MEELIS OIDSALU ⟩ Estonia excels in waging hybrid warfare against Russia

Meelis Oidsalu, editor of the «Power and Security» section of Fookus Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• During the Cold War Western hybrid warfare was dirty; nowadays, the situation is better.
• Estonia's security elite has two competing views on the importance of hybrid defense.
• It is important to listen to the opposition, as they exercise «civilian oversight» in hybrid war.

The Estonian government and parliament are increasingly adopting decisions that limit fundamental rights, with the clear and justified goal of protecting against Russia's aggressive hybrid attacks and supporting Ukraine in the war. For the sake of Estonia's democracy, it is essential to call things by their proper names and ensure civilian oversight of our own hybrid warfare, editor Meelis Oidsalu says.

Hybrid warfare is typically seen as a tactic of the enemy. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea by «little green men», it has been primarily associated with Russia, as well as China, Iran, North Korea, and other so-called «axis of evil» states. Democracies have been reluctant to discuss their own hybrid warfare operations and capabilities. However, it is both formally and substantively accurate to say that the democratic world – including Estonia – has long been engaged in hybrid warfare, or at least actively participating as a defensive party.

The Cold War provided our allies with ample experience and resilience in hybrid warfare. It would not be unfounded to say that the United States occasionally mirrored its enemies too closely. As a hegemon, it sometimes overused its power, not always for the noblest of purposes.

In 1954, the CIA conducted a hybrid attack against Guatemala with the goal of overthrowing democratically elected president Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, whose land reforms and other policies threatened US business interests, particularly those of the United Fruit Company. The CIA orchestrated a disinformation campaign and armed uprising, leading to a coup and the establishment of a military dictatorship, resulting in decades of instability and violence in Guatemala.

The West has not always played cleanly

A year earlier, the CIA and British intelligence MI6 orchestrated Operation Ajax in Iran to overthrow democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh's overthrow and the restoration of Shah Reza Pahlavi's rule led to decades of authoritarian governance and growing dissatisfaction, culminating in the 1979 revolution.

While the West rightly focuses on the Soviet Union and its successor Russia's hybrid aggression, democracies also engage in hybrid warfare and can sometimes overreach.

In 1973, the CIA supported and financed Chilean opposition forces to overthrow the democratically elected president Salvador Allende. After Allende's fall and death, General Augusto Pinochet took power, establishing a repressive military dictatorship.

These and other questionable episodes of Western hybrid warfare mostly date back to the Cold War era. However, as recently as 1994, France faced criticism for its involvement in Rwanda's internal politics leading up to a genocide. France has a history of controversial influence operations in Africa.

In more recent history, there have been less contentious hybrid operations, such as those by Israel and the United States against Iran's nuclear program (the Stuxnet virus). Overall, while the West rightly focuses on the Soviet Union and its successor Russia's hybrid aggression, democracies also engage in hybrid warfare and can sometimes overreach. Therefore, it is important not to shy away from public debate on this topic and to critically evaluate both our own and our allies' tactics alongside those of our adversaries.

Four slain Estonian kings

Hybrid warfare became a popular term again in 2014 due to the «little green men» who occupied Crimea. However, in a broader sense, hybrid warfare has used various elements (political and economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, information manipulation, deception, espionage, threats of force, foreign funding of political parties, arms support, etc.) for millennia.

The attack on Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets' personal car in December 2023 indicates that Russia is seeking opportunities to expand its hybrid attacks against Estonia. Photo: Erik Prozes

Cyberattacks, social media, and artificial intelligence have added new dimensions to this ancient form of warfare, but the methods remain largely the same. In cyberattacks, too, tactics such as masking, deception, simulation, attrition, and enticement are employed. One country's government uses indirect methods and avoids direct military confrontation to influence another government's decisions, potentially replacing it with a more favorable one. This is the essence of hybrid warfare.

Secrecy and covert actions are not necessarily integral to hybrid warfare; it can also be a completely open and official phenomenon. In the United States, hybrid warfare encompasses both public and covert activities. The transparency and legality of actions can be seen as characteristics that distinguish Estonia's hybrid warfare approach from Russia's.

In Estonian history, there have been horrific incidents of hybrid warfare even before the birth of the Republic of Estonia. For instance, the killing of four Estonian kings on May 4, 1343, in Paide was a classic hybrid operation (a deception operation culminating in the murder of leaders). However, the most gruesome and extensive use of this warfare method hit Estonia in 1939. The diplomatic, economic, and military pressure leading to the Bases Treaty was, from Estonia's perspective, a capitulation to Soviet hybrid aggression.

Two competing visions of security

Based on discussions with various sources, it can be concluded that the current Estonian security elite is broadly divided into two schools of thought regarding the defense of Estonia's independence in the coming decades. Both schools agree that the current period resembles 1939, but they draw different conclusions. The «hybrid warfare» school believes that Russia's hybrid warfare against Estonia and the other Baltic states is expected to expand significantly. If Estonia can succeed in hybrid (defense warfare), then a full-scale war might be averted.

