Hint

SANDRA LAUR NATO's eastern border alliance would reduce dependence on the world's great powers

Military hardware on display at a Polish military parade on August 15, 2023.
Military hardware on display at a Polish military parade on August 15, 2023. Photo: Jakob Ratz
  • Why does Estonia need new forms of military cooperation?
  • Close regional cooperation would also send a clear signal to Russia.
  • It is naïve to rely on promises and the reaction speed of the West.

The world order has changed, and it is time to adapt to the new reality. In this new reality, the countries of NATO's eastern flank – the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland – must not remain reliant on the mercy of larger and stronger powers. Shared history with the aggressor Russia and geographical location make these countries the European Union's and NATO's first line of defense, Sandra Laur (Center Party), a student of international relations at King's College London, writes.

Therefore, it is necessary to establish a NATO eastern border alliance that allows for the development of an independent and operational deterrence capability that does not depend solely on the political interests of major powers. The creation of a Baltic-Polish-Finnish security axis would not mean turning our backs on NATO, but rather strengthening the common striking force, including more effective regional cooperation in intelligence sharing, defense industry development, as well as joint military exercises.

NATO's fragile future

Why does Estonia need new forms of military cooperation? Europe has already started to look for new security solutions, which include the idea for a Nordic nuclear alliance. This reflects growing uncertainty about the future of NATO. According to some sources, the United States has already informed the allies of its intention to withdraw from participating in the planning of European military exercises. Nor do we have any reason not to take seriously signals that the US is considering the possibility of leaving the alliance. According to President Donald Trump, it is easier to deal with Russia than with Ukraine on ending the war, which deepens doubts about America's commitment to European security.

Moreover, the Baltic states have been excluded from two meetings in Paris and London, where many EU leaders were present. This clearly demonstrates that the security concerns of the Baltic states are not a priority for Europe's major powers, and our region's countries must take responsibility for strengthening their own defense capabilities. Although NATO's principle of collective defense applies, according to the treaty at least, we cannot rely solely on the hope that all allies will act swiftly and unanimously in a crisis situation. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation between the countries on NATO's eastern flank – Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland – both in strategic planning and at the operational level.

Unified command is needed

The Baltic Sea is the key zone for the defense of NATO's eastern flank – whoever controls it largely determines the security of the region. Bringing it under unified command and limiting Russia's access is crucial for establishing effective deterrence. For Russia, the Baltic Sea is a link with Kaliningrad, which has a logistical and military role for Moscow. If the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland acted in a coordinated manner, they would be able to jointly cut off Russian supply lines to Kaliningrad in the event of an attack, leaving the forces stationed there vulnerable and isolated.

Such a strategy would not only deter Russia but also force it to take into account that the Baltic Sea region is no longer vulnerable due to fragmented decision-making processes or separate defense plans. This would give NATO as a whole greater flexibility and reduce dependence on the timeline of political decisions in Western Europe. A defensive block that has grown too large may be militarily capable, but it is cumbersome and difficult to manage. NATO decisions are made slowly because there are many parties with different interests and priorities. A smaller, but purposefully acting regional alliance would be operationally more efficient than a long-deliberating mega-structure.

Close regional cooperation would also send a clear signal to Russia that there is no point in trying to divide NATO internally or recruit individual allies, as the region is capable of strengthening its security independently and acting as one. Therefore, regional cooperation is not only logical but also essential to ensure an effective and proactive security policy that prevents Russia from exploiting fragmented decision-making and lack of coordination in the Baltic Sea region during a crisis.

The weakness of existing alternatives

Currently, an alternative structure in the form of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) exists alongside NATO, which includes a number of Baltic and Northern European countries. JEF's strength lies in its operational flexibility and the leadership of the United Kingdom, which provides strategic weight. However, it is more of a political than an operational alliance, and its focus is not specifically on the security needs of the Baltic Sea region. A major weakness is the absence of Poland, which significantly reduces the impact of that structure on NATO's eastern flank, especially in view of Poland's rapid military growth. Poland's defense spending has surpassed four percent of GDP, and its armed forces are growing faster than in most other NATO countries. If the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland were to join forces, they could form a regional security structure that would not depend on the slow decision-making processes of the major Western European powers and would ensure the region's actual defense capability.

Lessons from history

Today, we are in a situation reminiscent of 1939, when Poland was essentially left to fight alone against two aggressor states. Although Britain and France were allied with Poland and declared war on Germany, they did not provide direct military assistance to Poland. The major Western European powers hesitated, and Poland was defeated in less than a month. Can we dare to hope today that history will not repeat itself? Countries situated in calmer geopolitical settings do not perceive threats as acutely as we do. It cannot be assumed that France or Italy view the Russian threat in the same way as the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, which are in the immediate danger zone. Germany and France have a political culture based on strategic autonomy and peace diplomacy, meaning their security strategies prioritize political maneuvering and balance-seeking. This is clearly reflected in Germany's long-standing Russia-friendly policies, where the Nord Stream 2 project was completed even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Germany's energy dependence on Russia was not a coincidence or an inevitability, but a deliberate political choice that created a systemic weakness in European security.

We should not hope that the political calculations of Paris and Berlin will align with those of the countries on NATO's eastern flank.

In the case of France, a similar mindset is reflected in President Macron's initiative for a «strategic dialogue» with Russia, which has not yielded substantive results but has deepened disagreements within Europe. Meanwhile, the eastern flank countries have adopted a realpolitik approach, taking bold steps to strengthen their defense capabilities and contain Russian aggression. While Western countries were hesitant to supply weapons to Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states provided assistance immediately. There is a divide in Europe's strategic thinking. We should not hope that the political calculations of Paris and Berlin will align with those of the countries on NATO's eastern flank. It is naïve to rely on promises and the reaction speed of Western countries. We must strengthen our own regional defense autonomy to avoid being dependent on slow decision-making mechanisms constrained by compromises.

Therefore, the new reality requires sobriety from us, because the future of Estonia's security must not be based on the hope that the great powers far away from us will act at the right moment and in unison. The defense of the Baltic Sea region must be shaped by those who are on the first line of defense in the geopolitical reality.

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