FOOKUS ⟩ Anti-personnel landmines in Estonia: a cost-effective solution or an expensive problem?

Explosive ordnance specialists of the defense forces clearing World War II-era munitions. Photo: Kaitsevägi

• The data on the military effectiveness of anti-personnel landmines is not particularly encouraging.
• The Taliban's successful use of mines against Western forces is not transferable to Estonia.
• The commander of the Finnish defense forces suggests a broader discussion on military technology.

The debate on anti-personnel landmines, reignited in Estonia last week largely inspired by Finland (the topic was last discussed publicly in 2022), has previously given the impression that these weapons are decisive in strengthening Estonia's national defense. However, military history does not unequivocally support this notion. Nonetheless, modern landmines could prove necessary in specific tactical situations in Estonia, editor Meelis Oidsalu writes.

Due to the recent decision by the United States to donate anti-personnel mines to Ukraine, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines and the question of maintaining a membership in the convention in the changed security environment have once again become hot topics in Estonia. The convention was adopted in 1997 and was joined by the three Baltic states in the early 2000s—much earlier than Finland, which joined only in 2012. To date, 164 member states have destroyed a total of 55 million anti-personnel mines under the agreement.

According to the annually compiled Landmine Report, the use of landmines and improvised explosive devices caused at least 5,757 victims in 2023.

The reason for banning anti-personnel mines is similar to other largely prohibited types of weapons or methods of warfare (chemical weapons, carpet bombing, cluster munitions, etc.). They cause significant harm to civilians, and their use makes it difficult to distinguish between combatants and the civilian population. Additionally, the consequences of conflicts persist long after battles have ended: unexploded ordnance, environmental damage, and psychological trauma impact local communities for decades.

According to the annually compiled Landmine Report, the use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) caused at least 5,757 victims in 2023. Of these victims, 84 percent were civilians, including 37 percent children. This means that 1,498 children were killed or injured in mine explosions. The most victims were recorded in Myanmar (1,003), Syria (933), and Afghanistan and Ukraine, each with over 500 victims.

The United States has not joined the convention

Anti-personnel mines were used by government forces in 2023 in at least four countries: Myanmar, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, the use of mines by unlawful groups was recorded in Colombia, India, Pakistan, and Gaza in Palestine.

Estonia's largest ally, the United States, has never joined the convention and has justified this by citing the need to use such mines on the Korean Peninsula to protect South Korea and deter North Korea. Between the two Koreas a relatively wide «no man's land» lies, the deterrent effectiveness and risk level of which cannot be transferred to the Baltic context.

Nevertheless, in 2014, the Americans announced that they would not produce new mines. In 2022, US President Joe Biden promised that, in general, the United States would adhere to the principles of the convention, with the exception of the Korean Peninsula for deterring North Korea.

The end of history is over

In light of the war in Ukraine, it has been asked increasingly whether the Ottawa Convention, signed in the «end of history» atmosphere of the 1990s, is still relevant today. Reference is also made to technological advances in mines that effectively reduce residual risks. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques and methods have also improved.

The general political atmosphere has clearly changed, too. A major war has been ongoing in Europe for three years, yet the average defense expenditure of European Union member states remains below two percent of GDP, as Ursula von der Leyen, the newly inaugurated president of the European Commission, recently pointed out with concern. Low defense investments also affect the sense of security in countries bordering Russia, leading to a search for cheaper ways to deter Russia militarily.

Ukrainian EOD specialists searching for mines. Photo: Dmitri Kotjuh

It was for this reason that Lithuania withdrew from the 2008 Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions on July 30 this year. The diplomatic cost associated with this step was minimal. Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide expressed regret, but the topic barely crossed the news threshold in European publications.

The price of simpler mines without self-destruct mechanisms is around 100 euros per mine, while more complex ones can be several times more expensive. Mines with self-destruct features—such as those recently donated by the United States to Ukraine—are more expensive and are consumed more quickly as they become unusable within hours or days.

The price of simpler mines without self-destruct mechanisms is around 100 euros per mine, while more complex ones can be several times more expensive.

The Estonian defense forces are rather skeptical

The density of anti-personnel mine placement depends on the purpose of their use, terrain characteristics, mine availability, and military tactics. Density can range from one to two mines per 100 square meters to one mine per square meter. The extent and density of mine use largely determine the complexity and cost of their removal, particularly in high-density minefields.

