Russian media strategy in neighbouring countries

The Last Gasp of Empire: Russia’s Attempts to Control the Media in the Former Soviet Republics, a report compiled by David Satter, splits states in four categories.

The Baltic States. There, attempted influence by Russian media is the most careful. The main news channel is PBK, which, in Mr Satter’s opinion, is correct by and large, still maintaining a negative undertone regarding happenings in the Baltics. The greatest professional achievement is election of former PBK news chief, Nils Ušakovs, as Mayor of Riga.

Central Asia. Russian media – both Russia’s own channels and local Russian language channels – have a dominant position. They are more numerous, they have a better reputation, and are also more professional. In Central Asia, media attacks are the most point-blank, clearly in Russia’s interests and aimed against the West.

A measure of opposition may be detected in Kazakhstan, where it is attempted to curb Russian media’s influence and Russian cultural impact. As an example of that, the Latin alphabet has been employed instead if Cyrillic – in Kazakhstan, this is being done for the very reason of lessening Russian influence. 

Kazakhs are also sensitive towards criticism from abroad. Mr Satter quotes parliament member Adil Ahmetov: «We bought advertisement in Euronews. We bought advertisement into Azerbaijani channels. I think the Russians love money as well; let’s pay them, then, that they would praise us better.»

Caucasian countries. In Armenia, Russian media is represented indirectly. Russian channels do not spread directly and local media outlets are the most popular ones.

Even so, the Armenian TV has a tradition not to criticize Russia. In case anything critical is uttered, regarding Russia, it is channelled via opposition politicians; government members will hardly ever say anything critical. Even so, sharp criticism towards Russia is found in Armenian newspapers.

In Georgia and Azerbaijan, Russia’s influence is weaker. In Georgia, the reason is the 2008 war, after which relations with Russia have not normalised. In Azerbaijan, the reasons are oil riches and orientation towards Turkey.

Slavic countries. Towards Belarus, Russian media is at times critical, at times supportive. The latest forceful campaign against Aleksandr Lukašenka came in 2010 as the Belarusian president opposed Russia’s desire to gain control over gas network located in Belarus – a year later, the control was gained. Meanwhile, it is difficult to directly affect Belarus through media, because, even though all Russian TV channels can be seen in the country, they are aired at an hour’s delay, allowing Minsk’s censors to cut out any criticism against Mr Lukašenka; and that’s what they also do.

In Ukraine, Russia pays bloggers and Internet publications so these would support pro-Russia views. Even so, as Russian language based blogs and sites are inferior to the Russian language ones, also in numbers, there is not too much impact except for constant «web wars of words».

Regarding television, Russian channels do air in Ukraine; even so, the local ones are more popular. Ukrainian media is split between four large business groupings; Russia has assisted Viktor Yanukovych to gain control over these media groups. From Russia’s side, the project has been managed by vice premier Igor Shuvalov in person – he it was who introduced, in Ukraine the so-called temniki system – these are secret orders to TV stations what is fit to air and what is not.

In spite of all that, Mr Satter still thinks that Russia has no control over Ukrainian media, as these four media groups – indeed seeking favour with President Yanukovych – are still competitors among each other, rather using media in their own interests and not those of Russia.