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PEETER TALI Dictator Putin trying to continue the nuclear poker game

Yars missile system.
Yars missile system. Photo: The Kremlin Moscow
  • The Kremlin probably also considered a nuclear test, which may still take place soon.
  • The shadow of nuclear war once again looms over the minds of Western decision-makers.
  • For every Russian weapon system, there is a countermeasure in the West.

After Western allies publicly announced that they will no longer prohibit Ukrainians from using long-range precision weapons supplied by the West against targets in Russia, Putin is trying to continue his nuclear blackmail, Peeter Tali, member of the Riigikogu (Estonia 200) and security expert, writes.

Previously, nuclear threats have proven successful, and the Putin regime, which is waging a war of conquest in Ukraine, has managed to deter Western allies, limiting the types, quantities, and delaying the delivery times of military assistance. Ukraine has not received time-critical and sufficient quantities of modern Western weapons: tanks, air defense systems, artillery systems, multi-role fighter aircraft, long-range missile systems.

After Western countries publicly announced that Ukrainians were relatively free to use ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles and Storm Shadow/SCALP EG cruise missiles against Russia, dictator Putin signed an update to Russia's nuclear doctrine. With this update, which brings down the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, the Putin regime had threatened the West for about a year.

Putin had called strikes on military targets in Russia with ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles supplied by the West «crossing the second red line» and promised to respond.

The Kremlin probably also considered a nuclear test, which may still take place soon, but decided that it was too desperate, would escalate tensions and could provoke a serious response, especially from key partners China and India.

Russian dictator Putin personally announced on television that Russia had attacked Ukraine with a ballistic hypersonic experimental missile, Oreshnik, thus directly responding to the use of American and British long-range weapons against Russia. Putin stated that the test was successful and that Oreshnik hit one of the largest industrial complexes in the territory of Ukraine, known since the Soviet era.

This was followed by the usual talk about the exceptional nature of Russian weapons. According to him, there are currently no means to counter this missile, as it strikes targets at ten times the speed of sound, that is, at a speed of 10 Mach, or 2.5–3 kilometers per second.

Classically, the Kremlin's talk is ambiguous, open to multiple interpretations, contradictory at times, and cunning in a Byzantine way. By using the name Oreshnik, the Kremlin likely aimed to create the illusion of a newly developed super-missile with unknown capabilities. The goal of this tactic is to instill fear and influence Western countries, to amplify ambiguity and to exaggerate Russia's technological advancements.

This is in line with the broader concept of strategic ambiguity, meaning an effort to confuse adversaries about Russia's actual capabilities. Putin is attempting to exploit this ambiguity as a psychological weapon to intimidate the free world and continue nuclear blackmail.

When the whole world is debating whether it was an intercontinental strategic or a medium-range ballistic missile, the Kremlin has already achieved one of its objectives.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova's play-acting at the press conference and the informing of the United States of a strike by a medium-range ballistic missile on Ukraine are part of Putin's game of using strategic ambiguity for propaganda purposes. When the whole world is debating whether it was an intercontinental strategic or a medium-range ballistic missile, the Kremlin has already achieved one of its objectives. Once again, the shadow of nuclear war looms over the minds of Western decision-makers. Attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine with Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles, which is a war crime, unfortunately no longer usually cross the news threshold. Although these missiles can also carry nuclear warheads.

According to Russian sources, the missile has a range of 5,000 kilometers, which means that it would allow the Kremlin to attack most of Europe and the West Coast of the United States. The Russians say it can carry from six to eight conventional or nuclear warheads.

According to initial reports, it was a RS-26 Rubezh missile, the development of which was said to have been frozen. The Kremlin then presented the name Oreshnik. The Pentagon thought it was a missile based on the RS-26 Rubezh, but adapted to be a medium-range missile. Ukrainian military intelligence described it as part of the Kedr missile system. The lack of reliable information about this class of weapons adds to the confusion. There is not a single confirmed image of the RS-26 Rubezh. The name Oreshnik had never been mentioned before the case in question, and Kedr is mainly known as a conceptual next-generation missile project.

The development of weapons of this class is a lengthy process. For example, it took 12 years to develop the submarine-launched Bulava intercontinental missile. According to Ukrainian intelligence, testing of the Kedr took place at the Kapustin Yar range in October 2023 and June 2024. It seems that the November 21 strike was a kind of missile test, which suggests that the missile is not entirely new, but rather based on already developed components and technology.

In the opinion of Ukrainian military intelligence, the main developer of the Kedr missile system is the same Moscow institute that has been the main developer of Soviet and Russian solid-fuel intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, including the Temp-S, Temp-2S, Pioneer, Topol, Yars, Bulava and RS-26 Rubezh. Russian ballistic missiles Kedr, Rubezh and Oreshnik can descend from Soviet-era concepts such as the Temp-2S, Pioneer and 15P666 Skorost.

The institute has historically used robust and pragmatic solutions in missile development. The Pioneer (RSD-10) utilized the first and second stages of the three-stage Temp-2S. It is known that the 15P666 Skorost, which did not enter production, used the second and third stages of either the Temp-2S or Topol.

The Yars was developed to modernize the Topol by replacing its single warhead with a multiple-warhead unit. The RS-26 Rubezh probably used the first and second stages of the Yars system.

It seems that the Russians are developing the Kedr as a modular system to succeed the Yars. This approach allows for flexibility, because by combining existing components of the Yars system, the Kedr could be configured as an intercontinental missile, a medium-range missile with a lighter warhead and capable of covering a distance of 5,500 kilometers, or a heavier warhead for shorter distances. The Kedr design could also integrate hypersonic glide vehicles, such as the Avangard, originally designed for the RS-26 Rubezh.

The missile allegedly used in the Dnipro attack may have been a medium-range variant of the Kedr system, as this interpretation aligns with Russia's pattern of modernizing Soviet-era systems.

It is likely that the Kedr is an evolutionary development of the Yars system, and this Russian modular design philosophy explains how Kedr, Rubezh, and Oreshnik may all be modifications of the same core technology. The missile allegedly used in the Dnipro attack may have been a medium-range variant of the Kedr system, as this interpretation aligns with Russia's pattern of modernizing Soviet-era systems, originating from the Temp-2S, Pioneer, and Skorost projects.

This also reflects the Kremlin's strategy to inflate and exaggerate its missile capabilities to achieve psychological impact and create strategic fear.

Russia regularly uses close- and short-range ballistic missiles in airstrikes on Ukraine, but medium-range and intercontinental missiles are much larger, can be equipped with nuclear warheads, and are designed to strike targets from much greater distances.

Ballistic missiles are fired high into the atmosphere before they descend towards their target. They are guided only in the early launch phase, so they may be less accurate than cruise missiles, but they have the advantage of reaching incredibly high speeds as they approach targets, sometimes over 3,200 kilometers per hour.

Until now, Russia has used several shorter-range ballistic missile types against Ukraine, including the Iskander and Kinzhal. Due to their high speed, only a few air defense systems can shoot them down. One of these is the US-made Patriot system.

To achieve their goal, the Russians attacked not Kyiv, which has strong air defense and Patriots, but Dnipro, which definitely does not have the most modern air defense systems. It was essential for the attack to succeed, as the Putin regime wants to continue playing poker with nuclear threats.

For every Russian weapon system, there is a countermeasure in the West. This includes all Russian missiles. In air defense battles, US Patriots have brought down both Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles. However, Russian missiles have never encountered American THAAD or Aegis systems, nor the Israeli Arrow or David's Sling missile defense systems.

These high-tech systems will not listen to Putin's talk of Russian missiles being without analogues, but will numbly do their job.

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