In 2014, Russia was in a much better position in hybrid warfare compared to 2022, and its situation subsequently visibly worsened on every front, especially in the information war.

The other, more conventional part of the security elite believes that Russia will decide to militarily attack its neighbors regardless of the outcomes of hybrid warfare or precisely if they fail in it. They cite February 24, 2022, as an example.

In 2014, Russia was in a much better position in hybrid warfare compared to 2022, and its situation subsequently visibly worsened on every front, especially in the information war. Nevertheless, the decision for a full-scale military invasion of a neighboring country was made.

Throughout the period of Estonia's re-independence, our government and intelligence services have conducted hybrid warfare against Russia based on clear defensive needs and as a reaction to Russian attacks. In recent years, Estonia's stance has somewhat changed, and in addition to purely reactive hybrid operations, proactive initiatives shaping the conditions of the adversary's actions have entered the government's repertoire. Estonia does not implement these initiatives alone but sets an example and takes the initiative to encourage the European Union and its external allies to increase pressure on Russia.

The nine lines of defense of the Republic of Estonia

With regard to Estonia's domestic hybrid warfare operations of a purely defensive nature, nine measures have been implemented since early 2022: restricting within Estonian territory the broadcast of Russian media channels that justify acts of aggression; holding accountable or expelling individuals engaged in anti-Estonian activities; the «monument war», which involves removing from public spaces the memorial infrastructure used by Russia to spread anti-Estonian ideology; banning symbols of aggression and the justification of aggression; confiscating weapons from Russian citizens; prohibiting the use of Russian license plates on vehicles; significantly enhancing the counteraction of cyber-attacks; closing Estonia-Russia border checkpoints; and declaring the Russian Orthodox Church as a supporter of aggression.

Last year, Andres Lember, leader of the voluntary hybrid defense cell Propastop, received the European Citizen of the Year award. Photo: Eero Vabamägi

These measures would not be necessary if Russia did not act as an aggressor or attempt to persuade the Estonian population to support its aggression in Ukraine. For example, the decision to transition to Estonian-language education and to accelerate this process is not a measure of hybrid warfare but a regular educational policy decision that has been made more urgent by Russian aggression and the extreme political ideology of the Kremlin regime, but was not directly caused by it. This political aim has been represented in Estonia's party landscape for decades.

Estonia's «hybrid defense force» comprises not only the Government Office, the Justice Ministry and Interior Ministry, Information System Authority, Police and Border Guard Board, Tax and Customs Board, and the special services, but also a voluntary element—the cyber defense unit of the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps and Propastop, which fights against Russian disinformation. Both operate under Kaitseliit. Additionally, creative unions and sports associations have imposed so-called voluntary sanctions on presenting Russian authors' works, limited cooperation with Russian creators or athletes, and restricted participation in events in Russia or involving Russian participation.

Some journalists and newsrooms have voluntarily advocated for the enforcement or tightening of sanctions and other measures. They do not always limit themselves to objective coverage or investigative purposes but call on the government to tighten or better enforce the measures, or call out companies serving Russian economic interests, even if these do not violate sanctions or laws. The eastward transport scandal is one of such cases. At the same time, the media's political activism is nothing new or unique in the context of the ongoing hybrid war.

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, having abandoned religious freedom, controls one of the Kremlin's most important domestic sentiment control and foreign hybrid operation networks. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/POOL/AFP

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes lead in offensive operations

The more active part of the hybrid war against Russia, which is not solely based on Estonia's immediate defense needs, is directed by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice. It is important to highlight the role of the Riigikogu, as various notable resolutions (such as opening a NATO air defense mission in Ukraine, recognizing Russia's aggression as genocide, etc.) have been adopted on the initiative of the Riigikogu itself.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees operations that require the assistance of allies and have a strategic impact on the opponent's operational conditions. These include the imposition of economic sanctions, the diplomatic isolation of Russia, and, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, the planning of «legal warfare» to prosecute Russian war crimes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spearheaded the initiative to utilize Russia's frozen assets, another active hybrid warfare measure.

Estonia has been a pioneer in providing military aid. We were the first to send Western equipment to Ukraine a few weeks before Russia's full-scale aggression and pressured other countries, such as Germany, to approve supplies.

The Ministry of Defense has led the provision of military aid to Ukraine on a material level. Military aid is a classic hybrid warfare measure, and Estonia has been a pioneer in this regard: we were the first to send Western arms to Ukraine a few weeks before Russia's full-scale aggression and pressured other countries, such as Germany, to approve arms deliveries. The ministry also oversees foreign and military intelligence, which has significantly assisted Ukraine. Western intelligence has played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine, and Estonian intelligence has been no exception.

Estonia has been a leader in countering Russian aggression also on a strategic and conceptual level. Last December, our Ministry of Defense developed the so-called «Estonian Plan» to assist Ukraine in achieving victory. This plan has garnered widespread attention and recently inspired the British government to commit to long-term military support for Ukraine. The ice is starting to break.

