MARTIN MÖLDER ⟩ Voters' worldview has undergone an ideological awakening

Martin Mölder. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• The terms «left-wing» and «right-wing» are meaningless for the Estonian electorate as a whole.
• EKRE voters have become distinctly more conservative in their self-identification.
• For some reason, many young women in particular have become ideologically active.

In the ideological framework of Estonian politics, a significant change has taken place over the last few parliamentary cycles. Estonian citizens' ideological self-identification on the liberal-conservative scale has become a very clear and important indicator, while self-identification on the left-right scale has lost what little meaning it once had, political scientist Martin Mölder writes.

This overview is based on surveys into values commissioned by the Institute for the Study of Societal Issues and conducted by Turu-Uuringute AS and Norstat from 2016 to 2024. During this period, 12 such surveys of values were carried out. The surveys included repeated questions about Estonian citizens' general ideological self-identification and specific economic and social views.

In 2016, issues such as attitudes towards progressive taxation, economic competition, or state ownership and privatization were somewhat (though not strongly) linked to Estonians' left-right ideological self-identification. By 2024, however, nearly all these associations had disappeared or diminished significantly. In 2016, about 15 percent of people's self-identification on the left-right scale could be explained by specific economic attitudes (based on six economic worldview-related questions repeated across surveys). By 2024, this had dropped to five percent. This essentially means that by 2024, Estonian citizens' left-right ideological self-identification bore no relation to specific economic policy attitudes. For the Estonian electorate as a whole, the terms «left-wing» and «right-wing» are meaningless.

On the social values dimension, however, developments have been the exact opposite. Over nine years, the questions associated most strongly with general ideological self-identification have remained the same. The four most important topics in both 2016 and 2024 were attitudes towards immigration from a different cultural background, homosexuality, same-sex partnerships, and same-sex couples' right to adopt children. In 2016, these four topics explained about 14 percent of citizens’ self-identification on the liberal-conservative scale; by 2024, this had grown to 47 percent. Half of Estonians' placement on the liberal-conservative scale can now be explained by these four topics. In the broader context of social science, this is an extremely significant increase and a very strong correlation.

The liberal-conservative dimension now offers far greater clarity in politics than it did nine years ago.

What does this mean in practice? It means that the liberal-conservative dimension functions very effectively in Estonia's political space. Remarkably better than in 2016, when there was considerable confusion on this issue, and people held contradictory views (see Akadeemia No. 6, 2017, «Nähtamatu enamus: Eesti kodanike liberaalne ja konservatiivne enesemääratlus ning hoiakud 2016. ja 2017. aastal»). Today, Estonian voters know very well what these terms mean. Citizens' specific attitudes align with their general self-identification. The liberal-conservative dimension provides far greater clarity in politics than it did nine years ago. Liberalism and conservatism have become important and well-functioning beacons on Estonia's political landscape. This marks a significant development and, from the perspective of political clarity, a positive one.

Conversely, the economic left-right dimension has regressed. Even in 2016, these terms did very little to explain people's specific attitudes. By now, even that minimal explanatory power has disappeared. The terms «left-wing» and «right-wing» create confusion, not clarity. For Estonian politics to become more transparent and understandable for voters and politicians alike, the left-right ideological dimension must undergo a similar awakening to what has occurred with the liberal-conservative dimension over the past nine years. Half the work has been done; half remains. At a time of economic complexity like the present, this is particularly important as fundamental economic policy issues demand political attention.

With the social values dimension becoming clearer, we also see how party supporters have shifted to somewhat more distinct positions during this period.

In 2016, supporters of all parties (except EKRE) were relatively close to the midpoint of the scale (5) and near the average voter. By 2024, significant movement and differentiation have occurred. EKRE voters have become distinctly more conservative in their self-identification, while supporters of the Social Democrats, Reform Party, and Estonia 200 have become distinctly more liberal. Currently, Isamaa's voter base, having significantly expanded in the last year, is closest to the average voter. Meanwhile, EKRE supporters and Estonia 200 supporters are furthest from the average voter, almost equally but in opposite directions.

With the social values dimension becoming ideologically clearer, an interesting and potentially troubling divide has emerged, reflecting similar trends in other Western countries. For instance, in the United States, Germany, and England, a significant ideological divergence between young men and young women has been observed over the past year (Financial Times, January 26, 2024, «A New Global Gender Divide Is Emerging»). Something similar is evident in Estonia, and not only among the young but occasionally across other voter groups. This is most apparent when examining the topic most strongly associated with the liberal-conservative dimension—same-sex couples' right to adopt children.

The following chart shows the percentage of men and women in different age groups who, over the observed period, answered «completely agree» to this question, choosing the most liberal option.

Until about 2020, the views of both men and women on this matter across all age groups were close to the average voter and rather conservative. Strong support for same-sex couples' right to adopt children came predominantly from a small segment of society. Then, something changed significantly. Among women under 50, especially those under 35, views on this issue explosively became more liberal, while the positions of men in these age groups remained stable and close to the average voter. The ideological divide between genders is now clearly visible, and for some reason, many young women in particular have become ideologically active.

Young men and women are the future parents of Estonian children yet to be born. It would be extremely tragic if these ideological differences, in an emotionally polarized atmosphere that fosters mutual disdain and prejudice rather than understanding and closeness, prevented families from forming. For in this, we ultimately risk losing our future.