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Russia has made yet another strategic move, and it already appears to have achieved the opposite result. It seems that the current ruler of Russia has an inexplicable ability to make a good tactical move and then overreach strategically, Erkki Koort, security expert of Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, writes.
Putin, the ruler of Moscovia, decided to visit his like-minded counterpart in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to strengthen relations, renew agreements, but above all, to secure continued arms supplies from the pariah state. In doing so, he likely forgot that the real economic powerhouse is the Republic of Korea at the southern tip of the peninsula. South Korea has already expressed its displeasure, summoned the Russian ambassador, and it is not impossible that Russia recklessly approaching North Korea will lead to direct military support from Seoul to Ukraine.
The annexation of Crimea was a victory for which Putin, in his mind, awarded himself a medal, but it has since turned out to be a millstone.
At the same time, Russia cannot currently wage war in Ukraine without North Korea. Millions of shells from the pariah state gave Russia the opportunity to maintain its firepower. We do not know how close the Russian army was to a shell crisis before the supplies began. Therefore, they cannot manage on their own. Today, Moscow has chosen North Korea over South Korea in the short term, as more shells are currently needed at the fronts. In the long run, this will not just backfire. Helping North Korea out of isolation and providing them with new technologies poses existential challenges for South Korea, and Moscow will not be able to reverse this.
In the fall of 2021, Putin laid out his red lines and demands to NATO, the UN, and the OSCE. Being a member of the latter two organizations, Russia essentially cut itself off from the world, trying to create the impression of being a major power. One of the demands was that NATO withdraw to its 1997 borders. What Russia achieved with these threats and the attack on Ukraine was the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. Considering the attitude of both countries towards joining the alliance just a few years ago, Putin managed to convince societies in a few months of something that the entire Soviet Union and the Cold War had been unable to do.
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Russia attacking Ukraine can be divided into two strategic failures. Through the attacks and occupation of Ukrainian territories that began in 2014, Putin managed to strengthen this society, thereby also strengthening Ukrainian statehood. Figuratively speaking, Russia gained land but lost an entire people.
We do not know how close the Russian army was to a shell crisis before the supplies began from North Korea.
The Crimean Peninsula was the main territory occupied in 2014. This occupation was a victory for which Putin, in his mind, awarded himself a medal, but it has since turned out to be a millstone. Politically and militarily, Crimea has caused more trouble than benefits for Russia. Putin cannot and will not give up Crimea, but this piece of land is dragging him inexorably towards defeat.
Before the 2022 invasion, only a few countries, Estonia included, provided lethal military aid. The full-scale war opened up arms shipments that were previously unimaginable. It seemed completely impossible that the European Union, which did not want to finance even the construction of border fences in its member states, would fund the purchase of arms for Ukraine
The attack on Kharkiv in May 2024 was also a total failure. Yes, there are still Russian-occupied territories in the Kharkiv region today. But without this completely idiotic endeavor from a military standpoint, the United States and Germany would not have given permission to use their weapons against targets in Russia. Now Russia cannot withdraw, and the Russian command, which hoped to exhaust Ukrainian reserves, is also depleting its own.
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Since the start of the attacks against Ukraine, Russia's interest has been to prevent Ukrainian grain from reaching the global market. After efforts, a grain agreement was signed, but Moscow continued to place obstacles in its path and eventually withdrew from the agreement. The result is that Ukrainian grain exports are functioning, and Russia's Black Sea fleet has partially been sunk and pushed to the eastern part of the sea.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas attacked Israel, and this war continues to this day. Russia, together with Iran, helped train terrorists for the attack, provided equipment, and reportedly shared intelligence. Moscow's interest was to divert attention from Ukraine, in which they temporarily succeeded. Iran's attack on Israel, with Moscow's approval, moved the US Congress' stalled aid package.
Russia achieved success in mediating the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, ensuring its troops were stationed in the region. It expanded its activities through a so-called peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh but failed to fulfill its duties. As a result, it lost credibility and influence in the region, and Baku captured the entire area from Armenia. Russia was forced to withdraw its troops, and Moscow's influence in the Caucasus decreased significantly.
Putin's attempt to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led it into a state of brain death. The NATO clone, which had existed for decades on political statements and exercises, was used in January 2022 to suppress unarmed opposition in Kazakhstan, whereas Armenia was abandoned in the war with Azerbaijan. As a result, Yerevan suspended its membership in the CSTO and announced a break in its relations with Belarus. The reason was a statement by Belarusian (CSTO member) leader Lukashenko, which could be understood as direct support for Azerbaijan in the conflict. The result is a reduction in the influence of the CSTO. Previously, Moscow worked to make the CSTO a credible peacekeeping force. This did not materialize.
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TASS Photo: Gavriil Grigorov
The war of aggression started by Russia in February 2022 was such a shock to many in the world that several former allies withdrew. At some point, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and to some extent China (which is more interested in the United States losing than in Russia winning) began to dominate. In February and March 2022, this support was not yet so strong, and initially, Putin mostly telephoned with the puppet governments created by Russian intelligence services in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Every call with Central Asian leaders was also announced.
Russia's desire to be a global superpower and a leading counterbalance to the United States has been thwarted once again. It seems that the ruler of Russia does not understand that strategic success in reshaping the world requires more than the skills of a former KGB operative. Although this background has helped Putin deceive Western leaders for years, it is far from sufficient to achieve strategic success.
In January 2022, CSTO forces were used to suppress unarmed opposition in Kazakhstan, whereas Armenia was abandoned in the war with Azerbaijan.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia is reshaping the world order, but instead of increasing its influence, it is reducing it. A country that befriends North Korea and blatantly violates UN resolutions does not improve its position. Quite the opposite. Russia has also covertly and overtly approached terrorist movements like the Taliban and Hamas.
Putin has a rare ability of making a tactically successful move and then exploiting it so much that it becomes detrimental. Even the threat of nuclear weapons was exaggerated to the point that it no longer has the impact it once did. Putin is like an addict who wants a high immediately and does not think about the long-term consequences.