Vladimir Jushkin ⟩ The Sarmat gamble: the failed missile that Russians would like to cover up

A satellite image of a closer view of a launch site after the launch failure of a Russian RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, according to arms experts, at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia, September 21, 2024. Maxar Technologies/Handout via REUTERS. Photo: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES

• There are several witnesses to the Sarmat explosion.
• The missile was developed in a hurry.
• The Sarmat may not be available for use until eight to ten years.

Vladimir Jushkin, director of the Baltic Center for Russian Studies, lists the reasons why the Sarmat missile developed by Russia exploded.

The first and only successful test of the Sarmat missile took place on April 20, 2022. This was acknowledged by Vladimir Degtyar, the head of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, which is part of the state corporation Roscosmos and which developed the missile. The test was personally observed by Vladimir Putin. Subsequently another (unsuccessful) launch took place on February 20, 2023, which was covered up by the Russian leadership.

In September 2023, Roscosmos announced that the Sarmat strategic missile system had been put on "combat duty."

On September 20, 2024, an RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile exploded in a launch silo of the Plesetsk military cosmodrome (at the Yubileynaya launch pad). According to experts, the explosion occurred during a test launch.

This is confirmed by satellite images taken in July and on September 23. They show that part of the launch pad has been severely damaged.

Second, NASA's FIRMS service, which provides rapid notifications about large fires worldwide, reported that a major fire was detected in that area on September 20 (it was visible from space).

Third, Pavel Podvig, head of the "Russian Nuclear Forces" project, and Maxim Starchak, from the Center for International and Defense Policy of Queen's University, claim that the Yubileynaya launch pad has been used for testing Sarmat missiles also earlier.

Sarmat was developed in a hurry, and not by a design bureau specializing in such missiles.

Fourth, on September 17, Étienne Marcuz, a French open-source intelligence (OSINT) specialist, published a post on the X social media platform highlighting a NOTAM (Notices to Airmen) alert, which looked similar to the NOTAM alerts used on previous occasions when missiles were launched from Plesetsk towards the Kura test range in Kamchatka.

Fifth: A U.S. Boeing RC-135S Cobra Ball reconnaissance aircraft which, according to FlightRadar24, took off from a U.S. Air Force base in Alaska to track the Sarmat test, did not register a takeoff.

There are several reasons for the failure of the tests of Sarmat strategic missiles

First, due to a conflict between chief designers, the development of the new silo-launched missile system was entrusted to the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau (located in Miass, Chelyabinsk Oblast), which is also the leading developer of all missile systems currently installed in submarines.

Second, the Sarmat was developed in a hurry, and not by a design bureau specializing in such missiles. The RS-28 Sarmat was urgently needed to replace the R-36M2 Voevoda (classified as SS-18 Satan in the West), whose service life was constantly being extended. All modifications of this missile were produced in Ukraine, and until 2015, their maintenance was done (support by the project's creator and technical support) by Ukrainian specialists from the Yuzhnoye Design Office and the Yuzhmash plant in the city of Dnipro.

Third, the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant (KMZ), the leading enterprise in the manufacture of Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles, has undergone a machinery overhaul, replacing its equipment with machine tools from Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria. Their production capacity is 2-4 such missiles per year. However, KMZ and other enterprises involved in the production of the missile suffer from a shortage of experienced workers, poor management, and a shortage of modern equipment. Sanctions have impeded the importation of necessary components and materials in sufficient quantities and quality. Factories typically rework components and materials to meet specifications, but many enterprises involved in Sarmat production simply do not have such capabilities.

Alexei Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes: "The Sarmat is not fundamentally different from the Voevoda missile. It's simply a new missile, and that's all. It's like having an old car, and then a new car appears, and in many respects, it's a little better. But fundamentally, it's the same model with the same functions. There's nothing fundamentally new in this system." It should be added that the Sarmat missile will use the same silos as the Voevoda, only the control electronics will require some modifications.

Maxim Starchak, an expert on Russia's nuclear policy and nuclear industry, believes the missile faces eight to ten more years of testing before it will be fully technically ready.