Estonia's hybrid warfare should be discussed more

Labeling Estonia's and the free world's efforts to support Ukraine against Russian aggression as hybrid warfare might seem provocative and combative, given that this defense is being forced on us and is shamefully costly. However, the hybrid warfare framework has clear advantages.

Firstly, it makes it easier to distinguish hybrid warfare from regular socio-political processes. Measures are implemented to limit the opponent's aggressive actions, which, due to their nature of infringing on basic rights, should be clearly separated from mainstream politics. The enforced militarism should not permanently infect Estonia's mainstream political parties.

Secondly, like any war, the current hybrid defense war against Russia requires a democratic civilian control framework. Primarily, the government needs oversight, and in hybrid warfare, this oversight is carried out by the chancellor of justice, the political opposition, and the media. Hence, all debates regarding the proportionality, legality, and effectiveness of various measures (such as the issue of stripping Russian citizens of voting rights) are crucial for the health of democracy.

The poster «Putin is a war criminal» on Narva Castle on May 9, 2023, is one of the most public examples of Estonia's hybrid war against Russia. Transparency and openness can be considered characteristic features of Estonia's hybrid warfare. Photo: Jānis Laizāns

The suppression of such debates weakens the quality of hybrid defense warfare. In military planning, using devil's advocates (known as Red Teams) is a standard method. Besides the opposition, the media must also play this role actively, methodically questioning the effectiveness of existing hybrid warfare measures. This has been done partially. The debate continues. However, during wartime, media self-censorship increases.

Thirdly, treating hybrid warfare as hybrid warfare allows us to assess it against the long history of this mode of warfare, highlighting areas that may be overlooked today. For instance, since the end of the Cold War, the West has been poor at creating and disseminating messages to ordinary people living beyond the new Iron Curtain. There are undoubtedly other blind spots and unrecognized impacts.

As my colleague Erkki Koort recently wrote, neither Estonia nor the European Union and NATO have a well-thought-out concept for hybrid attacks. Cyberattacks have been discussed as deterrent or punitive measures for the countless misdeeds perpetrated by Russia, but not very effectively.

Fourthly, we must always ensure that our hybrid warfare measures—even those of a predominantly defensive nature—do not inadvertently provide advantages to the adversary or excessively restrict the freedoms of Estonian citizens. We need to consider possible retaliatory actions by Russia and question whether our measures might end up giving the adversary an edge or making us similar to them.

Reckless militancy could diminish Estonia's resilience as a society and a state, potentially allowing Russia to exploit this weakness. Therefore, it is crucial to listen to and highlight opposing voices.

Reckless militancy could diminish Estonia's resilience as a society and a state, potentially allowing Russia to exploit this weakness. Therefore, it is crucial to listen to and highlight opposing voices.

Since 2014, both the European Union and NATO have made progress in conceptualizing hybrid warfare and adopting a more proactive stance. They have developed «playbooks» that help in comprehending the adversary's actions more comprehensively and responding more thoughtfully and collaboratively. However, the West still has much work to do to articulate more precisely in both secret meeting rooms and public forums what is happening in hybrid warfare and how we can influence developments, using smart power when necessary.

As President Alar Karis said in his speech at the Lennart Meri Conference on May 16, the West is «gradually abandoning its failed strategy of restrained deterrence». The president also noted that after mentally adapting to the war in Ukraine, the West must now take action. Terminological clarity and the use of an appropriate mental framework will help guide increasing activity more consciously.

Estonia has been a clear leader in the hybrid war between the West and Russia

* Estonia took the lead in supporting Ukraine and limiting the operational freedom of Russia and Belarus as early as the end of 2021. During the subsequent challenging years, we have managed to maintain initiative and expand our influence.

* In December 2021, Estonia announced its intention to provide Ukraine with military aid, including howitzers and Javelin missiles. The majority of this aid reached Ukraine before February 24, 2022. Estonia was the first to take this step, effectively breaking the ice for other NATO countries to donate large-caliber weaponry. The debate with Germany over the permission to donate howitzers also sparked a broader discussion in Germany.

* In early 2022, Estonia imposed a national sanction on Belarusian oil products, accelerating a similar process in Europe.

* In the spring of 2022, the Estonian parliament was the first among NATO members to call for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine and later passed a resolution recognizing Russia's actions in Ukraine as genocide.

* In September 2022, under Estonia's leadership, the Baltic states and Poland decided to stop issuing visas to Russian tourists.

* In January 2023, nine allies signed the «Tallinn Pledge» in Estonia, stating that sanctions alone would not end the war and clearly articulating the goal of supporting Ukraine to victory by expelling Russian forces. This added pressure on Germany, which was hesitant about donating Leopard tanks.

* In December 2023, Estonia published a long-term strategy for winning the war in Ukraine, proposing to provide Ukraine with permanent military aid amounting to 0.25 percent of GDP. The Estonian government also made a corresponding decision. Initially met with skepticism, this plan has gained support, and the United Kingdom recently established a permanent fund.

* In May 2024, Estonia became the first European Union country to approve the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.