FOOKUS ⟩ Former defense chief of Poland: Russia should not be allowed to even start the operation to capture Suwałki

Gen. Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, previous commander of the Polish armed forces. Photo: Eero Vabamägi

• We should increase investments in the infrastructure for the reception of allies.
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• The migration attack has been a cooperation between Russia and Belarus from the beginning.

Gen. Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, the previous commander of the Polish armed forces, took office in 2018, four months before Gen. Martin Herem assumed the same post in Estonia. The military friendship of these two men started a new era in the military defense of our region, the focus of which is on the addition of long-range firepower to the arsenal of the Baltic states and the early deterrence of the aggressor. The man who laid the foundation for the special military relationship between Poland and Estonia was interviewed by editor Meelis Oidsalu.

A communication interface on a new level is needed between the military and politicians, which would allow them to understand each other better, the former commander of the Polish armed forces, who laid the foundation for the renaissance of military defense thinking in Poland and the entire region, finds.

The inspiration for this interview came from the former head of the Estonian defense forces, Gen. Martin Herem, who called you the author of the long-range missile war or, in other words, HIMARS, anti-ship missile and other deep fire strategy, which has become established in the Baltic region by now. Is that so?

It is true that Gen. Herem and I spent countless hours discussing not only long-range military capabilities, but also how to translate the need for their use into terms that politicians could understand. Having a military capability is one thing, but explaining to politicians the need to use a proactive defense strategy is quite another. Anyway, I am very satisfied with the direction chosen by the Estonian defense forces, which is that you have made progress with the acquisition of both HIMARS and the anti-ship missile system.

Active service personnel of the defense forces of NATO member states - TOP 10

United States – 1,300,200

Turkey – 481,000

Poland – 216,100

France – 204,700

Germany – 185,600

Italy – 171,400

United Kingdom – 138,100

Spain – 117,400

Greece – 110,800

Canada – 77,100

Source: NATO, 2024

Has Poland fully embraced and implemented this deep fire concept both militarily and politically?

Yes, we started with the navy and then extended the fire range of the air and ground forces. Poland's geostrategic location right on the so-called front line puts us, similarly to Estonia, in a unique situation. We have no time or space to waste in the event of a military attack, we are facing Russian forces in the Kaliningrad region and Belarus.

In such an environment, a proactive approach is essential. We must send a clear message to Russia that, in the event of any concentration of forces near the border of Poland or Estonia, we will launch a military strike against their logistics and infrastructure.

Some have considered my views aggressive, but it is all the more important to continue translating this military strategy into the language of politicians.

We must send a clear message to Russia that, in the event of any concentration of forces near the border of Poland or Estonia, we will launch a military strike against their logistics and infrastructure.

How did your NATO colleagues react to the Baltic proactive defense strategy proposal?

There has been nervousness, but this is natural, because an approach to defense that prevents any unwanted developments inevitably entails the risk of escalation. NATO member states still need time to integrate the new military reality into their political agenda, the attitudes of the member states' politicians differ significantly in this regard.

NATO’s military leaders must continue to steer their politicians toward a more proactive military strategy. Russia respects only strength. Excessive reaction and passivity encourages Moscow. At the same time, discussions on this topic have gone smoothly at the military level in NATO, progress is being made.

In a recent statement, Gen. Ben Hodges, the former commander of United States Army Europe, linked together the defense of Ukraine and Poland. He speculated that if the Ukrainian front were to collapse, Polish troops would intervene on Ukrainian territory. Do you consider this scenario to be possible?

Poland is a sovereign country and every nation has the right to self-defense. If the front in Ukraine were to collapse, a strategic assessment of the situation will be made in Warsaw and the necessary decisions will be made based on it. We are a reliable member of NATO and the European Union, we must ensure that the allies are informed about our plans early.

During my previous tenure as commander of the armed forces, I emphasized to politicians that losing Ukraine would be a much more costly alternative than helping Ukraine win. If we lose Ukraine, we could end up spending 10-15 percent of our GDP on defense. In this context, there is some truth in Hodges' statement.

Polish President Andrzej Duda and then chief of defense Rajmund Andrzejczak at the Polish Armed Forces Day parade in Warsaw on August 15, 2018. Photo: Damian Burzykowski

What to think of NATO's new Baltic and Nordic defense plans? How important has the jump in military capability been to the implementation of the plans approved at the Vilnius summit last summer?

Regional defense plans are now much more practical. But there is one critical point that I have always emphasized. The heads of state have approved the defense plans and agreed on the need for 300,000 troops and 100 brigades capable of mobilizing within 30 days. Politicians probably feel that their mission has been accomplished. But if we were to turn the talk military, it must be said that mobilizing 300,000 soldiers and ensuring their readiness within 30 days requires significant additional funds and a realistic timeline.

Adm. Rob Bauer, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, has repeatedly spoken about the problem of insufficient defense funding.

