Editorial: conflict brewing in Baltic Sea waters

Photo: Urmas Nemvalts

Ever since Friday, Swedish armed forces have fishing for reasons for «foreign underwater activity». Among the isles of Stockholm, a broad military operation is underway – one involving vessels, choppers and infantry.  

An allegedly Russian object spotted in Swedish waters – as confirmed by two radio communication séances between Stockholm neighbourhood and Kaliningrad – is just one among the many border violations noticed recently. Thus, these past months have served multiple warnings by Sweden of Russian air forces acting up above the Baltic Sea, including the October 2^nd incident with just a dozen metres between a Russian fighter and a Swedish intelligence aircraft.

According to Tomas Ries, a teacher at Swedish National Defence College, this is due to Russian upset with readiness by Sweden and, partly, by Finland, to cooperate with NATO. Sweden specifically is seen as a NATO partner ever since the cold war days – one who would not hesitate to choose sides in case of conflict.

In light of other tendencies, the understanding looks logical. The Kremlin seems to be training the non-NATO states by Pavlov reflex: take a step towards NATO, and be punished. Not only does the «foreign underwater activity» resurface reflections on the Soviet submarine running aground near Sweden in 1981 – the «whiskey on the rock» incident – but a broader context is needed.

Sweden’s steps towards NATO after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine have triggered Moscow’s reaction: violations of airspace in the region are clearly in upward trend, and increasing in their provocative nature.

The other part of the explanation, also fitting the description by Tomas Ries, might be more general: Russia is not quite intelligent about NATO’s scope and expansion plans. Partly because a measure of NATO summit has been lost in translation. Here, the diplomatic use of language may be part of the problem – the tongue is understandable for Europeans but perhaps meaning something totally different to Russia. Recalling the summits of Bucharest and Wales in 2008 and 2014: no short-term embrace by NATO of Georgia or Ukraine was envisioned at either occasion; still, in language as polite as possible, as is considered good practice, the perspective could still be sensed in the final documents – through glasses of fear and phobia. Alas, the Kremlin has got both: the fear of NATO expanding, and certain stage paranoia in the matter. In what the Western diplomatic speech meant quite a clear «no», the Kremlin heard a response more positive by several notches, and reacted accordingly. The current situation, however, is closer by a notch, and also more serious by one.

And then there’s the other aspect: Pavlov reflex may also backfire – the stronger the pressure by Russia, the stronger the urge in non-NATO states to join up.

A third explanation would be more general and simple still: the latest developments are sign of Russia seeking to show supremacy on Baltic Sea. No matter the version, a conflict is brewing.