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- The Russian opposition is at odds with itself.
- No one has chosen Russian oppositionists to speak on behalf of Russia.
- A test question about who Crimea belongs to and the Russian empire is required.
Quite often, Estonian opinion leaders notice, use in their speeches, anticipate positions on and mention as an alternative the so-called Russian opposition, i.e. the liberal political wing that has gone abroad. It is understandable that their positions or purely human stories may seem likable, however, it must be admitted that in the long run their ability to influence what is happening in Russia is close to zero, columnist Viktoria Ladõnskaja-Kubits (Isamaa) writes.
Whether it's Andres Herkel's recently published opinion piece with the sentence «well-known observer Maxim Katz highlights in his analysis...» or Raul Rebane's speech at the Postimees opinion leaders' luncheon, where he said «...millions (who have fled Russia or are living in internal exile) understand things the same way as Europe...», or a human rights conference where Russian civic activist Anastasia Shevchenko speaks about «restrictions on human rights in Russia». We are seemingly constantly trying to look at these well-known alternatives to Russian political power (or activists that seem like an alternative to us) and look for words of wisdom there that would confirm our logic. But this is a rather futile endeavor, because even if there is perhaps something not just interesting, but also true (which I am not at all sure about), they have long become trapped in their own bubble. And by using their answers in your rhetoric, you can paint a much more confusing picture for yourself or your audience.
QUARRELS WITHIN. February marked a year since the killing of Alexei Navalny. The once influential Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) he created was a powerful information, media and political resource during his lifetime. Only a year has passed since the leader's death, and his political child has lost all credibility. His wife Yulia did not become a unified opposition leader based abroad.
Moreover, the so-called alternative has managed to diversify its relationships, activities and message, express so much slander towards each other and quarrel so blatantly with each other that today only a constantly vigilant observer can distinguish the «50 shades of gray of the Russian opposition»: who is who and for what reason. While the above-mentioned blogger Maxim Katz published sensitive information about FBK last year (he claims that money and reputations of a suspicious Russian background have been laundered through the foundation), in live debates with FBK head Ivan Zhdanov, Katz himself leaves questions about orders placed through his wife's company and money received from people close to the Kremlin unanswered.
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Navalny's fellow fighter Maria Pevchikh publishes her own large investigative journalism material entitled «The Traitors», in which she essentially takes a swipe at Mikhail Khodorkovsky. For his part, Khodorkovsky's close partner and friend Leonid Nevzlin is grappling with the accusation that he allegedly ordered the beating of FBK leader Leonid Volkov. This is far from the whole picture, but it is also enough to confuse a potential supporter of the alternative force. And most importantly: their quarrels pollute the political alternative, but even more so the fact that none of them has clearly stated what their political message is, what their ideological basis is, what program they might want to build their country on in the future.
THE ANSWER TO THE TEST QUESTION MAY NOT BE PLEASING. Because of the separation described above, it is relatively difficult to find common ground among the so-called Russian oppositionists. And that is why every time a quote from a selection of their opinions appears again and again in our media space…, you just shrug your shoulders, wondering what it proves, what it gives us or does not give us, how it helps to maintain our security?
In this regard, there was a dissonance in the text presented by Raul Rebane at the Postimees opinion leaders' luncheon. When he said at the beginning of his speech: «I myself know people who have fled Russia and who are critical of everything and everyone that is happening there. As soon as the talk turns to the possibility that Russia could be one country among others, many people's vision becomes blurry and there is immediate talk about Russia as a state of power or even Russian civilization...», later in the same text he stated: «Millions of Russians have now fled from Putin's rule or are living in internal exile, by the way, just like we did in our time. Millions understand things in the same way as Europe and are doing their best to change the situation. They risk everything, their lives and the fate of their families, they are declared foreign agents, they are imprisoned.» This is the crossroads: what we want to know and what we actually know. I suspect that we rather know the first part of the text.
