TOOMAS KIHO ⟩ We thought we had already witnessed the new end of history, but that too was false

Crowds gathered in Times Square in the United States to express support for Ukraine. February 24, 2025. Photo: Milo Hess

• Our entire foreign policy architecture has been built on support from the US.
• The spectrum of definitions of victory in the war is broad.
• The best military readiness in history alone is not enough for lasting peace.

The great war in Ukraine has been going on for three years, and we have had just as much time to get used to the idea that the world has changed. We have had to come to terms with the fact that the end of history did not happen, and that we must return to the «good old» world order, Toomas Kiho, editor-in-chief of Akadeemia, writes.

That, as we know, was an order in which the balance of power between states was determined by the right of the strong – through conquests and wars. These were also used to change national borders – a practice that was generally declared taboo by the late 20th-century final acts. Now, we have to acknowledge that those times are over.

Adapting to the new-old reality quickly brought our socio-political thinking to the realization that this situation signifies a new end of history (again!), manifesting in a state where, on one side, there are «evil» states against which we, the «good» allies in the West, stand, with the United States as our flagship, spokesperson, and champion. The US also leads the world's most powerful military alliance, NATO, and the entire future bet is built on this enduring security architecture.

This means that other Western countries, including us, have no need to do anything except blindly follow in the wake of the United States (and occasionally mention increasing defense spending). Those with whom the US fell out, we did as well (for example, China, with whom there was a friendly trading relationship just a few years ago). The US allies were our allies, its enemies were our enemies; whatever the US wanted – bases, natural resources, participation in military missions, etc. – we tried to provide. And in return, we received eternal security guarantees. Or at least we thought we did.

This was the new end of history that we have been getting used to for three years. Now that end has also proved false.

History has not stopped moving forward, and the security picture, which seemed stable just a short while ago, has changed. We must begin to get our bearings in a somehow different manner. Above all, this means that it is no longer possible to blindly echo the Americans, or, if we still do, it will seem strange. Such is the case, for example, with our foreign minister's recent suggestion that, if the US wants it, of course it can take our phosphate rock and mineral resources – we wouldn't mind giving them to the Americans. (Just as the foreign minister of the Estonian SSR probably wouldn't have minded giving phosphate rock to the Soviet Union at the time of its historical stagnation – but those bygone ends of history are beyond the scope of this discussion.)

It is no longer possible to blindly echo the Americans, or, if we still do, it will seem strange.

Our entire foreign policy architecture has been built over the years on strong and unwavering support from the US. It seemed so certain that we could be as tough as we wanted in our own geographical neighborhood and choose any side, such as the recent declaration of the Georgian government as illegal. But if now our previously reliable shield starts, for example, to conquer Greenland – whether the takeover of the world's largest island is carried out by direct military force, bundles of dollars, or some «little green men» – should we then side with the US or support Denmark instead?

The choice is certainly more complicated than in the case of Crimea in 2014. It will also be a difficult choice whether to recognize the will of the Canadian people to become the 51st state of the US – since we never thought of recognizing the similar will of the «people's republics» of Donetsk and Luhansk. Compared to this, whether the name of the gulf is the Gulf of Mexico or the Gulf of America a minor issue. This is the new world order we must get used to living in.

Ukraine – what next?

Regarding the war in Ukraine, it has been said that Ukraine's allies could agree to the war being ended if it happens on Ukraine's terms. However, it also follows that the allies do not have the right to push Ukraine into an endless war. Because every day brings Ukrainians deaths, destruction and other immense misery that comes with a war. There is a reasonable limit to how long it makes sense to fight. And at some point, the time will begin when the war will be over and you will still have to live in the same world with your neighbors both near and far. All wars that have begun have ended at some point, and often the enemies have later become allies (for instance, the current alliance between Germany and France after centuries of confrontation in Europe, the friendship of the Americans with Japan after the nuclear bombing of the island nation in World War II, etc.).

Surely, the time will come when the issue of having a normal relationship with Russia will arise. Of course, that's where I'll be warned to be careful with my words, as in the current discourse (read: the end of history), the prevailing belief is that Russia will never change – it will remain an eternally aggressive neighbor bent on conquest. And while our Baltic Sea region's history over the past millennium has reinforced this notion, we still cannot completely rule out the possibility – otherwise, what would we be fighting for?

There is a reasonable limit to how long it makes sense to fight. And at some point, the time will begin when the war will be over and you will still have to live in the same world with your neighbors both near and far.

Let's ask, how determined is the West to see Ukraine win anyway? For one thing, there is the smooth flow of arms supplies, which have been subject to serious delays on many occasions. But, alongside military aid, agreements at the international diplomatic level are just as important. Looking at it from the West, one might get the impression that the world is united in its support for Ukraine, but that is far from the case – if you look beyond the borders of NATO and the European Union (and those borders cover a relatively small part of the world), you can see that much of the world is not on the same side as the West in backing Ukraine. However, in the diplomatic and foreign policy arena, we should communicate wisely with all countries so that they condemn Russia's attack – if Ukraine's victory is the goal. As long as this is not done and, in addition to China, Iran and others, also countries such as India, the Arab world, etc., are allowed to drift toward supporting Russia, the question arises: is victory really the goal?

The diplomatic recipe for supporting Ukraine seems simple – to isolate Russia, it makes perfect sense to turn its current semi-supporters and hesitant countries into friends, rather than picking fights with them.

We have unequivocally stated that we support Ukraine until victory. But what constitutes Ukraine's victory – that must be left for the Ukrainians themselves to define. Is victory the preservation of independence along with sufficient security guarantees on at least part of Ukraine's current territory? Or is it the restoration of Ukraine's pre-2014 territorial integrity, including the liberation of Crimea and Donbas? Or perhaps it means the complete destruction of present-day Russia and a Nuremberg-style trial for its leadership? As we can see, the spectrum of possible definitions of victory is broad.

It can be said that it's a victory in every sense already if Putin's plan to conquer and destroy («denazify and demilitarize») all of Ukraine fails and a lasting peace is concluded.

Better protected than ever

It is the latter that is particularly important. Of course, Estonia also needs lasting peace in Europe. This is despite the fact that at times it seems as if a new outbreak of the Russian war is expected, along with its spread to our region, to the coasts of the Baltic Sea. Public discourse is full of war anticipation stories, shelters and defense lines are being built. This is, however, highly contradictory, as for years we have been assured that Estonia is protected, and better than ever before.

Here's a few random quotes from the last 15 years:

General Ants Laaneots in 2011: «I can confidently say that Estonia is better protected today than ever before in its history.»

Officer of the Year 2012, Major Janno Värk: «I can say that Estonia is protected today, no one needs to feel worry or fear about it.»

Government of the Republic in 2017: «Estonia is better protected than ever before.»

Defense Minister Margus Tsahkna in 2017: «Estonia has never been better protected.»

General Riho Terras in 2021: «Overall, we are in a good position today and the country is well protected.»

Defense Minister Kalle Laanet in 2022: «I know that Estonia is better protected than ever before.»

And Laanet went on to say: «Over a billion euros in additional funding to strengthen Estonia's defense capability, further decisions by NATO to protect Estonia.» Defense has strengthened at the same pace year after year, and current financial expenditures far exceed those of the aforementioned years.

If we were already fully protected in 2011 and from 2012 to 2022, then logically, our security – which at the same time means the prevention of war – is ever greater now and the risk of war ever lower. This is ironclad logic. Or rather, half of the logic. The other half consists of wise diplomacy – the ability to maintain good relations with both our closer and more distant neighbors. That is what ironclad logic says.