How to handle information war?

Mikk Salu
, reporter
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Estonian psychological defence doctrine specifies how and in which channels to stand for reputation of our state, both home and abroad

Yesterday, Minister of Defence Urmas Reinsalu presented a paper officially called Non-Military part of National Defence Development Plan (Riigikaitse arengukava mittesõjaline osa). The document is classified, content thereof not to be published. On basis of the paper, another one will be prepared – operational programme of development plan. That will be classified, too.

All we know, of the content, is topics covered therein: civil sector support for military defence; international activity, securing domestic security; functioning of vital services; and psychological defence. To sum it up, the document ought to list all topics related to national defence which are not directly military – tanks, guns, shooting.

The most interesting aspect of the document, however, is that for the first time Estonian officials have worded a subject like psychological defence. At first glance, is smacks of Goebbels-like propaganda ministry; even so, this is no laughing matter. This is a serious and growing domain, tackled by every country.

Take, for instance, Russia. No coincidence that they all – President Vladimir Putin, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, ministry officials and the common journalist – talk the same talk.

Nuances may vary, but as soon as foreign policy is addressed, the message is one: West is bad, Russia is good, and the Baltics are small ugly Nazi states busy rewriting history and persecuting national minorities.

In a recent interview to Postimees, the same was hinted by the Russia-expert David Satter: in all details, Russia’s propaganda activities may not be coordinated and directed from the top, but with the system and the message in place, all else will take care of itself. «Russian journalists do read the lips, what is expected of them by the powers,» said he.

This is soft power. This is psychological attack.

Twisted message

Estonian public is indeed unaware what exactly is contained in the psychological defence chapter in the national defence development plan; but on basis of indirect data and insinuations, certain conclusions may be drawn.

The first and foremost issue remains Estonia’s image as a state, its reputation. What is our reputation abroad, and here at home? Are we heard? Are we believed? Are we able to react properly, do we know and get things right?

Recently, even Estonian media covered the news that former US defence secretary Robert Gates called speedy acceptance of the Baltic States into NATO a mistake. What he actually said was: «The speedy acceptance of Baltic States into NATO was right», but in Estonian media the message was twisted the other way round. (Afterwards, numerous outlets have indeed corrected the initial wording.) The reason was that into Estonia, the news arrived via the Russian information agency Interfax.

Here’s a twist, however, that troubles psychological defence experts in Government Office and defence ministry: Estonian journalists live in the Western information field, many do not know the Russian language nor do they know and understand Russian media. Otherwise, they would know that Interfax is Russian government’s news agency that does twist and lie, if that’s advantageous to Russian foreign policy.

Or, take another example. Not long ago, Knight Cross recipient Harald Nugiseks was buried, whereat a statement by Russian foreign ministry was issued to the tune of «Estonia honouring a war criminal».

Again, this is the issue of psychological defence, and how Estonian is supposed to react. In this instance, it was correct for Estonia not to react at all. Namely, Russia’s statement had been made by a low level official at the ministry, a deputy press secretary at a department i.e. overall, Russia was not too interested in the whole thing – the usual arrow of criticism had indeed been shot, but nothing remarkable. Thus, it made no sense for Estonia to react, amplifying such insignificant news.

Both instances point to an aspect of Estonia’s psychological defence: we must understand Russia, know who is who, get the context. In Estonian media and among officialdom, all this is ever decreasing.

Denigrating won’t help

Even though in Estonia’s psychological defence doctrine, Russia obviously holds an important place, the document would definitely not be aimed at a neighbour alone. An example of psychological defence are some statements by President Toomas Hendrik Ilves – for him, the topic of psychological defence is definitely quite well known.

On multiple occasions – the clearest example being the New Year interview to Public Broadcasting (ERR) – Mr Ilves has repeated the idea of «attack me, but do not attack Estonian state». In his interview, this is what he said:

«I understand when you are saying that the government is bad and stupid; and if Riigikogu is bad and stupid, we might debate over that. But [Estonian] state in itself is unbelievably good, actually.»

Attack Mr Ilves or attack Mr Ansip, but do not attack Estonian state – this might be a main doctrine of domestic psychological defence.

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