On military enthusiast forums such as militaar.net, popular among Estonian defense professionals, various assessments of the military effectiveness of mines can be found. The official stance of the Estonian defense forces (EDF) has so far been skeptical. This skepticism has also been elaborated at length in forum discussions by former EDF commander, General Martin Herem.

The defensive impact of anti-personnel mines tends to be overestimated because mines do not stop enemy attacks but slow them down, making them better targets for defenders. According to Herem, anti-tank mines are more effective for slowing down the enemy. Rapidly installed mines are often unmarked and unmapped, posing risks not only to defenders but also to civilians.

At the Estonian Military Academy, cadets are taught that minefields and barriers are always combined, meaning that at defensive obstacles (e.g., intersections or roads), there is a mix of physical barriers, anti-tank mines (various types: track, bottom, and side mines), and anti-personnel mines. This makes breaching barriers challenging and prevents the technical clearance of barriers with devices such as reactive mine clearance devices. Therefore, even EDF engineers find it difficult to estimate the cost and scale of mine clearance.

Shadows of history over anti-personnel mines

In public discussions, the impact of mines on enemy losses tends to be overestimated. For instance, during the Korean War (1950–1953), mine-related casualties accounted for only about one to two percent of total losses. Similar trends have been observed in other conflicts.

During the Korean War, British, Canadian, South Korean, and Turkish forces built extensive minefields to block infantry attacks by North Korea and the People's Republic of China. Markers for these minefields were lost or destroyed for various reasons, and their own soldiers wandered into the minefields, resulting in injuries or deaths. Additionally, allied forces found that the minefields impeded their own maneuvers, cutting off access to certain areas. Minefields also proved impractical when positions needed to be relocated, as mine removal was time-consuming and dangerous.

US Marines evacuating a soldier wounded in an improvised explosive device explosion in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Photo: BOB STRONG/REUTERS

The minefields established by the Iraqi army in 2003 were ineffective, causing very few losses. Admittedly, the Iraqi army lacked the skills to fight, and the mined areas were often left uncovered by infantry and indirect fire. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the country became one of the most heavily mined in the world. Civilian casualties were colossal.

Confusion is rather common in war

Mines, in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), made a return in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the US Department of Defense, about 60 percent of deaths between 2003 and 2006 were caused by IEDs. However, the Taliban's success with mine warfare in Afghanistan cannot be transferred to Estonia. In Afghanistan and Iraq, individual IEDs were placed where Western forces moved, but minefields were not used.

War often involves coordination errors, information gaps, and confusion, which have also been observed during exercises of the Estonian defense forces. During the 2014 Kevadtorm (Spring Storm) exercise, the Rescue Board asked a representative of the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps' territorial defense staff which route should be used to evacuate civilians from southern Estonia. The staff suggested creating an evacuation corridor through Antsla. By then, the 2nd Infantry Brigade had already dug up and mined everything from Antsla to the Emajõgi River, leading the representative to direct civilians into a mined area. The history of the Korean War and other conflicts suggests that such coordination problems tend to recur.

Scattering anti-personnel mines across Estonian territory also limits the movement of our own forces in situations where gaps in enemy lines must be exploited to conduct swift counterattacks. Therefore, it would be more prudent to use remote mining systems, which essentially involve deploying mines with artillery over several kilometers, preferably onto enemy territory.

Spreading anti-personnel mines across Estonian territory also limits the movement of our own forces in situations where gaps in enemy lines must be exploited to conduct swift counterattacks.

The Estonian defense forces already widely use mines that are passive but permitted by conventions (such as anti-vehicle and anti-track landmines) as well as active, controlled anti-personnel mines, for example M12 mines and protective charges. These are detonated in a controlled manner by defense personnel to harm the enemy while avoiding casualties among Estonian forces or civilians.

A broader discussion is needed

Thus, we already have experience using mines; the question lies in the additional military impact of anti-personnel mines, considering that they do not play a decisive role in defensive operations. They are rather a marginal weapon, with their effects limited by numerous factors.

British General Sir Hugh Beach testified to the House of Commons in 1995: «[W]here 'Regular military use' is concerned there is no case known where AP mines as such have influenced a campaign, a battle or even a skirmish in any decisive way. They marginally increase the usefulness of anti-tank mine fields as instruments of delay and marginally raise the human cost of breaching them.»

«My point is that these effects (marginal, not multiplicatory) while not negligible are nevertheless simply not worth the candle when measured against the scale of human suffering they cause,» he said.

Our professional service members have spoken about the need for early influence on the enemy within Russian territory, while the interest of former military personnel turned defense policymakers in Toompea remains focused on a concept from a decade ago, which restricted defensive actions to Estonian territory.

