ANDREY KUZICHKIN Z-bloggers – the main tool for zombifying Russian society

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TOPSHOT - People walk past a New Year decoration - Kremlin Star, bearing a Z letter, a insignia of Russian troops in Ukraine, in front of the Monument dedicated to Heroes of the WWI, in western Moscow, on December 26, 2023. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP)
TOPSHOT - People walk past a New Year decoration - Kremlin Star, bearing a Z letter, a insignia of Russian troops in Ukraine, in front of the Monument dedicated to Heroes of the WWI, in western Moscow, on December 26, 2023. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP) Photo: ALEXANDER NEMENOV
  • Telegram channels disseminate fake insider information, fabrications, and recruit agents in Ukraine.
  • The harshest criticism of Z-bloggers is directed at Russian emigrants.
  • From a historical perspective, war correspondents are dangerous for everyone.

The institution of war correspondents of modern Russia was established in 2014, when large-scale hostilities began in Eastern Ukraine, columnist Andrey Kuzichkin writes.

At the time, it was a few dozen journalists who provided information in a fashion that was beneficial to the Kremlin, wrote in specialized publications, occasionally appeared on central television channels, and didn't have a big audience. However, everything changed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Former war correspondents quickly transformed into Z-bloggers and created an entire military information metaverse on social media.

The military troubadours are especially active in the domain of Telegram channels. The choice of namely this resource for the dissemination of Russian war propaganda can be explained by the fact that among those in Russia who trust television as the main source of information, more than 50 percent are staunch supporters of the war in Ukraine. Among those who place more trust in YouTube and Telegram channels there are significantly fewer supporters – 30 and 38 percent, respectively (Levada Center survey, August 2024). Therefore, propagandistic efforts are aimed specifically at increasing the share of pro-war people among Russia's internet users. Simultaneously, YouTube is slowing down.

Putin personally meets with war correspondents, holds gatherings with them, and thereby transfers a portion of his political resources to them.

The army of Z-bloggers consists of representatives of the state media, non-professional journalists, and participants in combat operations. Many Z-bloggers create their coverage directly on the front lines, can get wounded, killed, and achieve the status of heroes or even martyrs. This was the case with war correspondent Vladlen Tatarsky, who was killed in an assassination attack in St. Petersburg in April 2023. And on September 30, 2024, Putin awarded the title of Hero of Russia to Yevgeny Poddubny, a war correspondent for Rossiya 24, who was severely wounded in the Kursk Oblast. Putin personally meets with war correspondents, holds gatherings with them, and thereby transfers a portion of his political resources to them. And of course, this is a clear signal that war correspondents are led by the Kremlin and that all their activities are coordinated by the Russian presidential administration.

The most popular Telegram channels of Z-bloggers boast over a million subscribers. The channels' names, such as «Older than the Edda,» «When Cannons Started to Sing,» «Shakespeare,» «Black Colonel,» «Midshipman Ptichkin's Smoking Booth,» «Blue Z Beard,» «#Z-Bunker Everyday Life,» «WRNGTURN JUGEND,» «13 TACTICAL,» «Philologist in Ambush,» «ZERGULIO,» «The Bayraktar Witnesses» and so on, meanwhile testify to the creativity and poetic prowess of their authors.

Of course, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian special services use Z-bloggers to carry out information-psychological special operations. The general strategy is as follows: grotesque portrayal of the «Kyiv regime,» exposure of the crimes of «Ukrainian warmongers,» creation of links between the war in Ukraine and the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), presentation of Russian soldiers as heirs of the «Great Victory» and «liberators of Europe from fascism,» glorification of Russian military technology and the accomplishments of its arms, stories of «heroic victories of the Russian army in Ukraine.»

Telegram channels disseminate fake insider information, fabrications, and recruit agents in Ukraine. This is a rather effective tool for demoralizing the adversary and promoting Kremlin narratives among both the Russian internet audience and secret supporters of Putin's regime in Ukraine. And there are not few of them. Some channels raise funds under slogans like: «All for the front! All for victory!» To enhance the credibility of their information, Z-bloggers are even allowed to criticize the military leadership and the situation on the front lines. However, the supreme commander – Putin – remains beyond criticism of course.

The operation of the armed forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia became another reason for the indignation of war correspondents.

After the retreat of the Russian army from Kyiv, Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson, war correspondents began to criticize Russian generals for their failures in Ukraine. Many reports talked about shortage of munitions, poor quality of food for soldiers, cruelty of commanders and advantages of Western arms over Russian weapons. Among the war correspondents there were many «Wagnerians» from the Prigozhin staff. However, after his death, they disappeared. The operation of the armed forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia became another reason for the indignation of war correspondents. Of course, mistakes of the Russian military were criticized, but the real rage was ignited in Z-bloggers by the behavior of peaceful residents, who simply evacuated from the combat zone and didn't become partisans.

