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When talking about the leader of Russia, only Putin is mentioned. He is seen as the beginning and the end, a generic name synonymous with Russia itself. It's the easiest way, but is it also the most accurate? The following piece seeks to answer the question of who or what actually governs Russia. The answer might be surprising. Let's start our search from home.
Why didn't Estonians become Soviet people? The prerequisites to become Soviet people were certainly in place. Fifty years of life in the Soviet (actually Russian) information field should have transformed us after all. Back then, daily information was largely restricted to official propaganda outlets; TV, radio, and newspapers were under party control.
Our national heroes and symbols had been mostly replaced with Russian ones. For example, on my journey from home to the building of Estonian Television, I passed through streets named after Gagarin, Michurin, Suvorov, Gogol, and Lomonosov, and my high school was on Matrosov Street. University curricula included a number of «red» subjects, starting with the history of the CPSU and ending with scientific communism.
However, an analysis of the subsequent actions and views of those who lived in the Russian information field demonstrates to us that even a very long period of time lived in the information field of another country did not lead to irreversible changes in national ideology. When the opportunity arose to restore Estonia's independence, for most people the Russian information influence quickly disappeared.
The force that overcame the massive and aggressive Russian information field must have been very strong then. I will try to explain this phenomenon through the concept of the mythosphere.
This term has not been used in Estonian-language writing, nor in Russian. In English, it is primarily known as the name of a band playing heavy metal. In France, a magazine of this name was published a couple of dozen years ago, but it analyzed primarily semiotic systems, symbols, and image. I adopted this term to try to explain the psychological, communicative and behavioral processes we are part of every day.
The word mythosphere of course comes from the word myth, so in Estonian, it could also be called the field of myth. The simplest definition of myth is of it being a symbolic narrative that explains reality. In most cases, the author is unknown. However, when we believe in a certain myth, it influences our decisions and actions. There are many myths that influence us, and different groups may have very different ones.
If we were to try to define the mythosphere, it would be a set of national, historical, cultural, educational, and experiential symbolic narratives.
The dominant myth of Estonia throughout the occupation period was freedom. Estonia's independence as a national dream remained alive through the decades, through violence and over generations. In practice, it turned out that the stories told by grandparents and great-grandparents, memories of previous independence, and the national culture, were stronger than the decisions of all the congresses of the CPSU and propaganda pressures combined.
Most of the important information was conveyed through unofficial channels and only through interpersonal communication. A large part of the national mythos is acquired by children in domestic interactions, often before they are exposed to the influence of school or media outlets.
The following rules for the functioning of the mythosphere have proven themselves over time.
1. The mythosphere does not submit to criticism; it is the final truth for a certain period. If we believe that the best form of Estonia's existence is independence, it is practically impossible to change our stance on this matter.
2. The mythosphere cannot be rationalized. It is like love, blindly believed. The information field meanwhile is an object of constant criticism.
3. The mythosphere, like the myth, cannot be easily corrected, it can only be replaced by another myth.
4. Changing the mythosphere is a long-term process; it can take generations. For a quicker change, a very powerful new factor or shock is needed. For example, in Germany, the myth of the superiority of the Aryan race only changed after defeat in two world wars.
If the mythosphere works this way for us, it is the same for other nations and cultures. All have their guiding stories, which largely define their way of being and relationships. In most cases, the myths of different nations live peacefully side by side. For instance, the myths and heroes of Estonia, Latvia, and Finland do not conflict with each other. Moreover, we respect them and learn the stories significant for these nations both in schools and universities.
There are cases, however, where mythospheres are not only in conflict, but at war. We happen to live in a place that Samuel Huntington has called a cultural fault line, meaning we live next to the Russian mythosphere. The dominant Russian myth of the imperialism of their state (which, too, is believed blindly and without analysis) is in stark opposition with the independence ideals of dozens of other nations. One excludes the other, meaning that if the Russian imperial dream comes true, others will disappear as independent entities. This claim was proven with the start of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, when imperialist instincts forced Russia to attack a nation of 45 million people.
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 was the best time of their lives for hundreds of millions of people and dozens of nations. Latvia's former president, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, also said this directly to Putin at their meeting in 2001. Putin definitely did not agree, for people like him it was the greatest catastrophe, because power over other nations was lost.
For very many, their mental address to this day is not «a house and a street», but «my address is the Soviet Union». These lines from David Tukhmanov and Viktor Kharitonov's hit song were not just words; they represented a major ideology.
In Russia, the demise of the USSR did not only bring mental suffering to the nomenklatura, but regular Russian people also had very strong feelings about it. According to Levada Center polls, in 2012, 49 percent of Russians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union, whereas by 2018, this ratio had risen to 66 percent. That is, the beautiful mythical past is also very attractive to the average citizen.
For very many, their mental address to this day is not «a house and a street», but «my address is the Soviet Union». These lines from David Tukhmanov and Viktor Kharitonov's hit song were not just words; they represented a major ideology.
The pain of the loss of colonies caused great confusion in the 1990s, which later manifested itself in hatred towards Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin and accusations of them having dismantled the empire.
