:format(webp)/nginx/o/2024/12/13/16541095t1h79b8.jpg)
The outgoing Year of the Dragon, 2024, was challenging, yet it paved the way for an even more difficult Year of the Snake. Let us briefly examine the impact of the US presidential elections on just one of the key events of the past year, observer Raivo Vare writes.
The dynamics of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine have been significantly influenced by the prominence of the US presidential election, especially in the United States. From late last fall until April, amidst the election frenzy, the Republican Trumpist leadership in the House of Representatives failed to put a crucial and decisive aid package for Ukraine to a vote.
As a result, the Russians gained strategic momentum on the frontlines and in their attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. Faced with a severe shortage of warfare resources, especially ammunition, Ukrainians were unable to fully resist the Russians' broad-front offensives and massive bombardments of the civilian sector.
While Ukraine skillfully used its limited resources to prevent a complete collapse of the frontlines and protect the rear from major damage, the Russians managed to secure several key positions in Donbas. Despite sustaining losses, they continue to exert pressure with widespread attacks and heavy bombardments of Ukraine's energy and residential sectors as winter approaches.
Later developments on the war fronts have also been closely tied to the US presidential election. In August, Kyiv tried to counterbalance the loss of strategic initiative with a surprise and initially successful incursion into Russia's Kursk region. The goal was to create a bargaining chip by exchanging captured territory for that of Kursk.
However, Kyiv failed to anticipate that instead of pulling troops from Donbas as hoped, Putin intensified offensive operations there and elsewhere. He did not appear overly concerned about losing a relatively small portion of territory.
At the same time, Putin, preparing for Donald Trump's presidency, has begun pressuring the Kursk region more forcefully, aiming to neutralize the Kyiv bargaining position before the new president assumes office. This is intended to strengthen his hand in any future negotiations.
The US election context also shaped the behavior of the incumbent Democratic administration throughout the year. Initially, President Joe Biden, for his own campaign interests, and later Kamala Harris, exhibited extreme caution in providing military aid to Ukraine.
One infamous example was Biden's insistence on prohibiting the use of long-range weapons on Russian territory. The administration also limited the scale and speed of various aid packages, citing concerns over «avoiding escalation» and the need to safeguard Democrats' chances in an increasingly isolationist American electorate. Additionally, there were claims that US arsenals were running low, and some aid would not significantly impact the situation anyway.
Following the Democrats' loss to Republicans, the Biden administration has abruptly changed its rhetoric. Under the guidance of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, they are now trying to provide Ukraine with as much aid as possible before Trump takes office. President Biden has issued direct orders to that effect, fully aware that Trump will immediately halt such aid upon assuming office.
The United States has already provided over 120 billion dollars in military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, with military-technical support being the most crucial for the war effort. Although Biden missed the opportunity to utilize lend-lease-style assistance, he retains the authority to use the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) clause to allocate aid from existing stockpiles. Reportedly, this could amount to as much as 4.2 billion or more dollars' worth of weapons aid, but logistical challenges might hinder its delivery within the remaining weeks.
This entire rush to provide expanded aid at the end of the year clearly stems from the desire to give Ukraine enough support to hold out at least until next summer or early fall.
Europe is also stepping up its support for Ukrainians both institutionally and bilaterally with weapons and funds, as well as by developing the energy and defense industries through joint production or placing orders with Ukraine's own defense industry. The estimated annual capacity of Ukraine's defense industry is 30 billion dollars, but due to the country's significant budget deficit, it can only finance orders worth 10 billion. In total, European countries have pledged nearly 200 billion dollars in aid, of which only half has been delivered in any form.
The aid package also includes funds allocated to Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian state assets, as decided by the G7. The EU has signed agreements to allocate 35 billion euros, while the United States, in a last-minute move before Trump's arrival, has contributed 20 billion dollars, channeled through the World Bank. European Council President António Costa, who pointedly visited Kyiv on his first day in office alongside the EU's high representative for foreign affairs and the commissioner for enlargement, promised that, in addition to the already allocated multibillion-euro funds, Kyiv will receive a stable 1.5 billion euros each month throughout the coming year. All of this aid is desperately needed, as Ukraine's state budget is at least fifty percent in deficit due to the war.
This entire rush to provide expanded aid at the end of the year clearly stems from the desire to give Ukraine enough support to hold out at least until next summer or early fall. The underlying hope is that by next fall, some form of resolution can be achieved—either a ceasefire or a political agreement to end the war. All the more so because Trump has promised to address this very quickly upon taking office.
It is clear that Trump cannot fulfill his promise to end the war within 24 hours. This is due both to purely technical reasons and to the extent to which the opposing sides are even willing to engage in such a resolution immediately.
Although the battlefield is somewhat in a stalemate of attrition, it would be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to agree to what would likely be harsh terms, including significant territorial losses and some sort of political concessions. There is even talk of new elections, as they have been postponed due to the war. However, this could lead to a change in power, something the current leadership of the country would find hard to support.
Putin, on the other hand, is believed to remain strongly convinced that he will prevail and that Ukraine's capacity to sustain the war will falter before Russia's. This belief is reinforced by the growing signs of war fatigue in Western countries, recent political shifts, and the expectation that upcoming elections in the next few years will further support this trend. While Russia’s economic situation continues to deteriorate steadily, it still has some leeway. Moreover, the war-oriented economy has become somewhat path-dependent, making its conversion back to peacetime conditions far from easy.
In any case, this question is increasingly being asked: what happens if Trump fails to bring the parties to the negotiating table? Given the circumstances, Kyiv could resist pressure from Washington for at least another six months, and Putin might outright refuse to comply if his preconditions are not met. Would this mean Trump has to endure a setback to his carefully cultivated image as a master dealmaker, or would he reverse current assumptions and fully support Ukraine to pressure the Kremlin? This latter scenario is what many are hoping for, and not only in Kyiv. Alternatively, Trump might disregard Ukrainian interests altogether and engage directly with Putin, accommodating his demands to bring Ukraine under Russian control. In practice, this would amount to a repetition of Munich 1938 in some form. Only time will reveal the outcome, but the outgoing year will undoubtedly go down in history as a sad period of the collapse and transformation of the existing world order.
/nginx/o/2024/03/04/15927132t1h6457.jpg)