiring, maintaining and – most importantly – replenishing the missile stocks of a ballistic missile defense system are very significant. The acquisition cost of a minimally meaningful system (two batteries, each with 4–8 launchers) is around one billion euros. Added to this are maintenance and ammunition supplies, as the number of missiles included in the initial delivery is usually smaller than the total ammunition requirement.

Even then, a few locations could be protected (e.g. Tallinn, its surroundings and the main arrival point for allied reinforcements), which is of course no small matter in itself. The International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS) stated in its 2018 report on the air defense of the Baltic states that developing a comprehensive layered air defense would be an impossibly expensive undertaking for the Baltic states. In the meantime, the defense budget has grown significantly, but new shortcomings in defense capability have also been revealed in the face of Russia's massive war of attrition in Ukraine, in particular the low firepower and range, for which the 1.6 billion euros allocated last fall should only be half the equation.

German Patriot air defense system securing the Vilnius summit in 2023. Photo: Ints Kalnins

It is easier with Russian cruise missiles and drones with low flight trajectories, the defense forces can take them down with, for example, shoulder-launched Mistral and Piorun anti-aircraft missiles. According to experts, this would require at least a minute's advance warning for the shooter and the weapon would have to be located less than 1.5 kilometers from the cruise missile's route. This is why at one point the Estonian Air Force also developed aerial object notification options for the population.

Combating ballistic missiles is in a completely different league in terms of resources. That is why the rotational model for Baltic air defense announced at the NATO Vilnius summit in 2023 was agreed upon. Last July, a Dutch Patriot unit was in Lithuania for exercises, was integrated with the Lithuanian NASAMS medium-range air defense system, while the Spanish NASAMS medium-range air defense system has been in Ämari, some capable ships have visited the Baltic Sea, but the Baltic states currently do not have an effective and permanent ballistic missile defense, which is also needed to secure the arrival of allied reinforcements.

It is easier with Russian cruise missiles and drones with low flight trajectories, the defense forces can take them down with, for example, shoulder-launched Mistral and Piorun anti-aircraft missiles.

The main effort of NATO allies is currently on the air defense of Ukraine and Poland. Four batteries (each with 4–8 launchers) of Patriot and its European analogue SAMP/T systems have also been sent to Ukraine. Even if one Patriot battery with four launchers was purchased (Estonia currently cannot manage more alongside other needs, including ammunition needs), it would only cover a limited area – for example, if the Tallinn area, Ämari and Paldiski were protected, it would not reach Tapa. It is possible to play up one’s air defense capabilities with deception, but this works at best with aircraft, when the enemy would fear for the pilot's life and take fewer risks.

Foreign aid has played an important role for Israel, which is considered the leader in missile defense. The United States has supported the Arrow-3 ballistic missile defense system program with just under a billion US dollars, and the US has allocated 2.6 billion dollars since 2011 to finance the Iron Dome medium-range air defense system. If a similar funding model were available to the Baltic states, acquiring the capability could be considered, but it must be remembered that Israel's GDP is around a dozen times larger than Estonia's, and they too have needed extensive foreign aid.

In the context of limited resources, it is inevitable that the defense sector, when developing any military or broad-based defense capability, should assess whether the potential benefits and the damage avoided by the defense measure justify the cost and whether it would not be more effective to opt for strengthening an existing capability (indirect fire, deep fire, ammunition) or increasing the size of the wartime defense force instead of developing a new capability.

If we assume that attacks against Estonia will be limited to isolated strikes, then a defense system we can afford could repel them in some selected parts of Estonia with the help of allies and spare the capital, for example, from the worst.

In the case of Estonia, the feasibility of investing in ballistic missile defense depends, among other things, on assumptions about the attack. If we assume that attacks against Estonia will be limited to isolated strikes, then a defense system we can afford could repel them in some selected parts of Estonia with the help of allies and spare the capital, for example, from the worst. However, if an adversary were to launch a nationwide barrage of missiles and drones that is massive, sustained, or arrives in waves, the defense systems would be quickly saturated, leaving the system itself highly vulnerable. It is important that such expensive capability development decisions are made based on their actual pragmatic value, not political emotion.

Kalevipoeg’s Dome proposed by Estonia 200 is also, among other things, a political construct, a mental cathedral. The dome is an uplifting and unifying image, but it is also an illusion, because a comprehensive solution would be beyond the capacity of an economy of Estonia’s size, and even then it would not offer 100 percent protection.

Due to the cost of the capability, Estonian military circles have not been heard publicly discussing its acquisition before. The emphasis has been on long-range offensive capabilities to stop hostile activity in enemy territory, fighting with archers, not arrows. Ukraine has long been forced to do the latter due to the restrictions set by the West.