While in the past the so-called test question was: «Who does Crimea belong to?», and the answer to it meant quite a lot, today the test question is: «Should the decolonization (in other words, the disintegration) of Russia take place?». I am not a big fan of test questions, they can lead to complete extremes, but still, in this case, it is interesting to observe how this test question becomes a stumbling block for many so-called oppositionists, a cause of headache, when answering which, the subconscious mind brings up «a great and powerful empire». Therefore, when answering the direct question «should the empire disintegrate?», our answers and those of the so-called Russian opposition leaders may not coincide, which may give us an unpleasant surprise. Which is what has happened, for example, with the speeches of Yulia Navalnaya.
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Once again, it is worth remembering that «being against Putin, against the war» does not mean that the person is for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. «Being against Putin» does not mean that the person would release a great many potentially freedom-seeking peoples who are still part of the great empire. This is what in many aspects distinguishes our world of thought from the alleged political alternative that has fled Russia.
THE IMPACT ON ONE’S OWN IS WEAK. I described above that the so-called Russian opposition force is too fragmented, quarreling with each other, they lack a vision, and even the unarticulated vision may not coincide with the premise important to us. But that's not all. A politician is made not by his idea, but by the number of his supporters. Democracy and the rule of law are based on this: politicians are elected. And this is perhaps the biggest stumbling block for the Russian opposition that has fled abroad.
At the end of last year, Igor Gretskiy, a research fellow at the International Center for Defense and Security, published the results of the study «New Russian Immigration to the EU». A very interesting read, it sadly did not receive that much attention.
«The new Russian immigrants are sometimes considered 'politically driven', but the extent of this politicization seems to be greatly exaggerated,» the study concludes. The newcomers' interest in Russia-related political activities has gradually declined, along with their motivation to participate in political projects and initiatives. Widespread participation in such endeavors is more often the exception than the rule.
The study highlights that when it comes to issues related to visa restrictions, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them: «Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost.» Which confirms the previous point about complex questions and answers that may not match our understanding: «The majority, however, categorically denies collective responsibility. They tend to depersonalize the Russian population, portraying it simply as the victim of the government’s manipulations. It is no coincidence that the new immigrants consider the main reason for the invasion of Ukraine to be that Russia is permeated with the Kremlin's pervasive propaganda. Furthermore, some of them, either consciously or unconsciously, failed to differentiate between the terms «responsibility» and «guilt,» treating them as synonyms.»
And now perhaps the most important part of the study: «While many new Russian immigrants maintain connections with family and friends in Russia, they avoid discussing politically charged subjects, particularly those related to Ukraine. They often openly admit that they are unable to convince supporters of the war, even among their own close associates, many of whom adopted pro-Kremlin and anti-Western positions long before the 2022 invasion.»
Some of the respondents even acknowledged that they are rapidly losing touch with the Russian population and have a poor understanding of what is happening in the country: «Put differently, émigrés have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two cohorts is likely to endure.»
The biggest concern has been described: the so-called Russian opposition force that exists abroad has no opportunity to influence events in Russia, and also lacks its own constituency, that is, numerous supporters at home. This, in turn, means being trapped in a bubble, with almost zero influence on the entire situation. They have no answer to the basic political question «on whose behalf are you speaking?»
POLITICAL BENEFIT AT ZERO. Of course, we are happy to listen to newcomers from there, we are happy when their opinion is similar to what we consider reasonable, we discover their stories and, purely humanly, we often sympathize. And all this is very understandable in the world of people, because among those who could not stand the reality of today's Russia and decided to leave there, there are many interesting, intelligent interlocutors and just plain people. But is this also politically helpful? In the classical version, a political result is given by a situation when... there is a common political force. There is none. When there is a clear political message/vision. There is none. And when there is an impact on the potential electorate. Which is close to zero. If we evaluate the political benefit, then there is none. Moreover, there is political alienation, but also, above all, alienation from one's potential voters and division into other small bubbles in one's new bubble.