FOOKUS ⟩ Shapers of Estonia's security policy seeking a safe path like hedgehogs in global fog

Keit Kasemets, who will soon assume the role of state secretary, is as new to security matters as Prime Minister Kristen Michal. However, the state secretary has a key role in winning hybrid wars. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• The idea of a European peacekeeping mission in Ukraine is merely a talking point.
• Members of the Riigikogu rate Estonia's readiness for hybrid warfare as rather low.
• The European defense bonds initiative, which originated in Tallinn, remains stagnant.

As global uncertainty had skyrocketed by the start of 2025, one would expect national leaders to provide reassuring statements about our common goals. In Estonia, however, President Alar Karis declared at the end of last year that we talk too much about war, while Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna applauds the idea of sending European forces to Ukraine in foreign media. Editor Meelis Oidsalu attempts to map out the current security situation as perceived in Estonia's power corridors with the help of four security experts.

At a press conference following the National Defense Council meeting on November 25 last year, President Alar Karis remarked that the end of the year and the beginning of the new one would be challenging in terms of security. Yet, in an end-of-year interview with the ETV television channel less than a month later, the head of state changed his tone and approach, stating that there is too much talk of war in Estonia.

This rhetorical shift caused confusion among numerous observers. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, by contrast, was in an exceptionally combative mood at the end of the year, criticizing the outgoing government for speaking about defense without taking significant action. Meanwhile, the previous Lithuanian government had been planning to raise defense spending to match Estonia's level and had generally been more active than Estonia in defense matters.

X, a member of the Riigikogu from a coalition party, with whom I discussed the current security policy atmosphere in Estonia, highlighted the contrast between Alar Karis' end-of-year address and his earlier statements as an example of the general loss of direction that has plagued Estonia since the US presidential elections.

That said, the remarks made by Karis in his end-of-year interview should not be read too deeply into. He did not call for less discussion of the war in Ukraine. After all, he visited Kyiv in September, where he spoke boldly about the need to defeat Russia, at a time when others were already openly considering peace plans.

Last year's brain drain from the Ministry of Defense has, according to several experts, contributed to the current lack of focus in state policy. Photo: Madis Veltman

Nevertheless, Estonia's focus on Ukraine has been lost, according to the aforementioned Riigikogu member, who links it to last year's personnel changes in the defense leadership, specifically the departures of commander of the defense forces, Gen. Martin Herem, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Kusti Salm, and deputy commander of the defense forces, Maj. Gen. Veiko-Vello Palm. In early 2022, they proposed the idea of early weapon donations (including Javelin missiles), the Ministry of Defense developed a strategy to support Ukraine's victory (allocating 0.25 percent of GDP from all allies until Ukraine wins), and they were behind one of the potentially most influential defense initiatives at the European level — the idea of EU defense bonds.

The phantom initiative to save Ukraine

The start of 2025 differs significantly from previous years due to the sharp increase in unpredictability. Uncertainty has also grown in Estonia's efforts to help Ukraine. Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna (Estonia 200) continues to endorse in foreign media the idea of deploying a European peacekeeping mission to secure a potential ceasefire. However, two leading security policy officials explain independently from each other that Estonia does not have an official, thoroughly discussed stance on the peacekeeping mission issue.

Two leading security policy officials explain independently from each other that Estonia does not have an official, thoroughly discussed stance on the peacekeeping mission issue.

«There are all kinds of discussions happening on these (Ukraine-related—ed.) topics, most of them vague, which is why our position is still unclear, though we remain willing to help,» security expert A sayd. This willingness, they explain, means that Estonia will not be an obstacle.

At the same time, according to the official, Estonia sees boots-on-the-ground presence essentially as part of Western security guarantees, and the country is ready to discuss how to organize it. «We imply that if contributions are needed, we will contribute as well,» he adds.

The thoughts of Estonia's security policy makers seem stuck like the hedgehog lost in fog in Soyuzmultfilm's legendary cartoon «Hedgehog in the Fog». Illustration: Artur Kuus

Defense official B also confirms that the topic of a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine has not been seriously discussed in Estonia, and hence there is no official stance on it. «Various ideas are floating around, but not all of them are adequate,» the defense diplomacy expert explains.

