ANDREI KUZITŠKIN ⟩ A look into a Russian's shopping cart: the annual price increase is shocking

Potatoes in a Russian grocery store. Photo: personal archive​ Photo: Erakogu

• Official cost of living statistics in Russia do not always align with reality.
• Russia has the prerequisites to increase its potato cultivation, so why has this not happened?
• Information from Russian regions shows that crisis symptoms are mounting in the economy.

The past year of 2024 brought many unpleasant surprises to Russians, the main one being a significant increase in food prices, Andrey Kuzichkin, columnist and expert on Russia, writes.

According to official statistics, the cost of living in Russia has increased by 10 percent over the year – the inflation rate accelerated to this level, while the planned value was 4.5 percent. Vegetables and dairy products have contributed significantly to the price increase. Potatoes doubled in price, cabbage and onions rose by 50 percent, butter increased by 50 percent, and milk and sour cream went up by 20 percent. At the same time, the price of eggs and buckwheat decreased by 10 percent.

In some regions, the price of butter has doubled. For example, in Moscow, a 180-gram pack of butter with 82.5 percent fat content cost three euros in January 2025 (here and below, 1 euro = 100 rubles), compared to 1.3 euros in January 2024. In Siberia, the price of butter has increased by 75 percent. Official statistics did not show a sharp increase in fish prices, but a decrease in the catch of cod and other types of red fish has led to a 40 percent price hike. In Tomsk and Irkutsk, 1 kg of salmon costs 20 euros at the market. Red caviar rose in price from 60 euros to 140 euros per kg in many retail chains. Chicken and sunflower oil prices increased by 20 percent.

The price of butter has doubled in some regions of Russia. Photo: Personal archive

Experts have concluded that the rapid increase in the price of services, food products, and other consumer goods in Russia is a side effect of the accelerating economic growth against the backdrop of significant military expenditures by the state. The rise in income for individuals and companies operating in the defense sector has led to considerable demand surpassing supply. However, the newspaper article format does not allow a full detailed analysis of the food market situation in Russia. Therefore, I would like to highlight just a few key points of interest for examining the anatomy of Putin's economy. First, let us talk about potatoes.

Potatoes have long been regarded as «the second bread» in Russia. Potatoes are the most common vegetable in the daily menu of most Russian families. Each Russian consumes up to 60 kg of potatoes annually. Russia ranks third in the world in potato production. In 2023, Russia produced 20 million tons of potatoes, and potatoes are the only crop where more than half are grown in private households. However, in 2024, the land area for potatoes decreased by 10 percent, and production fell by 20 percent. As a result, potato prices in Moscow stores increased from 35–50 cents to 80 cents to 1 euro over the year.

On average, price increases in Russian regions ranged from 40–100 percent. This contradicts Putin's guidelines on Russia's self-sufficiency in basic food crops and raises questions about freezing the prices of socially important products. The vast areas of fertile land in Russia allow for a significant increase in potato production. So why has this not happened? An analysis of the causes shows the direct and indirect effects of the war in Ukraine on the critical situation with Russian potatoes.

The potato situation contradicts Putin's bold claims that Russia's economy is not experiencing any problems and is growing continuously, that the import substitution program is proving successful, and that the food market is not facing any shortages.

The direct impact comes from the fact that the largest industrial potato-growing regions in Russia are the areas bordering Ukraine—Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions—as well as the Tula region, which have now found themselves in combat zones. Agricultural machinery often became targets of drone strikes, as Russian soldiers have been using tractors and harvesters as positions for reconnaissance drone operators. Additionally, the Russian armed forces placed artillery on agricultural land and turned storage facilities into shelters for military equipment. Minefields and fortifications were also set up in the border areas. As a result, a significant portion of the land was removed from agricultural use. The evacuation of civilians from the combat zone made it impossible to harvest potatoes from private households, which account for half of potato production.

The indirect causes of the Russian potato crisis were sanctions and the increase in military expenditures. Russia uses domestically produced seed potatoes for 99 percent of its needs. However, Russian varieties account for no more than 5 percent. The remaining high-yielding varieties are of foreign origin, primarily imported from the Netherlands and Germany. Potato cultivation requires constant renewal of the seed stock, which has become nearly impossible under sanctions. As a result, the seed stock in Russia will degrade in the future, leading to reduced potato yields.

It should also be considered that there are food potatoes and potatoes used for the industrial production of chips, flakes, and french fries. Russia processes 2.5 million tons of potatoes annually for the food industry, all of which are grown from imported seed. Up to 12,000 tons of seed potatoes were brought in from the European Union. This agricultural season, much less seed potatoes have been imported, creating a risk of bankruptcy for potato processing companies and fast-food chains serving french fries.

See more food items from a Russian grocery store in the gallery​:

Intensive potato cultivation also requires powerful specialized equipment, such as tractors for land cultivation and potato harvesters. Russia lacks such equipment, with 80 percent dependence on foreign supplies. Imported harvesters cost between 200,000 and 300,000 euros. However, the increase in military spending and the Russian central bank's 21 percent base interest rate have blocked the agricultural loan program providing favorable loans. Russian farmers do not have the means to buy such expensive imported equipment. So far, the import substitution program has only initiated the process of creating a working group for the development of a Russian tractor. Its introduction in the next decade seems questionable.

The potato situation contradicts Putin's bold claims that Russia's economy is not experiencing any problems and keeps growing instead, that the import substitution program is proving a successful, and that the food market is not facing any shortages. Information from Russian regions shows that crisis symptoms are mounting in the economy, and the food market is sliding into a zone of turbulence. How this affects Russians' social well-being will be explored in the next part.

To be continued…