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Even though Russia failed to repel the terrorist attacks, they ruthlessly manipulate these incidents for their own advantage both within their borders and on the international stage, Erkki Koort, security expert at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences and Postimees, writes.
For two years, Russia has been engaged in a full-scale war in Ukraine, thereby leaving itself vulnerable. It is surprising, considering that meanwhile, the effectiveness of Ukrainian intelligence in striking targets within Russia has been remarkable. In theory, a nation at war should have safeguarded itself against such breaches, yet Moscow has stumbled over its own narrative.
«Is anyone even doing their job at the FSB? What do you mean the US intelligence is 'running' life in a prison situated beyond the Arctic Circle? How come Ukraine is effortlessly carving 'windows' into the front lines as they please?» All these questions go unasked.
Up until a short while ago, the Kremlin portrayed its actions in Ukraine as a special military operation. But does such an operation necessitate a state of readiness and mobilization throughout the entire nation? Clearly not, as Moscow has exerted considerable effort to mask the true nature of the conflict. Despite the global expectation for accessible information, in Russia, the monopoly on news is still state-controlled. The TV brings to people what to believe and what not to believe, telling them how «things really are» or what the «truth» is.
Pros and cons
The response of Russian state institutions to the incident was weak, slow, and extremely unprofessional. It took hours before sufficient forces arrived at the scene. The Rosgvardia base, from which forces are dispatched to quickly control demonstrations if necessary, is located just a few kilometers from the concert hall. The failure to quickly coordinate actions for threat neutralization, rescue operations, or medical assistance was evident.
The tepid reaction can be interpreted from various perspectives. Should one speculate that the Kremlin had a hand in orchestrating the incident, then the delay could have been due to «minimal losses». Another factor might be the state of readiness; the ongoing war against Ukraine requires a lot of resources, making the responding units weaker. For a demonstration or Navalny's funeral, the event is usually known in advance, and a larger force can be deployed. Also, such events as Navalny's funeral or the extension of the president's term created a huge amount of overtime, compensated to the special services with days off. Therefore, it is logical that a large part of the personnel was not immediately available.
In 2001, it was affirmed that people die due to terrorists' actions, not intelligence activities. Russia has fully exploited the weakening of counterintelligence in the West.
Special forces always ensure their own survival upon entry. They are not sent in until there is a plan and at least the necessary information about the opponent. Meanwhile, the wealth of photographic and video evidence from the Crocus City Hall incident is unusual, highlighting an atypical delay in the commencement of operations. Nonetheless, the initiation of rescue and medical teams cannot proceed without ensuring the threat has been neutralized.
Regardless of whether the incident was orchestrated by the Kremlin or truly perpetrated by ISIS, it has already crafted a conducive narrative for Moscow. The discovery of a so-called «Ukrainian trace» has sufficed to galvanize the populace. Internationally, this situation has garnered empathy and underscored the fight against terrorism as a pivotal aspect of Russian intelligence's acclaim, especially post the 9/11 attacks when a unified stance against terrorism was adopted by NATO. In 2001, it was affirmed that people die due to terrorists' actions, not intelligence activities. Russia has fully exploited the weakening of counterintelligence in the West.
Currently, despite terrorism being deemed a mutual adversary, Moscow's established connections with groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Gaza, and Iran, known for backing terrorism, are overlooked. The Kremlin has funded and armed terrorists, while a Russian diplomat is the deputy secretary-general of the UN for counter-terrorism.
«A window» in the border
The terrorist attacks on Russian soil have unveiled some predictable patterns while also introducing some new dynamics. The Kremlin's anticipated inclination to blame Ukraine aligns seamlessly with their established narrative. Former President Dmitry Medvedev promised destruction to all those involved, regardless of their position. Here too, there was a reference to Ukraine, the leadership of which Russia has been trying to kill for two years.
Putin hinted that Kyiv must have created a «window» at the border. This raises questions for the Russian leadership and the FSB, tasked with border security. With the frontline serving as the border for two years, what window could they possibly be referring to? A similar scenario unfolded in the wake of Navalny's death in a prison camp beyond the Arctic Circle, where US intelligence services were accused of orchestrating the event. In a functioning country, citizens would pose questions. «Is anyone even doing their job at the FSB? What do you mean the US intelligence is 'running' life in a prison situated beyond the Arctic Circle? How come Ukraine is effortlessly carving 'windows' into the front lines as they please?» All these questions go unasked.
Events such as Navalny's funeral or the extension of the president's term created a huge amount of overtime, compensated to the special services with days off.
It is worth paying attention to Russia's next move, especially since the terrorists actually fled towards Belarus. What business could they possibly have had there? Would they have embarked on a migration attack into Europe?
Some important changes
The most puzzling issue is the highest level of the United States' terror alert having been ignored. Clearly, Washington did not communicate the threat to Moscow solely through media. Normally, additional materials are also provided. It is possible that some information was not confirmed, yet it is not unthinkable that it was initially perceived as interference in internal affairs.
Changes in Russia's treatment of detainees are noticeable. The more embarrassing the situation for the FSB, the more brutally prisoners are treated. Dragging suspects into court in a demeaned state is standard in Russia, as it supposedly meets the public's «sense of justice». However, suspects have never been so openly tortured before, with no attempt being now made to hide the marks of torture. Apparently, the war in Ukraine and the brutality cultivated there have penetrated the system, ultimately affecting the general populace.
Another striking observation is the appearance of FSB agents capturing the fugitives; they looked more like members of a criminal gang than elite forces. The norm has been to present a media image of uniformed, well-equipped units. This was not the case now. Evidently, the war has ravaged Russia more than is officially acknowledged.
Moscow will undoubtedly exploit this situation for foreign policy advantages and to further restrict freedoms within Russia.
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