Hint

Workplace of foreign minister exposed to eavesdropping

Please note that the article is more than five years old and belongs to our archive. We do not update the content of the archives, so it may be necessary to consult newer sources.
Copy
Article photo
Photo: lukenofsingerlaw.com

Two years after the infamous phone call between Urmas Paet and Catherine Ashton on Maidan snipers which was eavesdropped, part of top foreign ministry staff facilities are still available for ears of hostile intelligence. 

«We are dealing with the issue,» admits foreign ministry diplomatic corps director-general Andres Kangur. He is talking about expanding security area at the ministry to offices of the management. At interior and defence ministries, also working with top sensitive information, this is the arrangement for years.

Before Mr Kangur coming from security police background, «there was somewhat of a disorder at foreign ministry» according to an expert in Estonia. Another informed source said the ministry had been repeatedly warned to see about the security.  

It’s getting better now. Under Mr Kangur, the ministry main building security area has expanded 40 percent to already cover part of the top staff facilities.  

The work continues. As for the minister Marina Kaljurand, for sensitive conversations she needs to use one of her offices, located next to one another. To this day, her «public» workplace is accessible for hostile intelligence.  

At that, it is the face to face conversations potentially posing the greater security risk – hostile ears interested in «who talks to who and when» etc as put by Government Office coordination director Kristjan Prikk.

In theory, the minister’s «open» office could be eavesdropped from a nearby park, using a van filled with special equipment. Considering the threat of getting caught, it could not go on for longer periods of time.

---------------------

EU presidency to boost volumes of confidential info

Enhanced security is the order of the day in light of Estonia assuming the rotating EU presidency in two years. According to Latvian and Lithuanian experience, in certain sections of the work volumes of confidential information may grow up to fourfold as information from member states converges.

Top