POSTIMEES IN UKRAINE ⟩ Estonia knows where to purchase two billion euros' worth of shells for Ukraine

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur in Ukraine on March 20 during a stopover on his way to Kyiv, where he was scheduled to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart and take part in a security forum on the following day. Photo: Jaanus Piirsalu

• Pevkur: Estonia knows which countries are ready to sell all the necessary calibers to Ukraine.
• Estonia proposes to buy 800,000 shells, similar in scope to the Czech initiative.
• Allies' depots still hold air defense missiles, with more supplies being dispatched to Ukraine.

Estonia has the opportunity to buy some two to three billion euros' worth of shells and missiles for the Ukrainian army if the allies provide the funds, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said in an interview with Postimees.

Considering the prices of shells, Postimees estimates that this could amount to approximately one million shells and Grad rockets. Such a quantity would help the Ukrainian army hold out until the end of the year.

Pevkur announced Estonia's ability to assist in this manner at the meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein group, on March 19. The group includes all NATO countries and an additional 24 countries, including Australia, South Korea, and Japan. On March 20, Pevkur gave an interview to Postimees en route to a meeting in Kyiv with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.

What is the allies' strategy for helping Ukraine in the near term, considering yesterday's Ramstein group meeting, also known as the meeting of Ukraine's allies?

There are four major areas: ammunition, air defense, everything related to armored capabilities, and as a newer area, electronic warfare has become very important, as the Russian army has started to use drones in large quantities.

As for ammunition, funding is currently the bigger concern rather than the availability of munitions. When it was said that there was a lack of munitions, the Czech initiative to acquire 800,000 shells shows that munitions are actually available. Estonia also has a wide range of countries from which we could buy shells for Ukraine. I stated this yesterday at Ramstein, that if anyone is ready to financially contribute, they should contact us. We have the capability to purchase shells for Ukraine, including in large quantities and quickly.

How quickly?

With a delivery time of two months.

Where could Estonia potentially buy these from?

Mainly from non-European countries, but there are also some in Europe. Unfortunately, I cannot specify. In many cases, the seller themselves does not wish it to be known. Since the orders include 155 mm as well as 152 mm shells, Russia is also actively searching globally for suppliers via Belarus (155 mm are utilized by NATO artillery systems and the Russian army employs 152 mm shells – J.P.). There's a bit of a race against time to see who can secure them first.

epaselect epa11220370 Artillerymen of the 80th Separate Galician Air Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine operate a BM-21 'Grad' self-propelled 122 mm multiple rocket launcher near the frontline in Donetsk area, Ukraine, 14 March 2924 amid the Russian invasion. Russian troops entered Ukraine in February 2022 starting a conflict that has provoked destruction and a humanitarian crisis. EPA Photo: YAKIV LIASHENKO

You mentioned that funding is the bigger problem in acquiring shells. What kind of sums are we talking about for the quantities Estonia could buy for Ukraine?

The offers we are aware of in the world cover all the calibers [needed by] Ukraine. These include 122 mm rockets for Grad [multiple launch rocket systems], 122 mm artillery shells for D-30 [Soviet-era howitzers], and then 152 mm and 155 mm shells. There's a variety to choose from.

With regard to the price, for the quantities in question, they fall between two and three billion euros (currently, the global market price for shells is around 2,500 euros. For two billion euros, this would amount to 800,000 shells; for three billion euros, 1.2 million shells – J.P.)

Would this be in addition to the European Union's plan to provide Ukraine with one million shells?

That is a separate matter. This quantity is either produced or taken from the storages of European Union countries. Roughly a third of this has been done. The remaining part is approximately 600,000-700,000. European Union countries have committed to supplying Ukraine with 1.1 million shells by the end of this year.

If we combine these one million shells, the Czechs' potential purchases, our buying capabilities, and also the British, who have indicated they have some knowledge [of where to buy shells], I dare say that it would be possible to send Ukraine 2-2.5 million shells this year, if the funding were available. These 2-2.5 million shells would already be comparable to what the Russians can deploy.

What happens in 2025 if the current market for shells is depleted by purchases now?

Production will increase. By the end of this year, European production will grow to 1.4 million shells, and next year it is expected to increase to two million shells. The Americans are also boosting their production (according to plans, the United States is expected to produce at least 1.2 million shells in 2025 – J.P.). Naturally, a portion of this will go into the countries' own reserves.

But other countries around the world are also increasing production. While Russia is boosting its production, everyone else is doing the same (The Ukrainian army needs 200,000 shells per month, or 2.4 million shells per year. If plans are realized, Ukraine's allies should be producing even more by 2025 – J.P.)

So, as I understand, this year, the plan for Ukraine's allies is to buy as many shells as possible from around the world, and next year...

…to shift towards sourcing from production.

About air defense. What did the Ukrainians say in Ramstein about how critical the situation is with air defense missiles and weapons?

This is one of the most critical areas. A simple example. Ukraine managed to shoot down two A-50 [Russian radar planes] and SU bomber aircraft, and on the other side of the Dnieper the Russian army has not used bombing aircraft and glide bombs against the Krynky bridgehead, which used to be one of the biggest headaches for Ukrainians.

This is factual confirmation that if one can control the air and keep the skies clear, then ground operations are possible. Ukrainians have also managed to shoot down 60-80 percent of Shaheed drones, depending on the direction.

TOPSHOT - Ukrainian servicemen prepare their weapons during a military training exercise near the front line in the Donetsk region, on February 23, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Anatolii STEPANOV / AFP) Photo: ANATOLII STEPANOV

How accurate is the assessment published in The Washington Post that Ukrainians will only have air defense missiles until the end of March?