Vladimir Putin restored the idea of Russian imperialism, all the way to the concept of Russian civilization. Since his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, it has been clear that Russia's unofficial, but in the eyes of much of the population, official ideology is the restoration of the Russian empire. This direction has granted Putin extraordinary power, and the more aggressive he is towards the former territories, the greater popularity he enjoys.
Martti J. Kari (1960-2023) was a Finnish expert on Russia, whose 2018 lecture at the University of Jyväskylä, «Russian strategic culture: Why Russia does things the way it does,» was very popular. Kari has described Russia's historical strategy from the time of the Mongols to the present day and explained why phenomena such as one-man rule, corruption, and cruelty are alive there to this day.
He notes that the major mystification of Russia only began during the time of Peter the Great, and many of the great narratives and role models originate from his era. Earlier still, during the rule of Ivan III, an ideology emerged suggesting that Russia does not want to capture foreign lands, but only those territories that border on its own, meaning everything. All subsequent autocrats have continued in the same vein.
Russian journalist Kirill Nabutov, who fled Russia at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, has produced a series of programs over the past year on Russia's expansion – from Siberia and Turkestan to Finland and Bessarabia. The programs show how, along with the growth of the state's size, came the myth of exclusiveness, wisdom, and superiority.
Paradoxically, the greatest champion of this image of exclusiveness and superiority is not a Russian, but a Georgian, Joseph Stalin. On May 24, 1945, in his toast to the commanders of the Red Army dedicated to the victory in World War II, he articulated the leading role of the Russian nation over all other nations. Stalin remains the most revered leader in Russian history to this day, and the majority believe to this day that he was right.
This summer, Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. His interlocutor was political scientist and presidential adviser Sergey Karaganov, whose speech was later aptly headlined by Radio Liberty as «Why did God send Putin to Karaganov?» According to Karaganov, of course, so that Putin would save the world.
Sergey Karaganov is 25 days older than Putin, born on September 12, 1952. In 1992, back in Yeltsin's time, he penned the so-called Karaganov doctrine. This doctrine called for the active protection of the rights of Russians in the «near abroad», which includes our region. It advocates for the preservation of the Russian-speaking population and the defense of the Russian language, education, and media. Accusations of «systematic discrimination» against Russians became a favorite topic among Russian politicians and the mass media when discussing the Baltic states.
As Karaganov put it, Boris Yeltsin was «psycho-physically weak» during his time in power – likely a reference to the president's fondness for alcohol –and thus, he could not handle the likes of us actively enough at the time. The situation improved only with Putin's rise to power. It is astonishing how accurately Karaganov's doctrine has been followed when it comes to the former Soviet Union, which makes him an important ideologue for Russia.
In the past year, he has spoken frequently, including come up with utterances reflecting the whole pain of the loss of the Russian empire and the passion to regain it. He considers Russia to be mentally superior to others. For example, he said: «Russia is a genetically authoritarian state; it has been formed over the course of history and has shaped our genetic code.» He also remarked: «You don't give a monkey a grenade. They gave one to Ukraine and look what happened.» He has described the leaders of the Baltic states as «intellectual dwarfs». These are just a few examples of his utterances.
Now, he plays a particularly important role in spreading the ideology of nuclear war. In his article «A difficult but necessary decision», he calls on Russia to start a nuclear war, because only in this way would it be possible to save humanity. Most of what he says is top-to-bottom text. «A few dozen bombs on US bases, 100,000 dead, and they're going to start making sense,» he has threatened.
Thirty years ago, he was almost regarded as a top liberal intellectual of Russia and a welcome speaker in the West. Now he is under sanctions for threatening nuclear war, but it's nevertheless shocking to see what the loss of empire can do to a man. Now, as an old man, he is prepared, at least in words, to kill tens of millions in defense of the Russian mythosphere.
The aggressive imposition of one's worldview and power has not gone painlessly for Russia. In Europe in particular (the East and China are a different matter), Russia's reputation has been badly damaged. The changes are extensive and in most cases irreversible.
1. The Russian army, thanks to the bravery of the Ukrainians, is no longer an invincible colossal force. This has led to an increase in national defense budgets, the development of military industries and the enlargement of NATO.
2. As a result of the war, Vladimir Putin's image has transformed from that of a great strategist to a war criminal.
3. The myth of the Russian army as the liberator of Europe has been shattered, as the war crimes committed in Ukraine are more recent and emotionally more impactful. This has led to and continues to fuel a «monument war», where countries, one after another, are ridding themselves of thousands of Russian war symbols.
4. The war changed the lives of millions of Russians living abroad (including in our country), as the Karaganovian narrative of constant discrimination and being the elite victim in Europe no longer works.
5. The role of the forced imposition of Russian culture is being redefined. During the USSR, variants of Russian literature, art and film were imposed on many nations. In Estonia alone, millions of copies of books about socialist labor heroism and Russian heroes have now lost their meaning.
6. Many Russian cultural figures who have aligned themselves with Putin and support for the war are now excluded from international life and contacts.
