MEELIS OIDSALU ⟩ When is it acceptable for a security official to lie?

Meelis Oidsalu, editor of the «Power and Security» section of Fookus. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• There is a razor-thin line between calculated deception and a Machiavellian lie for retaining power.
• An ill-considered white lie from a security agency can disproportionately impact relationships.
• It is crucial to avoid sugarcoating the security situation when truth might mobilize society.

Security policy-making politicians and security officials sometimes embellish or distort the truth to maintain public confidence or protect the rule of law. We must ask ourselves from time to time whether these «noble lies» from security experts might actually exacerbate threats, Meelis Oidsalu, editor of Fookus, writes.

On July 25, 1990, during a meeting with Saddam Hussein, US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie stated that the United States had no official stance on the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait: «We have no opinion on your conflict with Kuwait, an Arab country's conflict with another Arab country.»

British retired general Thomas Boyd-Carpenter, in his book «Conventional Deterrence», suggests this misleading statement reinforced Hussein's belief that the United States would not intervene if he were to invade Kuwait. Deception and misinformation, often permissible in security diplomacy and the field of security more broadly, can sometimes fuel threats rather than diminish them.

The chance that an unnecessary lie, spurred by anxiety or guilt, might go undetected is significantly higher in the classified realm of security than elsewhere in the public sector.

Niccolò Machiavelli, a Renaissance-era security strategist and political thinker, advised rulers to lie to maintain power. In Western democracy, such a lie is seen as a cardinal sin. Photo: akg-images/rabatti – Domingie

The question of when a security official or policymaker is permitted to deceive or withhold information warrants examination, if only because these officials are the only public servants to whom such behavior is occasionally forgiven under specific conditions. The chance that an unnecessary lie, spurred by anxiety or guilt, might go undetected is significantly higher in the classified realm of security than elsewhere in the public sector, as is the risk that a liar might misjudge the «nobility» of their lie. Or that a figure of power might lie simply to protect their status—a practice that may have been the norm in Renaissance-era security politics (as per Machiavelli’s political philosophy) but should be a cardinal sin in Western democracy.

When Kaja Kallas disclosed NATO's defense plans for the Baltics in 2021, likely by accident, reactions were mixed. For many, her honesty was empowering; there seemed to be fewer of those who were hurt by the revelation that the public had previously been lied to.

This can be traced back to practices from the Cold War era. In certain cases, lying may be the only way to ensure security and deter adversaries—particularly if telling the truth would expose a critical vulnerability or embolden the enemy.

Joe Biden's United States has been criticized for excessive transparency, neglecting «strategic ambiguity». The real question is whether the actual problem lies in the United States' honesty about its passivity in ensuring global security or in the passivity itself. The same question could be raised regarding Baltic defense plans.

Lying to the enemy has a harmful side effect—it leads to lying to and embellishing matters also for one's own people. It is very possible that Russian authorities were better informed about the actual state of NATO's Baltic defense plans than the Estonian public.

Lying to the enemy has a harmful side effect—it leads to lying to and embellishing matters also for one's own people.

Due to high levels of secrecy, trust plays a critical role in relations between security experts and the public. When a security agency or politician erodes that trust with an ill-considered white lie or unnecessary embellishment, it can have a disproportionately large impact on trust within the field.

In the absence of an immediate, serious threat, both security policy-making politicians and security officials should avoid lying and exaggeration. This way, the public will not develop a false sense of security in situations where society should, in fact, be making serious efforts to ensure its own security.