ANDREY KUZICHKIN ⟩ Comment sections of Russian media betray public sentiment within the eastern neighbor

Borovitskaya Tower and Gate of the Kremlin in Moscow. Photo: Wikimedia

• The media, which has a semi-free status in Russia, is forced to accept the rules of state.
• Russians want to read sources alternative to Russian state media.
• Victory over Putin's regime must first occur in the information field.

As we know, information is the most valuable resource in our time and an effective tool in the struggle for interests in the fields of trade, politics and ideology. It is no coincidence that informational and psychological special operations became the most important weapon in the Russian-Ukrainian war, columnist Andrey Kuzichkin writes.

The use of special methods of information influence enables to demoralize the population and armed forces of the opposing side and helps to consolidate one’s own population in the fight against the enemy. The Kremlin, using the resources of the special services and the media, is quite successfully waging an information war not only with Ukraine, but also with the West as a whole. This can only be prevented by the effective work of counter-propaganda institutions, including independent Russian media. And although in 2025 the Russian propaganda budget will exceed two billion euros, Putin has not managed to create an information dictatorship in the country. Why is that?

Putin's state against a free press

Experts note that the Russian media can be divided into three major segments: federal media (TV channels RT, Pervyi Kanal, RTR, NTV, newspapers Izvestia and Rossiyskaya Gazeta); corporate expert niche resources (TV channel RBK, newspaper Kommersant, magazine Forbes) and regional private publications; as well as Russian and Russian-language media operating outside Russia. Putin began a «crusade» against independent media as far back as 2001 with the destruction of NTV. In the following years, the trend of restricting freedom of speech became dominant in the domestic policy of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation.

The attack on Ukraine marked the final act of the drama: as the Russian Air Force bombed Ukrainian cities, the bastion of the Russian liberal opposition in Moscow, the radio station Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow), was «bombed». This launched a large-scale «crusade» by Russian power structures against independent media and a mass exodus of journalists from Russia.

The war against free media continues to this day. Thus, in 2024, Roskomnadzor blocked more than 280 news media domains. Several large independent publications were removed from the register. For example, the oldest media resource polit.ru, which has been operating since 1998. It is characteristic that the main blow in the fight against journalism was directed at publications of ethnic regions under the pretext that they contained materials containing elements of separatism. For example, the activities of the Khakassia news agency were banned, and the online publication Komi Daily was added to the register of terrorist organizations.

The special services also do not shy away from the falsification of criminal cases. Two editors-in-chief of independent media outlets were arrested this way in Ryazan in January of this year.

This shows the fear of Putin's state in the face of the hypothetical possibility of the collapse of Russia, which could be triggered by forcing the Putin regime to make peace with Ukraine. At that, in 2024, criminal cases were initiated against 45 Russian journalists, including under the «extremism section». The special services also do not shy away from the falsification of criminal cases. Two editors-in-chief of independent media outlets were arrested this way in Ryazan in January of this year. They were accused of extorting a bribe from the head of a business structure. Russian punitive bodies also widely use such a tool of political censorship as declaring journalists and media as foreign agents, which limits their opportunities to earn income from professional and public activities. Nevertheless, the media continue to operate in Russia and abroad, offering the Russian population an alternative agenda.

Front behind enemy lines

Of course, in Russia, the media, which has a semi-free status, is forced to accept the rules of the game established by the state. Therefore, the war in Ukraine, the events of Bucha and Irpin, criticism of the Russian armed forces and Commander-in-Chief Putin are taboo topics. However, private and corporate media, which operate at the federal level and have extensive connections and even founders outside of Russia, maintain their reputation. Therefore, fanatics of «special military operations» do not get a say on these platforms or are rare guests there.

The chronicle of military operations is not ruled out when it comes to content, but it is limited in scope. On the other hand, there are many analytical materials that do not romanticize life in Russia, but talk about the critical situation in the Russian economy, the consequences of sanctions and bleak forecasts for the future. Such materials can be found on the air of RBK, in the publication Kommersant and in Forbes magazine. By the way, according to the Russian project Medialogia, in 2024 Kommersant took second place among the top newspapers in the Russian media, Forbes became the leader among magazines, rbc.ru (the digital version of RBK) took first place among online resources.

Public opinion among the regional audience, even when «smoothed out», is in sharp contrast to the picture created by the Kremlin's federal media of life in the country.

