VLADIMIR JUSHKIN ⟩ Mini-Tauruses will help bring a turning point in the Ukraine war

Helsing is planning to mass-produce inexpensive drones with X-shaped wings that can fly alone or in swarms over several dozen kilometers to complete assigned combat missions. Photo: Helsing

• The Kremlin is sustaining its combat operations primarily using stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment.
• Most Russian defense factories are already working around the clock.
• German-made attack drones compensate for the absence of Tauruses

The Russian army is rapidly draining its reserves of manpower and military equipment, but it can replace them to a sufficient degree to continue fighting for a short time. Ukraine could offset the resource asymmetry with drones guided by artificial intelligence (AI), according to Vladimir Jushkin, director of the Baltic Center for Russian Studies.

In Europe, which the Kremlin perceives as merely the western peninsula of Asia, some politicians and experts argue that expanding support for Ukraine and de facto integrating the country into NATO structures would push the world to the brink of a third world war. Others believe that failing to involve Ukraine fully and offering only partial support undermines the alliance's global credibility and erodes it from within. It is evident that, at this stage, Ukraine's defeat is clearly perceived, both internally and externally, as a defeat for the alliance.

There are also two opposing views on the prolongation of the war. The first suggests that the war in Ukraine has exhausted Russia's war machine and army. Regardless of how the conflict ends, Russia is now severely weakened due to its costs and sanctions, making it a much less dangerous adversary in the long term than it was before the full-scale war began.

The opposing view emphasizes that the war has bolstered Russia's military-industrial complex, mobilized its economic resources for military construction, and transformed the largely outdated army that entered Ukraine in February 2022 into a force with unique skills for adaptable warfare honed through hard combat experience.

Let us try to make a choice in this strategic dilemma.

The depletion of Russian army personnel

From the early 1990s to the late 2010s, the size of the Russian army declined, stabilizing around 1.9 million personnel (including one million military personnel), according to presidential decrees issued in 2016–2017.

The Russian army lost its most capable and well-trained units within the first weeks after invading Ukraine. According to a joint project by the BBC and Mediazona, confirmed losses during the war include approximately 3,000 soldiers from airborne troops (including 512 officers), 1,150 naval infantry, and nearly 700 special forces operatives (the actual losses may be significantly higher, possibly double).

During the war, Putin has increased the size of the army on three occasions, reaching 2.4 million personnel (including 1.5 million military personnel) by the latest decree, comparable to levels in the mid-1990s. Civilian staff numbers have not increased, but the number of military personnel has grown 1.5 times as a result of these three decrees. This has been achieved through an effective ban on demobilization and the offer of extremely high financial incentives for voluntary enlistment in the «special military operation.»

The Russian army currently fighting in Ukraine cannot serve as the foundation for a post-war Russian military capable of effectively attacking other nations.

Additionally, the military education system, which during the Soviet era could produce the 60,000 officers annually needed for a four-million-strong force, is now designed for a much smaller one-million-strong force and cannot adapt quickly. Many training institutions have been consolidated or downsized over the past two decades.

According to military experts, units formed during the war from hastily recruited fighters characterized by high turnover are unlikely to become the basis for a professional Russian army despite their gained combat experience. To rebuild an army comparable to its size in the early 1990s, Russia would need to recreate the infrastructure that has gradually been dismantled over the past 25 years. This reduction followed the concept of maintaining a professional, compact army focused on local assaults and «special operations» in conflict zones. Building and maintaining an army capable of large-scale offensives requires entirely different expenditures.

In general, it has been concluded that the Russian army currently fighting in Ukraine cannot serve as the foundation for a post-war Russian military capable of effectively attacking other countries.

The depletion of Russian military equipment

There is a general consensus among analysts that, despite significant losses, the Kremlin has managed to sustain active combat in Ukraine primarily by relying on strategic reserves of Soviet-era military equipment. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), at the start of the war, Russia's strategic reserves included approximately 10,000 tanks, 18,500 various armored vehicles, 4,200 self-propelled and 12,400 towed artillery systems, and 3,200 multiple rocket launchers. Dara Massicot, a senior researcher in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that during the war, Russia's Defense Ministry has established about 270 facilities for the operational repair of military equipment, some located only 15–20 kilometers from the front line. This setup allows Russia, according to IISS, to sustain combat at the current intensity for another two to three years. The British Ministry of Defense offers a more conservative estimate, suggesting that the current rate of losses will allow Russia to maintain its combat capabilities at least until 2026.

