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Currently the situation in Ukraine appears much calmer. However, it is the lull before the storm. The political crisis in Ukraine will not end even after the government resignation, the annulment of the unconstitutional laws that were adopted on January 16, and the vote on ‘amnesty’ law on January 29.
The problem of the crisis lays much deeper than the reorganization of the ministerial posts and adoption of symptomatic laws. Ukrainian political system has been eroded with the usurpation of power by the executive branch, partisan judiciary and widespread corruption. All of above leads to a widespread distrust at the political level and makes the system completely dysfunctional. The environment that would lead to long-lasting trust is missing, and the five rounds of «crisis-management» negotiations with the President failed to establish such environment.
The changes made on January 28-29 return the crisis back to the status-quo and temporary de-escalation. Neither side is pleased with the deal so far. On the one side, there are the protesters who refuse to accept a piecemeal response to their comprehensive package of demands. On the other side, there are the oligarchs with fragmented situational awareness and a great belief in their «truth». Moreover, the law-enforcement machine has been so heavily abused that it is uncapable of stopping. The number of missing activists continue to grow, the new cases of torture come to light and violence by the street thugs continue.
Despite the concessions made, Yanukovich’s pantheon (a log house in reality) remains standing on three pillars: 1) electorate; 2) security sector; 3) oligarchs.
These pillars are wobbly and a crack in at least one of them can crumble the whole construction.
The first pillar is the steadiest among the three. Yanukovich’s voters are inclined to support the authoritarianism and their views will not change rapidly. It is a question of decades. Even a professional information campaign targeting this part of the electorate can only cause a minor vibration in this pillar. Moreover, access to remaining resources gives Yanukovich confidence that this pillar can be patched to withstand early presidential elections.
Security sector pillar (law enforcement and intelligence services, armed forces, border and customs services, justice and penal institutions) also remains firm in Yanukovich’s construction. Failed reforms, high level of demoralization and infiltrated partisan directors make this column almost immune to the major cabinet changes. This pillar requires long confidence-building efforts, preferably led by trustworthy generals with spotless reputations.
The third pillar is the central element in the construction. Oligarchs wish to continue growing rich through the preferences provided by the authorities. However, the first signs of cracks have appeared in this monolith pillar. Apart from the pressure from the USA, the oligarchs experience an increasing tensions with their foreign business partners in the EU.
However, the opposition troika clearly lacks credibility in offering alternatives for the heavy-weight teams of Akhmetov, Firtash and others. In these circumstances, further pressure is needed from the EU on the inner circles of Yanukovich.
Eradicating the chances of power concentration in the hands of one business «Family» is the first step in the long process of fixing the political system and eliminating the risks coming from Ukraine.