Editorial: catastrophe risks may be reduced, not removed

Photo: SCANPIX

In all likelihood, Germanwings co-pilot Andreas Lubitz intentionally crashed into a mountain killing himself and all aboard – totalling 150. Why? Was there something the airline failed to do? Are there systemic errors in aviation making this possible?

Respecting the facts, not all questions can be convincingly answered. We do, however, have the liberty to discuss, on basis of what of known, about what might have gone wrong and what we might learn. 

Doubtless, aviation is a most guarded and secured domains in the world. The rules have largely been derived as lessons from catastrophes past – as regards checking for technical glitches, terrorism threat, and condition of pilots. And yet, turns out the many-layered safety net is still too porous thus making the recent catastrophe possible. And, as in times before, again a lesson is being learnt. The budget carrier Norwegian Air Shuttle, for one, has already announced it will be requiring two people constantly in the cockpit, for security.  

With those desiring to become pilots, personal traits are tested even upon admission to aviation schools. Instructors have been trained to detect people with tendencies towards risk behaviour, and to promptly react. Regularly – once a year, typically – pilots undergo medical checks. As told Postimees by Estonian Air Line Pilots Association board member and airplane captain Rauno Menning, «there is no extra mental health check there, everything as a whole is for the aviation doctor to decide.» Presumably, learning from the catastrophe at hand, regular psychiatric check will be mandatory. It’s another issue if it will totally exclude what probably happened on board of the Germanwings aircraft. Alas, not. These are people, and the condition of people changes. 

Therefore, a means of prevention – in numerous areas – is teaching employees to recognise behavioural changes pointing to danger, and to react. This would be especially important at jobs where the adequacy of one determines the wellbeing and life of many. For the most part, the intent to commit suicide will not emerge immediately before execution thereof. Usually, a person planning to take his life will blurt it out to family and friends. Such watchfulness will not apply to suicidal tendencies alone, but to whatever altered behaviour as possibly hazardous in critical situations. Allegedly, in aviation they do teach people the skills of watching ones companions. A question now to be asked by the public: is the teaching sufficient, so an organisation will promptly react if an employee reports a change in his colleague’s behaviour? 

Regrettably, it must be assumed that no system of prevention can totally do away with cases like this. All it can do is reduce them.