ERKKI KOORT ⟩ In case of threat, Pskov and Leningrad regions must be mined

War of Independence. Machine gunners from a Kalev subdistrict regiment in the trenches of the Izborsk fortified area, killing Reds. Photo: Karl Akel / National Archives Photo: Karl Akel / Rahvusarhiiv

• We need to be capable of establishing barriers already on Russian soil.
• In the event of a threat, the conflict must be immediately taken beyond Estonia's borders.
• Asking critical questions does not diminish our will to defend our country.

Estonia's experience form the War of Independence and the lessons from the war in Ukraine show how important it is to defeat the enemy outside one's own territory. This requires political will, ammunition, and excellent intelligence, Erkki Koort, security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, writes.

On May 30, 1919, commander‑in‑chief of the Estonian armed forces Johan Laidoner announced to the Constituent Assembly that the land had been cleared of enemies. This was a significant moment because the Estonian national army had managed to take the war beyond Estonia's borders. Keeping the war outside one's borders ensures better protection for the population and much better preservation of infrastructure. Additionally, in such a case, the damage to the aggressor is greater, effectively affecting their own "home."

Figuratively speaking – we have an apartment, and our hostile neighbor also has one. The fight would occur in one of them, and there is no point in pretending that we would be fighting on some third party's property.

The discussion that began with the departure of the secretary general of the Ministry of Defense largely focused on the sum of 1.6 billion euros. The amount is enormous, and the defense forces' choice to destroy enemy forces on their own territory, should they try to enter ours, is a very good one. But in addition to having ammunition, are we ready for such a decision at the political level? Do we have sufficient intelligence on the targets? How will London, Berlin, and Washington react? Essentially, it is a pre-emptive strike.

Until 1927, Estonia's defense plans included a pre-emptive strike from armored trains, which would have provided time to defend the country. The gun platform Leitnant Sabolotnõi in armored train No. 6 in the War of Independence in 1919. Photo: Estonian National Museum/muis.ee Photo: Eesti Rahva Muuseum/muis.ee

A pre-emptive strike is not new in the context of the Estonian republic. According to officers' memoirs, until 1927, Estonia's defense plans included a pre-emptive strike. It envisaged sending armored trains across the border to fire on the enemy's assembly areas, gaining time for mobilization.

Previous war or the next

Planning for the previous war is widely regarded as a big mistake. We are aware of this trap, but we have nonetheless fallen into it in our planning. The threat assessment following 2014 primarily envisioned hybrid and cyber warfare, and as a result, topics like civil protection did not reach the political level. It was rather seen as an unnecessary remnant.

Let's start by mining the Pskov and Leningrad regions, as this will cause us less permanent damage, and the mines could be deployed beyond the post-Tartu Peace Treaty border.

Ten years later, we have and have not learned (much). At the beginning of 2022, the current government decided to allocate an additional 400 million euros for defense. Now, they are seeking funding for 1.6 billion euros. Unfortunately, the size of this amount is determined not by the size of our country, but by that of the potential aggressor. While it is necessary to invest against existential threats, critical control questions must not be forgotten.

A recognition ceremony of the Ministry of Defense at Lillepaviljon. Will there be political will in tougher and more confusing times, or will the debate still focus on a formal request? Photo: Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

There is no point in talking about large amounts of money without discussing what it will buy. Looking at the trends in the war in Ukraine, it is not inappropriate to ask if we can replace ammunition with drones in certain areas. If we can allocate 1.6 billion euros for ammunition, perhaps we can find 100 million for drone factories. Factories in plural, because dispersion is key to success in times of threat. It would make no sense to build them all in a single industrial park near Tallinn. The decision allows us to produce drones for ourselves and also generate revenue, including for financing defense capabilities.

After the occupation of Crimea, Estonia's public threat assessment, too, envisioned mainly hybrid warfare. Members of the 108th Air Assault Regiment posing in Crimea in 2014. Photo: Photo: Informnapalm

Destruction of the enemy must start outside Estonian territory

Six months ago, the topic of building a so-called Baltic defense zone briefly surfaced. It was supposed to be a belt of bunkers across the Baltics. The topic faded surprisingly quickly because it mainly concerned the Viru and Voru counties. It was forgotten that it also involved tens of millions of taxpayer money. It is quite possible that their construction is a very sensible idea, but they probably will not be established because the enemy would have too good an overview.

The idea of laying minefields in the event of a threat was also discussed. This is an excellent idea because it is likely the cheapest solution for hindering the enemy. A small suggestion to put things into context: let us start by mining the Pskov and Leningrad regions, as this will cause us less permanent damage. Let us also remember that these mines could be deployed beyond the post-Tartu Peace Treaty border. They will cause us less damage, and for example, in Pechory, due to natural conditions, it is possible to mine a narrower area. Suitable solutions exist for mining, but if funds for expensive options are limited, perhaps the Estonian defense industry could develop catapults to deploy mines in front of the enemy's boots.

Considering that our region is a Baltic "peninsula," we must also keep an eye on what happens with our neighbors. If there is a conflict, it concerns all three of us. I have not noticed any similar discussions on buying the same large quantities of ammunition in Latvia, and the Latvian Defense Ministry's secretary general also seems to remain in office.

Unfortunately, the volume of funds is determined not by the size of our country, but by that of the potential aggressor.

The political will to destroy the enemy before they reach our land is extremely important. It may seem like escalation, but if we are not ready to escalate from the very first meter (even if it is on water), it means even more suffering for us. Figuratively speaking – we have an apartment, and our hostile neighbor also has one. The fight will happen in one of them, and there is no point in pretending that we will be fighting on some third party's property.