ERKKI KOORT ⟩ Two factors facilitating change in the war

HIMARS multiple rocket launchers from the United States can now fire from the Kharkiv region into Russia. Without Moscow's strategic miscalculation in attacking the region, Ukraine would not have received permission from multiple Western countries to strike Russian territory. Photo: Sgt. John Schoebel/U.S. Army National Guard/Scanpix

• Russia made a mistake in attacking the Kharkiv region.
• Fighting is increasingly spreading to Russian territory.
• Belousov's actual role as defense minister is unclear.

The war in Ukraine seems to have reached a new and strange phase. While the fighting appears stagnant, significant preparations for the next steps are underway, Erkki Koort, security expert at Postimees and the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, writes.

Russia's fortunes on the front are deteriorating once more. Although Russia has gained some ground in certain areas, progress has been challenging and costly. In 2024, Moscow's forces have managed to capture about two-thirds of the territory the size of Hiiumaa island. This is not insignificant, but considering that Russia once had the world's second-largest army and Ukraine has been facing significant issues obtaining aid from the West, it is not a great deal either. Moreover, these gains are not continuous but are made in small segments along a thousand-kilometer front.

It is possible that Defense Minister Belousov may also have to «retreat» in some capacity, similarly to General Surovikin.

In May 2024, Moscow made a strategic error by attacking the Kharkiv region again. As a result, several Western countries finally allowed the use of their supplied weapons to target recognized Russian territory. The change was particularly significant due to Germany and the United States' approval, as their contributions are considerably larger. Without the attack on Kharkiv, Ukraine likely would not have been granted permission to strike Russian territory.

Due to the lack of supplies, Ukraine has had to be much smarter and more calculated. The new opportunities have enabled strikes on targets that were previously out of reach. The Ukrainian army no longer needs to adhere to restrictions on combating attacks, which is a significant change. This undoubtedly also allows for simpler logistical arrangements, as these considerations no longer need to be followed when arming and supplying troops. However, ongoing restrictions remain on attacking nuclear sites and possibly other potential targets.

Russia's second war

Putin has replaced his defense minister and the FSB have arrested several high-ranking officers. The actual number of detainees is unknown yet undoubtedly continues to grow. Since corruption is deeply embedded in the Russian system, this fight cannot truly be effective. However, it serves well as a justification for removing those who have fallen out of favor.

Without the attack on the Kharkiv region, Ukraine likely would not have been granted permission to strike Russian territory.

Reportedly, one reason for Andrey Belousov having been appointed defense minister is that he is supposed to direct all resources to warfare and reduce theft of public funds. Neither goal is quickly achievable, if at all, in such a large and entrenched system. The purge initiated under the guise of fighting corruption has two outcomes. Some corrupt individuals get scared and at may withdraw, at least temporarily. For others, the cost increases because the risks have grown. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the theft of public funds within the Russian Ministry of Defense will decrease.

Russia's alleged fight against corruption will undoubtedly impact the front lines, as power struggles and efforts to secure positions among staff are inevitable in such a situation. The role of Defense Minister Belousov in all of this remains unclear. Sergei Shoigu had to be moved aside, and a new leader had to come from outside to make some system changes or unpopular decisions. A parallel can be drawn with General Sergey Surovikin, whose main task was to entrench the occupying army and retreat from Kherson. The latter seemed to be his primary task. It is possible that Defense Minister Belousov may also have to «retreat» in some capacity, similarly to General Surovikin.

Aleksey Dyumin (left) has a very good relationship with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin (right). His candidacy would have been much more suitable for the position of defense minister than Andrei Belousov's. Photo: SPUTNIK / AFP / Scanpix

This opinion is supported by another maneuver. Putin appointed his former bodyguard and former governor of the Tula region, Aleksey Dyumin, as secretary of the State Council. Dyumin has a military rank, leadership experience, and undoubtedly a better understanding of army operations. He was active in the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the evacuation of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to Russia. Apparently, Dyumin could not yet be appointed as defense minister.

Following Russia's attack on the Kharkiv region and the subsequent confusion within the Ministry of Defense, Ukraine now has a greater opportunity for success. It seems that preparations are being made for significant changes in both Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine due to the interplay of these two issues.