When asked why Foreign Minister Tsahkna is so actively voicing opinions on the peacekeeping mission issue, the official suggests, «He wants to stay visible in all matters, but as far as I know, no substantive discussion has taken place at the European Union level.» Therefore, in security policy terms, Estonia does not have a «staffed-out» position on the issue of EU peacekeeping forces.

Hopes for change in Russia

Y, a member of the Riigikogu, expresses concern, stating that the only concrete idea discussed at Toompea regarding support for Ukraine is a declaration of support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's victory plan, aimed at sending a necessary signal to the new US administration. All other ideas are «strangely adrift», including the creation of an EU peacekeeping force, which Foreign Minister Tsahkna supports in foreign media but which has not been discussed anywhere.

«Officials are coming in to talk about how bad things are in Russia. They seem to offer hope that this year things will become more difficult for the adversary,» they say. However, beyond that, the picture remains blurred, and there is no plan on what Estonia or the European Union will do or say to their populations if the worst-case scenario happens, and Ukraine suffers a military defeat due to the erratic peace populism of US Republicans. While the worst-case scenario is not necessarily the most likely, its probability is now dangerously higher than before.

Y mentions that there has been a rumor-level idea circulating that Europe might send a symbolic military presence to some city in western Ukraine, as even that would be a step forward in demonstrating European support for Ukraine. Senior officials A and B do not confirm that anyone is prepared to consider such an option, stating that it is too early to say whether any European country would be ready to send troops to Ukraine, even symbolically.

It is worth recalling that in the spring of 2022, the Riigikogu, together with the parliaments of other Baltic countries, supported launching an air defense operation in western Ukraine. However, at the executive level, this idea was either opposed or lacked enough support to bring it seriously to the agenda in meetings with major allies during North Atlantic Council sessions or NATO summits.

Europe reluctant to strengthen itself

In an ideal scenario, Foreign Minister Tsahkna would endorse the idea of deploying troops to Ukraine in foreign media only after a relevant policy-planning meeting has taken place among executive officials and key ministers. At least an informal preliminary discussion should also be held with Riigikogu members.

Currently, Estonia seems to be drifting along with the rough ideas of major powers, attempting to catch even a small fish for Ukraine in increasingly murky Western waters, with little hope left for landing a big one.

Since 2023, the Estonian Navy has also been responsible for maritime security and law enforcement in peacetime. Photo: Tairo Lutter

The chronic underfunding of European defense makes it unlikely from the outset that a credible military mission capable of deterring further Russian aggression could be launched in Ukraine. Even as the threat perception grows, NATO member states in Europe struggle to improve their territorial defense capabilities. The need to strengthen collective defense will not diminish once an operation in Ukraine begins; on the contrary, escalation risks will increase, requiring NATO readiness in Europe to improve simultaneously.

Efforts to boost the defense industry and increase defense spending in Europe remain inadequate. NATO reports that this year only two-thirds of alliance members will meet the two percent minimum spending requirement. However, as Estonia has pointed out, the two percent threshold itself is no longer sufficient. Moreover, suspiciously little attention is given to the fact that by the end of the third year of war, one-third of member states, including wealthy Baltic Sea countries like Denmark and Germany, still do not meet even the minimum requirement.

NATO is still asleep. Even under President Joe Biden, the United States did not significantly increase its defense spending. Donald Trump's new term may not resemble his previous one.

Considering global developments, it can be said that NATO is still asleep. Even under outgoing President Joe Biden, the United States did not significantly increase its defense spending (only keeping pace with inflation). Donald Trump's new term may not resemble his previous one, so it cannot be assumed that he will again increase defense spending as much as before.

Awaiting Kubilius' report

Riigikogu member Y highlights the implementation of the defense bonds initiative as one of this year's most critical issues, stating, «We need to bring it from paper into the real world.» Former prime minister Kaja Kallas introduced this initiative to our European allies in 2023, following a proposal by former secretary general of the Ministry of Defense Kusti Salm. By early 2024, signals began to emerge that Estonia's proposal for one hundred billion euros in defense bonds was gaining broader support. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently mentioned the possibility of defense funding totaling as much as 500 billion euros. The projected half-trillion figure came from a recommendation in a European competitiveness report by Italy's former technocrat prime minister Mario Draghi.

