A final nail in the Democratic coffin was the shift in what Michael Moore called the “Rust Belt Brexit” states of the Midwest—whose unemployed or underemployed factory workers were remarkably receptive to the message that Clinton and her entourage had become the party of Wall Street, not Main Street—a charge from which Sanders had also gained considerable advantage.
Republicans
Despite Trump’s best efforts to portray the party as united at its convention in Cleveland in July, it was more notable for who did not attend than who did. All of the party’s former presidents and presidential nominees declined to attend, while both House Speaker Paul Ryan and primary runner-up Ted Cruz declined to offer full-throated endorsement of the nominee.
And despite the wave of Republican office-holders who refused (or retracted) endorsements of the New York businessman, Trump won without them. Again, the question is—why?
Ironically given the rhetoric of a campaign founded on “America first,” the answer may lie in its embrace of a remarkably global trend towards less American-style conservativism and more European-style populism. For decades, the Republican party has been a relative outlier in comparative politics, with its embrace of pro-corporate policies on taxation and trade, along with support for (legal) immigration and a robustly interventionist foreign policy. While the vast majority of the Republican-controlled Senate will continue to endorse these positions (an estimate today was that only 5 would back Trump’s proposed withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example), Trump voters do not—and they may well be joined by the anti-globalization constituency so effectively identified by Sanders as well.