MEELIS OIDSALU ⟩ Russian hybrid attacks have made Estonia stronger

Meelis Oidsalu, editor of the «Power and Security» section of Fookus. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• The constant minor messes orchestrated by Russia are supposed to instill a sense of helplessness.
• Coalition politicians are still unable to agree on common crisis management talking points.
• As long as Estonia's democracy is viable, the adversary's hybrid attacks are making us stronger.

The Estonian-Russian hybrid war has been going on for the last 30 years. It started in 1993 with the illegal secession referendum in East-Viru County and continued in 1995 with the double tariffs imposed on Estonia. Also the numerous subsequent hybrid attacks by Russia have only made Estonia stronger, says editor Meelis Oidsalu.

On May 2, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg expressed concern about Russia's increasingly intensive hybrid attacks in the alliance's territory. The topic is relevant again also in Estonia, in the context of the decision of the airline company Finnair to end flights to Tartu due to GPS jamming originating from Russia. The same problem plagued regional airports in eastern Finland a few years ago.

Experts say the jamming could be due to several factors, including Russia's fear of Ukrainian drone strikes. But a similar measure was already used by Russia in 2017 in Norway, during NATO exercises, and back then the bully had no reason to fear attacks himself. Such a measure does not directly affect aviation safety, but as we can see, in this case it has affected the regional mobility of Tartu's residents.

Therefore, sometimes the only option is to become stronger ourselves so that the neighbor's bullying has less power over decisions made by the public and private sectors in our territory.

In an interview in today's Fookus, an expert from the center for hybrid threats of Finland says that it's not always possible to respond proportionately to hybrid attacks. If the totalitarian neighbor launches a migration attack against Estonia, it's difficult to imagine that a democratic state could respond with something equivalent. During a major war, when the West itself too is already engaged in a large hybrid war – diplomatic and economic – with the aggressor, it's also difficult to impose indirect additional penalties. Therefore, sometimes the only option is to become stronger ourselves so that the neighbor's bullying has less power over decisions made by the public and private sectors in our territory.

It has already been suggested from the government that Ülenurme airfield needs additional technical capabilities to enable the landing of aircraft. Tartu Airport meanwhile has announced that it will use the break in regular flights in May to conduct training exercises.

Limiting freedoms does not increase resilience

However, becoming stronger must not come at the cost of relinquishing freedoms, as then we risk becoming more and more like the adversary. Such a development is an indirect goal of hybrid warfare. For example, if Estonia's crisis-time censorship arrangements become more similar to Russia's, it becomes that much harder to explain to skeptics how democratic governance differs from their «sovereign democracy».

This year marked the 150th anniversary of the birth of Konstantin Päts, a statesman and the first president of the Republic of Estonia. He is the only Estonian leader who has succumbed to Russia in a hybrid war. Photo: Dmitri Kotjuh/Järva Teataja

The civil crisis and national defense bill, which is currently stalling in the corridors of power, provides, among other things, for extending the right of censorship to officials as a measure of resilience of the state. In fact, the problem with crisis management in Estonia has not been the lack of opportunities for censorship, but a lack of initiative manifested in the information space.

Its latest manifestation occurred in connection with the Balticconnector gas pipeline incident, when Estonian residents heard about the suspicion of an attack having taken place in our waters from the government of Sweden. Also in the case of GPS jamming, Estonia's political elite began publicly debating whether it was a hybrid attack after all. Raimond Kaljulaid, a member of the Riigikogu national defense committee (SDE), trolled Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna (Estonia 200) in his opinion piece on the ERR portal, questioning his assertion that the GPS jamming is a Russian hybrid attack.

Coalition politicians are unable to provide the public with coordinated information about Russia's actions, and several official versions of what is happening are being aired at the same time. Apparently, such a «debate» is being developed just to solicit attention in the run-up to the elections.

It is not for the first time in the last two years that we see coalition politicians being are unable to provide the public with coordinated information about Russia's actions, and several official versions of what is happening are being aired at the same time. Apparently, such a «debate» is being developed just to solicit attention in the run-up to the elections.

We ourselves are making our country more stupid and more powerless than we really are. There is an inherent vagueness to hybrid attacks, but that does not mean that government politicians, at least, shouldn't agree talking points among themselves.

Small attacks need to be talked about too

Foreign Minister Tsahkna is right to raise Russia's bullyish actions at the level of NATO and the European Union. Since 2014, both have developed a policy on hybrid warfare, with allies exchanging information and experts to have the collective defense work effectively also against hybrid attacks.

The only successful Russian hybrid attack on Estonia is the 1939 Treaty of Bases.

Hybrid threats are equally causes for concern for both Estonia and Germany, where recently two Ukrainians were stabbed to death and where both railway infrastructure and military facilities have been targeted. Talking about them helps raise awareness of the Russian threat in Berlin as well. While talking at a North Atlantic Council meeting about the technical capabilities of the Ülenurme airfield, bomb threats made to schools in southern Estonia, or the incident where the interior minister's car window was smashed may seem exaggerated, constantly causing minor sorts of messes indeed seems to be Russia's tactics in hybrid warfare now.

During a recent visit by Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets, Abbess Philareta, head of the Pühtitsa Stavropegial Dormition Convent, sent the minister to Moscow to ask for permission to carry out his plans. Filareta's talk follows exactly Moscow's score for the hybrid war. Photo: Eero Vabamägi

The constant little messes are supposed to send a signal to the population here that our government is powerless, that Estonia is the dreamland «near abroad» of Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill, where Moscow's approval is required for certain issues -- be it religious or communal. The local representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, in chorus with the residents of the Kuremäe convent, are also now playing along with this «ask Moscow» game. The latter directed the the interior minister of Estonia, who visited the convent, to Moscow to ask for permission to carry out his plans. There hardly is a much clearer way of showing the fig to the sovereignty of the Estonian state.

Estonia has been the clear winner

In the big picture, Estonians should not be very worried at the moment. Historically, Moscow has succeeded in only one hybrid attack against Estonia – diplomatic and military pressure in 1939 led Konstantin Päts' autocratic regime to the conclusion of the Treaty of Bases. From there, the installation of the Estonian puppet government – also a classic technique in Soviet hybrid warfare – was a matter of formalization.

The history of Estonian-Russian hybrid warfare teaches us that hybrid attacks emanating from Moscow are truly dangerous only when we neglect our democracy and corruption levels ourselves.

After the end of the Soviet occupation, it's us that have been the clear winners of the Estonian-Russian hybrid war so far. The long-term double tariffs introduced in 1995 helped Estonia reduce its dependence on the Russian market, thus becoming a better candidate for membership of the European Union. The cyber war against Estonia that followed the Bronze Night in 2007 increased our weight and visibility not only in NATO, but globally. Today, the Ministry of the Interior is building the «eastern border named after Eston Kohver» – without this 2014 kidnapping case, we would probably still be discussing whether there is enough money for the construction of the eastern border after all.

The history of Estonian-Russian hybrid warfare teaches us that hybrid attacks emanating from Moscow are truly dangerous only when we neglect our democracy and corruption levels ourselves. During the recent hybrid civil war in the Riigikogu – by this I mean the filibuster – democracy has already been compromised, by both the opposition and the coalition.

The ongoing Russian hybrid campaign indeed warrants greater attention in the coming years, against the backdrop of potential internal divisions, because hybrid warfare is an Eastern martial art where the goal is not necessarily to knock the opponent down but to trip them up so that they fall flat on their face due to their own carelessness.