I diligently followed the posts of leading Z-bloggers for an entire month and arrived at the conclusion that, for them, the enemy is not the United States and NATO, or even the Ukrainian armed forces. The real enemy is the Russian citizen who is not fighting in Ukraine, is not making camouflage nets in the rear, and who doesn't attend concerts of patriotic singers like Shaman. A primary trend in the Z-information space is the exposure of «hidden liberals,» who sabotage meetings of combatants back from the war with young people in schools and universities, refuse to provide venues for stage productions by Z-directors, and don't allow the rental of Z-patriotic films on streaming platforms.

So, according to writer and Ukraine combatant Zakhar Prilepin, Z-blogger and Russia's most famous representative of Z-culture, modern culture in Russia is a «liberal swamp» that rejects any patriotic product, destroys patriotic thought and raises children in a spirit of subservience to the West. Prilepin sees Stalin-era Soviet culture as the ideal. The author calls this period «an era of achievement and hope.» And Z-blogger Zhanna Valevskaya writes: «The overwhelming majority of the population is not immersed in war, but lives in the illusions of peacetime. The war irritates these people. Only a small proportion of the Russian population supports the war. The main motive for participating in the war is not patriotism and duty, but the «windfall of cash».»

War correspondents demand that emigrants be stripped of their Russian citizenship, confiscated property and money. However, the best thing would be to kidnap them, take them to Russia and send them to war.

But the harshest criticism of Z-bloggers is directed at Russian emigrants, who are contemptuously referred to as «netvoinyashki,» «uyezhanty» and «soy relocanty» (in translation, roughly as «no-to-warers,» «runaways,» «soy migrants») – the latter because of their love for soy milk, which is not popular in Russia but is trendy in Europe. War correspondents demand that emigrants be stripped of their Russian citizenship, confiscated property and money. However, the best thing would be to kidnap them, take them to Russia and send them to war.

The second most popular topic on Z-blogs is a recent case of drone operators, whose aliases were «Ernest» and «Goodwin.» Due to a conflict with their commander, they were assigned to an assault unit and sent into battle, where they were killed. This caused enormous indignation among war correspondents, who demanded a reckoning with the commanders who sent the soldiers they didn't like to their deaths.

Putin's recent decree on the exemption from criminal liability of those who have fought in the «special military operation» in Ukraine is also being actively discussed. Many Z-bloggers have been suspicious of the decree: the proportion of former criminals among Russian soldiers is already high. One of the bloggers recalls a case where a young man arrived at the front directly from a penal colony, where he had been doing time for a murder and eating the heart of his victim. He had been sentenced to 25 years in prison, of which he did three; he then signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense and went to Ukraine. A few months later, this young man killed a fellow serviceman, was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison, but returned to the front a year later. And the blogger asks: «Do such fighters, who have killed more Russians than khokhols, cause more good or bad?» But the main conclusion that war correspondents come to is that the decree implies relinquishing mobilization in favor of repeat-offending criminals.

«The authorities do not want to scare citizens with mobilization, but prefer to deal with contract soldiers released from prisons and colonies. Yes, this is an evil, but it is an unavoidable evil if you are not prepared to have your son, brother or husband replace them in the attacks on the minefields,» «Hydro assault trooper» («Hydrodessantnik») writes.

The author of the channel «Shelter No. 8» also shares a valuable observation about the cadre policy on the front: «During assaults, an especially big proportion of alcoholics get killed. So why do the military commissariats recruit them into the army and pay huge sums of money if that alcoholic is going to get killed tomorrow? And then they recruit new people because there are not enough fighters! Where is the logic?» But no one should be fooled by this criticism: war correspondents remain Putin's faithful servants. Their vocation is to serve as informers and to keep the Russian army's top brass in fear. But from a historical perspective, war correspondents are dangerous for everyone.

The danger of Z-bloggers lies in the fact that they are formulating the matrix of Russian fascism and creating a multi-channel connection between the Russian military-political elite and society. It is precisely this tool that the Kremlin is using to elevate veterans who have fought in Ukraine to key positions throughout Russia. The pinnacle: on October 2, Putin appointed Artyom Zhoga, former commander of the Sparta battalion, speaker of the parliament of the «Donetsk People's Republic» and a Z-hero, as his plenipotentiary representative in the strategically important Ural Federal District.

And I wouldn't be at all surprised if tomorrow Z-bloggers took an active part in establishing a military dictatorship in Russia. In today's world, information gives power over people, and war correspondents are emerging as a powerful weapon for the Kremlin to imprison Russian society.

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