The depletion of the military-industrial complex

Russia's military-industrial complex remains dependent on critical imported components and industrial equipment, which have become difficult to access due to sanctions. The greatest shortages are in the production of engines, turbines, and microelectronics. Defense sector companies face low productivity, a shortage of skilled workers, and issues with the limited lifespan of machinery used in military production. These structural limitations leave Russia's military-industrial complex poorly equipped to cope with the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

Dara Massicot estimates that since 2022, Russia's venture capital market for military technology startups has shrunk by 56 percent annually, while defense procurement has grown by 10 percent. Despite numerous problems in Russia's military-industrial complex, the country is capable of rebuilding its military forces more quickly than NATO in the short term and in the perspective of five to ten years. Most NATO countries (except those in the northeastern part of the alliance) are not responding adequately to this reality, creating a dangerous imbalance. If the Kremlin perceives opportunities arising from Western weaknesses or internal disagreements, it may launch a provocative strike even before its military capabilities are fully restored.

Significant increases in production have enabled Moscow to supply about 1,500 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles to the front each year, as well as produce nearly 200 Iskander missiles annually. Russia's monthly artillery shell production is estimated at 250,000—three times the combined output of the United States and Europe. Some experts consulted by the Atlantic Council argue, however, that these advancements in military construction have only made the Russian military «terribly bad» instead of catastrophic, with limited prospects for further improvement.

Post-war military-industrial development programs also face limitations due to a general labor shortage in the economy. Most Russian defense factories already operate around the clock, relying on prisoners and foreign technical college students as labor. Building new factories would require the purchase of significant amounts of machinery and equipment, which is restricted by sanctions.

How to compensate for resource asymmetry

The Russia-Ukraine military conflict could, in some respects, be considered the first drone war in history. Drones have largely enabled Ukrainian forces to compensate for the asymmetry in weaponry and manpower during certain stages of the conflict. Success in drone technology competition could balance Russia's advantages in a war of attrition that initially appeared insurmountable.

Gathering intelligence on the battlefield has become the primary use of drones. Today, no maneuvers or attacks are carried out without drone support, which provides real-time information about enemy positions. Consequently, attacks in the current conflict have nearly lost the element of surprise, and the overall advantage of defense over offense has significantly increased.

Avoiding escalation and direct confrontation between NATO and Russia leads to a trap—attempts to avoid escalation ultimately result in escalation.

Modern electronic warfare technologies can disrupt a drone's communication with its operator. However, a solution has already been found – AI-guided drones that operate without such communication, as they can identify and strike targets based on pre-programmed instructions.

According to the German publication Bild, the German startup Helsing, which specializes in AI-guided drones, signed a contract in September 2024 with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to deliver 4,000 attack drones (manufactured by a Ukrainian company in cooperation with the Germans).

These drones are already referred to as mini-Tauruses in professional circles. The German Taurus cruise missiles, which Germany has so far refused to supply to Ukraine, are also characterized by the stability of their autonomous guidance systems under conditions of electronic warfare.

According to Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the difference between the Taurus missile and the mini-Taurus drone is that the missile is pre-programmed for a specific static target before launch. In contrast, the latest drone uses AI to identify targets mid-flight—it is programmed, among other things, to detect Russian military equipment. AI offers additional capabilities even compared to powerful Western weapons like HIMARS, as the Russians have learned to jam not only radio frequencies but also GPS satellite navigation used by HIMARS. The technical parameters of the mini-Taurus remain classified. It is known that a typical FPV drone (a drone piloted in virtual reality mode) has an operational range of seven to ten kilometers. The mini-Taurus presumably has a range of up to 40 kilometers.

Experts estimate that the mass deployment of AI-guided drones could permanently offset Russia's well-known key advantage in a long-term conflict between Russia and Ukraine—its superiority in manpower.

Thus, avoiding escalation and direct confrontation between NATO and Russia (viewing the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a regional issue) leads to a trap—efforts to avoid escalation end up causing it. The only way to prevent escalation is to accept its costs and risks in advance, recognizing the existential nature of the conflict.

Since December 1, Estonian diplomacy has had the opportunity to explain this complex logic to its allies living further away from the the Narova River.