What is behind this discrepancy between plans and resource decisions? And is 300,000 soldiers even enough?

When speaking on this subject, I have proposed the following intellectual exercise. Imagine a three-dimensional matrix. Its first axis represents Russia. We forecast three to five years into the future. We think about how many tanks Russia will have by then, how much ammunition there will be, what the impact of sanctions will be, and how much Russia’s future capacity will be affected by arms and munitions supplies from China, North Korea or Iran.

Let the second axis represent Ukraine. We should assess how long we can maintain military aid, funding and sustain losses for three to five years.

The third axis is NATO, and in the case of NATO, we have to consider the impact of the military aid given to Ukraine on our own military preparedness.

We should look at these three dimensions of planning comprehensively. The comprehensive approach just described is not currently practiced in NATO.

We often consider developments in Ukraine, NATO and Russia in isolation. We should visualize these three developmental axes and evaluate whether our regional defense plans will still be effective in five years.

We talk a lot about how quickly Estonia or Poland have increased their defense budget, but I would also like to hear more about how slowly some member states are increasing their defense spending. This discussion is too rarely heard.

We often consider developments in Ukraine, NATO and Russia in isolation. We should visualize these three developmental axes and evaluate whether our regional defense plans will still be effective in five years.

Could you briefly describe to our readers how Poland has managed to secure such a large presence of US forces in Poland? Why has your bilateral military relationship evolved to be as close as it is today?

Relations between Poland and the United States have deep historical roots dating back to 1918, under President Woodrow Wilson, and continued through the Cold War with the efforts of Ronald Reagan.

Our military ties are particularly close at the moment because of our shared military history in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, former chief of staff of the US Army Gen. Mark Milley and I served together in Afghanistan, he was the deputy division commander and I was the brigade planner. The bonds born in fighting go beyond formal alliances.

In addition to the US forces permanently stationed in Poland, we also have a significant capacity to host additional forces. After the start of full-scale Russian aggression in Ukraine, the US quickly deployed its Immediate Response Force (IRF), a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, to Poland. This is the same division I served with in Afghanistan. The logistical operation of receiving the brigade was successful.

This is called «host nation support» in NATO military terminology.

Exactly, and we should think more about the infrastructure that supports it. Therefore, there is currently a discussion in Poland about building a new large air base in the middle of the country, similar to the Ramstein Air Base in Germany. This would be beneficial for the economy and civil transport, but also a direct contribution to security. The establishment of a «Polish Ramstein» would significantly increase NATO's deterrence in the region. Similar investments in Poland and the Baltic states are crucial in terms of deterrence.

In Estonia, it has been discussed whether the Rail Baltic project has any significant impact on the military defense of the Baltic states. How does it look from Poland?

Although Rail Baltic remains primarily a political and economic initiative, its military significance is enormous. Only roads are not enough. The rapid redeployment of troops from Poland or the arrival of any NATO reinforcements from Poland to the Baltic states, especially Estonia, is critical.

Gen. Martin Herem, the previous head of the Estonian defense forces, says that he received inspiration and encouragement to organize a deep fire revolution in Estonia from his Polish colleague. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

Is the Suwałki corridor, which Rail Baltic will pass through, better protected or more defensible than five years ago, when you started as the commander of the armed forces?

Back in the day, Gen. Herem and I also extensively discussed how to change the approach to the Suwałki problem. We should not start thinking about fighting in Suwałki only after the Russians have finally crossed the Polish or Lithuanian border. Instead, we should prevent the enemy from launching such an operation.

One of my first visits as commander of the armed forces was to Estonia. I wanted to understand your country personally and not only through video conferences, but to meet face to face. We immediately agreed with the Estonian defense forces that Poland would send its anti-ship missile unit to exercises in the Gulf of Finland. It was a good and necessary exercise. Similarly, we launched a Polish-Estonian cooperation project with HIMARS in order to exchange experiences. I said then that the defense of Poland begins in Tallinn.

In my opinion, Estonia has chosen the right direction in the development of the navy, instead of immediately acquiring new ships, you have invested in mines and missile systems. This inspired Latvia and Lithuania to do the same.

You talked about the fact that the military and politicians should improve their communication. Are you ready to comment on why you suddenly stepped down as commander of the armed forces in 2023 before the end of your term?

It was my decision. Everything has a beginning and an end. I served two rotations, more than expected, and there were only five months left. I am glad that my successor, Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, is continuing with my ideas and concepts. That's all I want to say about it.

Will we see you in Polish politics in the near future?

That won’t happen, I am a soldier and will remain one. A journalist asked me during the last presidential election if I was going to run, a question that caused some public uproar. When I got home, my wife was standing at the door and said: «Don't even think about it.»

Former chief of staff of the US Army Mark A. Milley Photo: Yuri Gripas

In 2008, I had a fellow student from Poland at the Baltic Defense College, who mentioned that there was a «political purge» taking place among the Polish military elite. Now that a liberal government has come to power, is there a risk that such a purge will happen again?