Now there is talk of a white paper being prepared by the European Commission's new Lithuanian Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, which could provide fresh momentum for creating a joint defense fund. However, the need for additional funding has long been evident.

The continued delay in the EU defense bonds initiative is further evidence that Trump's election has not prompted Europe to rethink its military defense posture. Europe is still waiting for yet another internal push. If this idea remains on paper, it will be a very bad sign for Ukraine, marking the beginning of Europe's capitulation.

Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur, having bounced back from this summer's ammunition procurement dispute, is now beaming with confidence. Photo: Madis Veltman

As an example of the loss of focus within Estonia, A, also a member of the Riigikogu, points to the renewed discussion on the ban on landmines under the Ottawa Treaty and the deceptive notion that Estonia's national defense is now complete following the introduction of a security tax. «Never mind that even the 1.6 billion euros for ammunition only covered part of the ammunition needs expressed by the defense forces,» they note. Let alone the previously ignored funding requirements for comprehensive national defense.

Now, underwater warfare in the Baltic Sea demands attention as well. «What is Estonia's stance on the Ottawa Treaty?» Riigikogu member X wonders aloud.

Ottawa is back on the agenda

Roughly a month and a half ago, the issue resurfaced on defense policymakers' agendas, inspired by Finland. However, after the national defense committee's meeting with Maj. Gen. Andrus Merilo, the commander of the defense forces, on December 16, the matter seems to have stalled. Instead of presenting a well-justified stance of Estonia, Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur speaks about the importance of not upsetting our allies.

More specifically, in an interview with the online news portal of public broadcaster ERR, Pevkur highlighted the need to maintain good relations with Canada, which serves as the NATO framework nation in Latvia.

«In Estonia, we have the United Kingdom as our framework state, and they have long stood for banning what they view as foolish infantry landmines, even at the royal level,» the defense minister explained.

Meanwhile, our Baltic neighbors are aligning their positions on the treaty.

«We have agreed to aim for a regional decision on the Ottawa Treaty,» reads a January 7 tweet, summarizing a phone call between Lithuania's new Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė and her Latvian counterpart Andris Sprūds, posted on the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense's account on the social media platform X.

In theory, during crises as significant as the sabotage of Estlink 2 during Christmas, the crisis structure outlined in the national defense action plan should have been activated under the leadership of the Government Office.

The Estonian Ministry of Defense stated that the southern neighbors had not discussed this issue with them but noted that a Baltic defense ministers' meeting has been scheduled for January. By that time, simply mirroring the positions of allies may no longer be effective, as there is a real possibility that Lithuania, and subsequently Latvia under its influence, may decide to support withdrawing from the treaty.

Lithuania’s position is still unclear. On January 6, according to the Lithuanian public broadcaster's news portal, Lithuania's new Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas said that he supports withdrawing from the treaty. However, Defense Minister Šakalienė added that she is awaiting military advice from the commander of the defense forces, Gen. Raimundas Vaikšnoras, which will be crucial in shaping their final stance.

Not enough hybrid exercises

This year's challenges inevitably include hybrid warfare and the sabotage of Estlink 2. On January 9, coalition politicians were unusually candid in Postimees, criticizing the lack of preparedness before the Estlink 2 incident. However, Riigikogu member Y expressed frustration over their lack of specific plans for responding to hybrid attacks.

«When an incident occurs, there's plenty of serious talk afterward about what could have been done, given the opportunity. But the truth is, we lack clear, well-rehearsed plans for managing such situations,» the lawmaker said.

They cited an incident in Latvia in September as an example. A Russian military Shahed drone flew to Latvia uninterrupted and crashed in the Rēzekne region without exploding. It was an attack drone equipped with a warhead, detected by Latvia's air surveillance while still over Belarus. Despite this, NATO (more specifically Germany's Bundeswehr) Eurofighter Typhoon jets stationed at the Lielvārde airbase did not respond and did not even take off. The Shahed was not shot down, even though a drone traveling at a couple of hundred kilometers per hour (which is extremely slow for an airborne vehicle) would not have been difficult to intercept.