Every day brings new developments in this regard. At Ramstein, several countries announced that they are sending air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine. However, there are challenges. There are several older systems that function very well, such as the Hawks, but these require spare parts.

The systems need maintenance. This has been discussed less, but everything related to equipment maintenance and spare parts is becoming increasingly critical. Their wear and tear are quite significant. Maintaining Western technology poses a significant headache for Ukrainians. This is done through video links and with the help of local experts. It is not easy at all. Consider all the technology that has been sent to Ukrainians. There are hundreds of different weapon systems there. The maintenance of all these systems is different.

What are the prospects for providing air defense weaponry?

There are still missiles in the warehouses. More missiles need to be provided. The Germans will definitely supply additional ammunition for the Gepard (35mm self-propelled anti-aircraft twin guns – J.P.), which have proven very effective. Simply put, much more is needed. It is being used up at an enormous rate.

Russians continue to produce missiles and drones in greater numbers than last year. It is important to remember that air defense is always multi-layered. One needs ultra-short-range, short-range, medium-range air defense, and defense against ballistic missiles. Ukrainians have about 4,000 mobile groups performing air defense.

Still, will the allies resolve Ukrainians' critical situation with air defense equipment or not?

We'll see. Much depends on the intensity of Russia's air warfare. It is highly likely that Russia will launch a new offensive after [Vladimir] Putin's re-election [as president], especially in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions, and not in the southern parts [Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions].

It all depends on the intensity of the Russian onslaught. The Russian army's personnel involved in the war in Ukraine is now nearly twice as large as in 2022. Russians started the war with 260,000 men, and according to Ukraine's latest estimate, [the Russian army involved in the Ukraine war] numbers 470,000 [soldiers].

Can we expect the allies to secure Ukraine with enough weapons and ammunition if Russia starts an intense offensive by the summer – which is currently expected by everyone?

There is hope that it will be enough. But the reality remains that there is a significant gap in terms of ammunition. About seven times. From the beginning of the year until yesterday, when the Ukrainians provided an update to us (the Ramstein group), in approximately three months, Russians have used around 500,000 shells of various calibers, to which Ukraine has been able to respond with about 75,000 shells.

No matter how much ammunition the allies send, this ratio remains in Russia's favor. The shells sent to Ukraine need to travel further and be more precise, so that fewer are used per target hit. Clearly, Ukrainians need more of both shells and air defense ammunition. On the positive side, Ukraine plans to create new brigades and increase its manpower.

Selliseid Prantsuse päritolu 155 mm suurtükke Caesar on Taani Ukrainale juba andnud. Nüüd antakse ära ka oma muud suurtükiväe relvad, et Venemaa edasitungimist rindel takistada. Taani peaminister kutsus üles teisigi Euroopa riike rohkem laskemoona annetama. Photo: ARIS MESSINIS / AFP

Artillery pieces require not just shells but also barrels. What is the situation with those? (According to an analysis published by the Estonian Defense Ministry at the end of last year, the Ukrainian army needs 1,500-2,000 new artillery barrels annually, with prices starting at 900,000 US dollars – J.P.)

Fortunately, we are currently able to maintain the barrels, and Ukraine has a capable heavy industry that can also perform maintenance. Fortunately, barrel maintenance is relatively simple. Barrels are still available in Europe.

Obviously, Ukrainians are not abiding by European army standards for artillery firing. In Ukraine, cannons are fired until the barrel is essentially destroyed, even if accuracy begins to waver. They do not have the luxury of replacing barrels. More barrels would be beneficial, but it is not a critical issue.

The third area is armored vehicles. How are the allies assisting Ukraine with this?

Ukrainians are forming new brigades, which require armor. Current brigades have armor, but of course, it has worn down. Standard wheeled armored fighting vehicles, 4x4 and 6x6, used for evacuating the wounded and transporting troops to the front, are of particular concern. These are in the greatest shortage for Ukrainians, as many have been hit.

But let us also talk about tanks. Spain announced yesterday that it would provide an additional 16 Leopard 2 A4 tanks. Perhaps others will contribute as well. Some countries only announce the amount they are donating [in equipment and supplies] without specifying what they are giving. However, the fact remains that there are not many tanks available in Europe. For example, after the end of the Cold War, Germany destroyed thousands of its tanks.

What assistance have the allies promised in the field of electronic warfare? As we recall, in his famous article in The Economist, the previous Ukrainian defense chief, General Zaluzhnyi, deemed this area crucial for achieving success.

Firstly, Ukrainians themselves are rapidly developing this area, but the allies are also contributing more. The problem is that Russians frequently change the frequencies [used for drone control]. The industry has yet to produce a multi-weapon that covers the entire frequency range. In addition to direct aid, there is significant development work happening in this area.

Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur. Photo: Jaanus Piirsalu

The numbers shown by the Ukrainians [at the Ramstein group meeting] on drone suppression are somewhat encouraging. However, it is important to consider that the number of drones used by the Russian army is increasing monthly, and they are producing more each month. Russia allegedly has factories capable of producing 300,000 drones a year. The number of drones in the war is increasing at a significant rate.

A small change has occurred. Initially, we were sending only ammunition, but now the shipment of explosives to Ukrainians has become important. We are indeed sending C4 or something similar so they can mix the appropriate explosive charge themselves and attach it to drones.

Do you know of any confirmed cases where weapons provided to Ukraine by allies have ended up in other conflict zones or in the hands of criminals?

No. I am not aware of any such instances.