A certain level of political direction is natural when it comes to appointing top military positions. At the same time, it has taken time for Poland to abandon the practices of the Warsaw Pact in personnel policy. But I see no signs of such a purge under the current government.

Your successor, the new chief of defense, Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, comes from the territorial defense forces, which were created in Poland only in 2017. Why did Poland launch the establishment of a territorial defense force so late?

We inherited a civil protection system from the Cold War that was outdated and inadequate. Following the Russian invasion of Crimea, we launched extensive discussions on how to modernize the operational components of our military and address other issues. Going through various crises like a pandemic, floods, etc., we realized that we need a special territorial defense force.

This was also partly due to the need for a new recruitment strategy. Many Poles are not ready to be full-time active duty soldiers, but are willing to serve two to four weeks a year while maintaining their job in the civilian sector.

There are currently 35,000 troops in the territorial defense and they play a key role in the immigration war on the Polish-Belarusian border. However, an army with a large reserve component has both advantages and disadvantages.

A certain level of political direction is natural when it comes to appointing top military positions. At the same time, it has taken time for Poland to abandon the practices of the Warsaw Pact in personnel policy.

What disadvantages do you mean?

For Estonia, for example, war-time mobilization will bring significant economic consequences, because fighters have to leave their civilian jobs.

I have advised politicians to simulate the economic impact of mobilizing large numbers of soldiers at exercises. Israel's situation in Gaza vividly illustrates this – Israel's mobilization had immediate economic effects. A reservist force is therefore no miracle cure; it has both advantages and disadvantages.

Poland’s approach is to maintain a significant professional force, supplemented by reserves during wartime.

Couldn't this logic of economic influence also be reversed? If a country has a large standing army, which is persistently keeping tens or hundreds of thousands of people off the civilian labor market, this also affects the economy.

A reservist force is very important, especially in longer-term conflicts, such as in Ukraine. At the same time, I am skeptical when someone claims that relying mainly on reservist forces is the solution to all military challenges.

We argued in Estonia in 2021 whether the use of Belarusian migration as a weapon was directed against Poland and Lithuania only by Belarus or whether Belarus acted as a representative of Russia. What do you think, has this been a joint Russian-Belarusian operation?

I cannot reveal all the details, but I can say that according to the Polish intelligence services there is no doubt that this was a Russian-designed operation. We were able to identify Russian involvement throughout the process, from motivating people in Afghanistan and other countries to transporting them to certain European countries and then moving to Belarus.

This is a new generation of warfare, a relatively cheap instrument. Poland is forced to contribute money and people to border protection.

If, in the future, Poland's neighbor is a failed country that has to spend half of its budget on military defense, then we have a big problem.

How do you assess the future military threat to NATO countries? Why should Russia militarily target some NATO member states in the coming years at all?

I don't agree that the Russians are crazy and just decide to attack Warsaw or Tallinn. The threat of attack is related to the search for opportunities to disrupt NATO unity as well as developments elsewhere. If something happens in Taiwan, Israel, Lebanon, or Iran, the United States may also face dilemmas in those regions.

So the threat of a military attack against Poland or Estonia would consist not only of attacking these countries, but of influencing the global position of the United States and forcing Washington into a difficult situation?

Yes, even then the attack may not be military, but hybrid. The threat of a military attack is directly related to the future of Ukraine. If, in the future, Poland's neighbor is a failed country that has to spend half of its budget on military defense, then we have a big problem.

For Poland, the security of the region is also a pragmatic issue, because we do not want to lose the success we have achieved over the past 35 years. Estonians share this point of view. We need to invest more to solidify our achievements and send a message to Russia that we are strong and determined. Poland has strong relations with its neighbors, so we have a solid foundation to build on.

A Polish general who cares a lot about Estonia

Gen. Rajmund Andrzejczak, previous commander of the Polish armed forces. Photo: Eero Vabamägi

Gen. Rajmund T. Andrzejczak (56) served as chief of the general staff of the Polish armed forces from 2018 to 2023. He resigned unexpectedly, five months before the end of his term, and is now a well-known military commentator in Poland.

Andrzejczak had a close relationship with former chief of staff of the US Army Gen. Mark Milley, with whom he served in Afghanistan, and this helped strengthen Polish-US military ties.

He also had a special relationship with Estonia, he is behind the idea that Poland's defense starts from the Gulf of Finland, and he considers it necessary for Poland to play a greater part in the defense of the Baltic states than at present.

Recently, Andrzejczak started making a defense-related show on YouTube called «Ground Zero». He described to Postimees his efforts to explain to young Poles the importance of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. «I had to explain to today's youth how we lost 200,000 people in Warsaw,» he said, emphasizing that Poland must do everything so that there would be no need for such an uprising in the future.

The general spent part of his summer vacation as a cyclist on the roads of the Baltic countries, including Estonia.