The incident caused considerable public confusion in Latvia. President Edgars Rinkēvičs publicly and loudly demanded an explanation from NATO as to why their air policing jets failed to take off on September 7 to identify or neutralize the air threat, even though Latvian radar systems had detected the drone approaching from Belarus.

For Estonia, it is crucial that Keit Kasemets — who, unlike Taimar Peterkop, has not completed military service or been involved with the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps — should immediately take bold action in addressing key hybrid warfare issues.

Such scenarios have not been rehearsed in Estonia with the involvement of the Government Office, politicians, and the defense forces (including NATO allies conducting air policing). A quick resolution in the event of a Shahed drone intrusion into Estonian airspace would require pre-authorized and well-defined rules of engagement, similar to those needed to prevent sabotage incidents like Estlink 2.

In theory, during crises as significant as the sabotage of Estlink 2 during Christmas, the crisis structure outlined in the national defense action plan should have been activated under the leadership of the Government Office. Over recent years, legal amendments have concentrated the key levers for interagency security and defense coordination in the hands of the secretary of state. If these levers are not used for some reason, it is likely reflected in a broader lack of direction among the security elite.

During the tenure of Taimar Peterkop (center), the secretary of state became the nation's crisis commander. Peterkop's experience in military service and background in the Ministry of Defense helped him assume this role. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

Stenbock House, or the «Prime Ministry», is currently in a transitional period, with the outgoing secretary of state serving his final weeks and the name of his successor already known. For the sake of Estonia's future ability to set clear strategic directions, it is crucial that Keit Kasemets — who, unlike Taimar Peterkop, has not completed military service or been involved with the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps — should immediately take bold action in addressing key hybrid warfare issues.

Greater initiative and stronger coordination from the «Prime Ministry» would help compensate for the lack of experience and refocus attention in light of the global uncertainty that has dispersed priorities.

20 New Year's wishes from the «Power and Security» section

Conscripts of the Guard Battalion heading to serve in the honor guard of the president of the republic. Photo: Madis Veltman

That Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets (SDE) should not let his policy of holding the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate accountable stall due to the election year.

That the 1.6 billion euros allocated for ammunition should not end up being empty talk, and that by the end of the year, all ammunition should be covered by contracts.

That NATO should launch a real, long-term maritime security operation to protect undersea cables.

That the state and private sector should learn to trust each other more, and companies losing tenders should stop unfairly tarnishing the state's reputation.

That Estonia should learn from Latvia and Lithuania how to quickly establish large enough military training areas.

That the annual report of the Foreign Intelligence Service should not become even more vague than before, simply because it has been a confusing year and it is convenient to avoid making forecasts.

That the new prosecutor general should refrain from recording conversations with ministers or actively seeking new positions halfway through their term.

That the people who actively question the need to procure ammunition should not present themselves as experts in military deterrence.

That the «Men, Get in Shape!» campaign should not stop at growing mustaches and doing push-ups but result in more public exercise areas. Central Tallinn would be a good place to start.

That Estonia's security elite should have at least a rough plan for what to do if, by mid-year, we wake up to an unexpectedly harsh new reality when the period of uncertainty ends.

That defense professionals transitioning to the defense industry should not be demonized based on social speculation.

That the Internal Security Service should hold an internal discussion on lessons learned from last year's communication efforts.

That discussions about leaving the Ottawa Treaty should also consider evidence-based humanitarian factors.

That the prime minister should ask the new secretary of state to organize a tabletop exercise simulating what to do if a Russian attack drone, like the one in Latvia last year, violates Estonian airspace.

That the Riigikogu's defense report should include not just the recycled ideas of Meelis Kiili (Reform Party) and his «club of disgruntled generals» but also new and important ideas.

That the term «deterrence» should not be used unless it includes real, concrete actions, capabilities, and rules of engagement that can effectively stop the adversary if necessary.

That NATO should stop making false promises to Ukraine about future membership at the summit in The Hague.

That Estonia should push harder on European defense bonds and the country's own 0.25 percent strategy to gain allied support.

That Estonia should revive its broad-based security agenda and take the lead in managing hybrid warfare at a professional level.

That Estonia's maritime defense should develop a new vision aligned with the realities of planet Earth.