Regional media resources that have retained their independence use the Italian strike format: in their information content, the share of references to the war in Ukraine is on average less than 10 percent. That is why z-bloggers are furious, writing about Russian journalists who betray their homeland and ignore the topic of «the heroic deeds of Russian soldiers in Ukraine». But most importantly, these resources create a public space for readers to freely exchange opinions. And although moderators censor comments in order not to break the law and protect their resource from persecution, public opinion among the regional audience, even when «smoothed out», is in sharp contrast to the picture created by the Kremlin’s federal media of life in the country.

I took examples from two resources – Tomsk and Rostov-on-Don. I will not name them in detail, because I do not want to attract excessive attention to them from the Russian special services, who diligently read the Estonian press. Thus, the decision of the Tomsk deputies to make it mandatory to play the national anthem before the start of a meeting caused a lot of poisonous comments: «At this rate, they will soon oblige all apartments to install radio receivers and wake up at 6:00 in the morning to the anthem», «Soon they will force everyone to give Nazi salutes like Musk and bow to the portrait of the Sun-Faced [солнцеликий, Putin’s disguised name in the blogosphere – author’s note]», «Inflation is huge and growing. But these freeloaders sing anthems and look him in the eye».

The initiative of one of the deputies to erect a monument to Stalin in Tomsk caused a flood of statements like: «What a horror, what a shame to Tomsk», «But did they ask the relatives of those who Stalin killed?», «Cities with monuments to Stalin are going down... I don't want Tomsk to go down with them. Shame on the citizens and the authorities if this is erected in Tomsk».

Information about price increases was accompanied by comments like: «It's a pity that this news is not read by someone who for 25 years has been promising to improve the well-being of Russians», «It is necessary to send a delegation of the people to the Sun-Faced and tell him the whole truth», «However, the wealth of the richest Russians increased by 18.465 billion dollars in a year. Putin's friends became even richer...».

A comment on the news about Zelenskyy demanding security guarantees for Ukraine: «Even a schoolboy can see that Ukraine must become part of NATO and Russia must escape from the power of Putin and his entourage in order for all this to end.»

The initiative of the regional deputy who went to fight in Ukraine was received with irony, with one of the comments saying: «Well done, set an example for the rest of the leadership! I hope that Mazur (the governor of the Tomsk region) and Makhinya (the mayor of Tomsk) will also join.» A Rostov-on-Don (a base of the Russian Army, where the headquarters of the Wagner private army was located) online portal posted the news that the head of Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, announced problems with the serial production of the Russian passenger aircraft MS-21, its production was postponed from 2024 to 2026. Several comments followed: «Sanctions are in our favor!», «In a country where a party of thieves and swindlers is currently in power (so far), this is completely expected and legal», «The tsar promised to produce one aircraft every month. He lied again!», «But has he fulfilled anything at all?». A comment on the news about Zelenskyy demanding security guarantees for Ukraine: «Even a schoolboy can see that Ukraine must become part of NATO and Russia must escape from the power of Putin and his entourage in order for all this to end.»

And of course, Russian media abroad is distributing content via YouTube and Telegram channels that breaks the Kremlin's propaganda codes and informs Russian users about the real situation both in the world and in Russia. That is why the Russian authorities have started to restrict YouTube. However, Russians are actively using VPNs and other programs to circumvent the restrictions.

When there are some important events in the world, such as the overthrow of Assad in Syria, the number of VPN downloads in Russia increases several times. This shows that Russians are looking for alternative sources of information and do not trust official propaganda. And indeed, as confirmed by research by the Levada Center, during the three years of the war in Ukraine, Russians’ trust in fully state-controlled television decreased from 60 percent to 45 percent, while the use of the internet as a source of information without state censorship increased from 55 percent to 75 percent. And the number of subscribers to channels such as Ochevidtsy (Очевидцы) and Govorit NeMoskva (Говорит НеМосква), created by Tomsk journalists in exile, increased to almost 50,000 in two years.

However, there are over 2,000 foreign Russian media projects in total. It is precisely such resources that create a window for communication between Russians living in the free world and those who remained in Russia that are very important, because victory over Putin's regime must first occur in the information field. Putin's power structure rests on two pillars – the Chekist-oligarchic clan and public opinion. The transformation of Putin's status from an idol of millions to political bankruptcy will lead to the loss of popular support and the collapse of power. This is possible with strong information pressure exerted on Russia. Journalists are the main force of this pressure.