MEELIS OIDSALU ⟩ There are still gaping holes in the blanket of collective defense

Meelis Oidsalu. Photo: Mihkel Maripuu

• The Ministry of Defense has not met the collective defense objectives formulated two years ago.
• Objectives have changed since, but there is still no clarity on key capacity gaps.
• The Baltic countries need a comprehensive collective defense solution at the level of objectives.

Seismic changes have taken place in the collective defense of the Baltics over the past two years, but the original objectives of the Ministry of Defense remain partly unfulfilled and there is still a lack of understanding of when and how the shortcomings in some key capabilities in Baltic defense are to be eliminated. Estonia's collective defense objectives need a revamp, editor Meelis Oidsalu says.

On April 8, 2022, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Kusti Salm told the public broadcaster: «Estonia's goal at the NATO summit in the summer is to achieve doubling the military presence of allies.» This doubled presence was supposed to result from «division headquarters, a mechanized brigade of allies consisting of a headquarters and at least three battalions.» In addition, indirect fire, air defense, reconnaissance and other units supporting the division were to arrive in Estonia. Pre-positioned equipment was going to be part of the solution.

Quite soon after the collective defense objective had been announced by the Ministry of Defense, Estonia's goals began to change, and instead of an allied brigade stationed here, talk began about a framework of division and need-based strengthening of the battalion stationed here. The latter function has been assigned to the UK's 12th Armored Brigade, with a brigade transfer exercise due next year.

According to an explanation from the Ministry of Defense, by spring 2022, the most important of Estonia's goals – NATO has changed its deterrent posture to be such that it is in fact possible to deter Russia with it – had been achieved.

According to an explanation from the Ministry of Defense, by spring 2022, the most important of Estonia's goals – NATO has changed its deterrent posture to be such that it is in fact possible to deter Russia with it – had been achieved. «NATO has not had defense plans like this in place since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago,» Salm says. While this is correct, it's a bit too general of a reply.

On the presence of allies, the Ministry of Defense explains it was just that during negotiations with allies a more optimal solution was found. Besides, new elements have been added to Estonia's defense model compared to April 2022.

The United Kingdom has rotated significant capabilities to Estonia, such as main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers. France's presence in Estonia has become permanent (until 2022 they were deployed here every second year). Since December 2022, there have been US soldiers in Estonia: currently, a battalion-sized unit in southern Estonia and HIMARS multiple rocket launchers in Tapa.

In total, there are more than 2,000 allies in Estonia at present, and according to the Ministry of Defense, their quality also plays a role. The core of the battalion stationed in Estonia is three capable allies who are also members of the UN Security Council and nuclear powers.

In total, there are currently more than 2,000 allies in Estonia, and their quality also plays a role. The core of the battalion stationed in Estonia is three capable allies who are also members of the UN Security Council and nuclear powers.

Progress has also been made on the necessary structure (the Estonian Division, a part of the NATO chain of command); the French and Britons have placed staff personnel in it. Nevertheless, both the response of the Ministry of Defense and the current public communication on collective defense remain patchy.

What has become of the plan to pre-position munitions for the brigade assigned to beef up Estonia's defenses and other allied equipment? How and when will the problem of Baltic air and missile defense be resolved? (Our own air defense assets will fall short of providing a comprehensive solution also once they have arrived.) In the event of a military attack on Estonia, can we hope that we will not be subjected to target restrictions by Washington and Berlin such as those imposed on Ukraine?

In two years, there have indeed been seismic changes in collective defense, but this acknowledgment alone is not sufficient, we need a comprehensive and militarily credible plan for all the key capability enablers of Baltic collective defense. Two years ago, Secretary General Salm promised that Estonia will be defense-ready by February 24, 2024. It is time for a midterm review and to set new objectives.