At the same time, the United States has considered their use on the Korean Peninsula and more recently in Ukraine to be sufficiently justified to refrain from joining the Ottawa Convention. Additionally, a substantive debate has begun in Finland on legalizing the use of anti-personnel mines.

Commander of the Finnish defense forces, General Janne Jaakkola stated in a recent interview with Finnish television channel MTV that the security environment has changed significantly since Finland joined the Ottawa Convention in 2012. However, the Finnish defense chief did not take a position on whether Finland should withdraw from the Ottawa Convention. In his comments, he suggested a broader public discussion on new technologies rather than focusing narrowly on the issue of anti-personnel mines. Estonia would likely do well to follow this example.

A strange political dissonance

Our recent munitions debates reveal a peculiar dissonance. In the summer, members of the national defense committee of the Riigikogu accused the Estonian defense forces of focusing too much on specific weapon systems (long-range firepower) and too little on holistic strategic thinking. The committee also did not support the defense chief's requests for additional ammunition. Now, we see the national defense committee taking the initiative on the issue of anti-personnel mines, a tactical tool.

Members of the national defense committee of the Riigikogu Leo Kunnas and Alar Laneman have also demanded the legalization of anti-personnel mines in previous years. The debate that erupted in Finland encouraged them to revisit this topic. Photo: Madis Veltman

The preferences of the defense forces and the national defense committee also reveal differing institutional views on Estonia's defense. Our professional service members have spoken about the need for early influence on the enemy within Russian territory, while the interest of former military personnel turned defense policymakers in Toompea remains focused on a concept from a decade ago, which restricted defensive actions to Estonian territory.

What makes anti-personnel mines attractive to politicians in their low purchase price. It is much cheaper to demand their acquisition than, for example, the purchase of howitzer ammunition. The quality of the newly revived debate on mines depends on how well politicians and active-duty personnel remain within their legally prescribed roles and whether members of the national defense committee can resist the temptation to assert themselves over the defense forces for reputational reasons after being cornered in ammunition debate this summer.

Anti-personnel mines cannot be used without residual risk to the civilian population.

The cost of clearing landmines varies depending on the area, the extent of contamination, and the methods used. Explosive ordnance disposal is an expensive and time-consuming process requiring specialized personnel, technology, and logistics. For example, clearing one square meter of land can cost between one and two US dollars, but in more complex conditions, this cost can be much higher.

In recent years, progress has been made in clearance methods and tools. Traditional methods, such as manual searching and the use of dogs, have been supplemented with new technologies. For instance, researchers at the University of Mississippi have developed a method using lasers and acoustic vibrations, enabling faster and more efficient detection.

Drones and remotely operated vehicles have also been introduced. These can map and identify suspicious areas without direct human presence, reducing risks to EOD specialists. Additionally, new detectors and sensors have been developed to better distinguish landmines from other objects in the ground, reducing the number of false positives and accelerating the clearance process.

Modern technologies have significantly improved the detection of landmines, but it is still impossible to eliminate the risk entirely. Even with the latest equipment and methods, some mines inevitably remain undetected. This is referred to as residual risk, which generally ranges from one to five percent depending on the area and tools used. While the percentage may seem small, it poses a significant threat, particularly to civilians and deminers.

Environmental conditions such as humidity, temperature, and vegetation can also make mine detection more difficult. Dense vegetation or adverse weather conditions, such as rain or snow, can hinder both visual inspections and the operation of equipment. In Estonia, the abundance of swampy terrain further complicates explosive ordnance disposal efforts.

Over time, landmines may sink deeper into the soil or partially deteriorate, making them harder to detect. When buried deep or degraded, mines may go undetected even by the most advanced equipment. While new technologies, such as lasers and acoustic vibrations, have improved detection efficiency, they are not flawless. Occasionally, materials or objects can interfere with signals, causing false-negative results.

Human factors also play a significant role in the scale of residual risk. The workload on deminers can significantly affect detection accuracy. Human errors, such as inattention or improper use of equipment, can result in mines being overlooked. Therefore, it is essential that EOD specialists are well-trained and supported to minimize the risks associated with their work.

Since residual risk is unavoidable, it is crucial to combine different detection methods and technologies to ensure the most effective clearance. Continuous training and raising awareness are also necessary to protect both civilians and EOD specialists. These costs must also be factored into the comprehensive assessment of the overall cost of anti-personnel mine capabilities.