7. The use of the Russian language is rapidly decreasing.
As things stand, it is hard to imagine what development scenarios could restore Russia's reputation. Possible military successes will not bring respect, and the very popular question in Russia, «Why don't you love us?» will not be worth asking for decades, perhaps even generations.
The exceptional resilience of the mythosphere to external pressure, discussed above, also applies in Russia.
Most people there believe that all of Europe and the «collective West» are going in the wrong direction. The following arguments are valid today, although time may make certain corrections to some.
1. Three years of war has not diminished Putin's popularity; even without falsifying votes, he would win any election now.
2. There is no visible anti-war movement in Russia.
3. The majority of people in Russia do not seem to have any desire for democracy. Instead, due to propaganda, the words «democracy» and «democrats» have become curse words.
4. The number of casualties in the Ukraine war, which seems large to people outside Russia, does not have the expected impact. Russia has 1,117 towns and cities and 100,000 inhabited villages, and has so far put glory and propaganda to the fore when it comes to casualties.
5. The impact of sanctions has been smaller than the West had hoped. With the help of many greedy countries and businesspeople, an «alternative trade» quickly emerged.
6. The protests of the opposition living abroad have not had much of an impact. Moreover, over time, it has become clear that many opposition figures are also stuck in the idea of Russian empire.
7. The economic factors that in the early 1980s became decisive in the disintegration of the USSR do not work in Russia now. The thriving war economy and the large amounts paid for participation in the war have improved the standard of living of many groups and regions.
8. The war has boosted the self-esteem of many people because, according to the propaganda, the Russian people are fighting the whole world alone and are winning.
From the foregoing, it is easy to see that much more radical political and economic shocks than have taken place are needed to bring about any major changes. The mindset of «I support no matter what» and «it must be must endured» is very strong to this day.
In order to compensate for the great decline in reputation outside the country and reduce domestic threats, Russia has embarked on an exceptionally vigorous war to protect its mythosphere. Nothing nearly similar has happened before, as social media, which has dramatically increased the possibilities of direct contact, has been added to the information influence toolbox.
Since free speech and Russian-style authoritarianism cannot coexist for long, the country is closing itself off, much like in the days of the Soviet Union. For years now, instead of information, slogans emphasizing the exceptionalism of Russians as an ethnos have been offered, such as «Russia never starts wars, it only ends them,» «Russia has never lost a war», «Russia has never invaded anyone», «We are a nation of victors», and so on. The degree to which Russia's public sphere is rife with myth is clearly demonstrated by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's stance in his interview with Tucker Carlson on December 6, 2024.
Lavrov said: «It is not us who started the war. President Putin has repeatedly said that we started the special military operation in order to end the war that the Kyiv regime was waging against its own people in the Donbass.»
Putin is the physical embodiment of the fight for Russian myths, a tool for implementing the ideology in the present day. This means that with his departure, not much will change.
Such substitution of reality with alternative communication variants and calling the war something else is currently the main methodology in Russia.
Since they understand the significance of myths very well in Moscow, one method applied towards us is rupturing and replacing local national narratives. At least 25 negative stereotypes are constantly employed in hundreds of media stories. Estonia and the other Baltic countries are portrayed as temporary, poor, with puppet armies, fascist, anti-Semitic, with declining populations, as half-starved American lackeys living off European subsidies. To spread this narrative, a number of local social media influencers have also been activated.
It is easy to see that the war of the mythospheres is in a very acute phase and all methods are used: physical, communicative, and virtual.
I hope the answer to the title of this article is now clear. Russia is governed by its national mythosphere. The ideology of the mythosphere also guides Putin in his actions. Putin is just the physical embodiment of the fight for Russian myths, a tool for implementing the ideology in the present day. This means that with his departure, not much will change; the Russian people's dream will continue to be that of an empire, not a state. This internal conviction drives people's actions, mobilizes the population for the conquest of neighboring lands.
The next generations are there too. Under Putin, a new generation of enthusiastic imperialists has been brought up through active propaganda. A grandson of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, also Yevgeny Primakov, a politician, diplomat and campaigner for «compatriot rights», has summed up Russia's threats thus: «I know a lot of ways to get the bear out of its den. But I don't know of any to get it back in.»
Another descendant of a famous figure, writer Leo Tolstoy's great-grandson Pyotr Tolstoy, also a former journalist, is now making a successful political career. Eight months ago, he became famous in France when he, with his jaw trembling with anger, threatened to kill every last French soldier who comes to Ukraine.
Europe is now facing its moment of truth. Until the war in Ukraine, a large part of European countries desired to live without change and to ignore the aggressiveness of the Russian world. The Czech literary genius Jaroslav Hašek jokingly created a party called The Party of Moderate Progress Within the Bounds of the Law in 1914 to describe this mindset. With the war in Ukraine, Russia has rendered the sustainability of such a conflict-free life laughable.
Russia acknowledges only greater force. NATO has a military budget ten times larger than Russia's, vastly greater human resources and higher scientific and technical level, but something seems to be missing.
However, if there nevertheless were the courage to seriously confront Russia, the main enemy should not be misidentified. It is not Putin; it is the Russian mythosphere – aggressive and bent on conquest.
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