Economically hurting, will Russia grow less or more aggressive internationally? Attempting to explain in hindsight the Kremlin getting militant regarding Ukraine and annexing Crimea, it’s easy to talk about the little victorious war waged to mask internal problems of the bully.
Would that be so, the Iran-type broad-based economic sanctions would serve the Putin Regime just fine, sending the message to the average Russian: economic decline is not the fault of your leaders, it’s the bad west acting nasty.
From the Kremlin view-point, reasons for aggression towards Ukraine probably vary. Firstly, a large Slavic state should not succeed in building democracy, and separation of powers – that, looking through the eyes of Kremlin, would be an unacceptable example for the Russian people. Free court procedures and separation of criminal investigations from executive power? Alas, that would be in direct collision with KGB-rooted Putinism.
Allegedly, Western values don’t fit the Slavic. Still, as separation of powers including fair court procedures deal with building a state and not with nationality, the argument could be toppled easily. On a broader scale, the KGB cadre currently in charge of Kremlin desire to send an ultra-nationalistic signal: human freedoms aren’t good for the Slavic. We, Estonians, being genetically quite close to a large part of Russia’s population, should feel greatly concerned by such labelling.
The more so, people of Russia ought to be insulted by Putin’s policy. Over there, more than a hundred million talented people have their abode. More in number than the Japanese. So why, counting scientific articles for instance, does Japan beat them by almost a half? Why is Estonia twice as impactful with scientific articles as Russia? Putin’s KGB regime is simply wasting the potential of their people, causing those with something to tell the world to flee the country.
Long ago, the excessive dependence of Russian economy on pumping natural resources is an established fact. Over and over again, this has been affirmed by various leaders of Russia – including Mr Medvedev the Prime Minister. Opting for the victorious war, they choose to overlook long-term weaknesses, rather than finding answers.
The rise of Putin Regime was buoyed by economic grown during the first two thirds of the previous decade, and by the rising demand for commodities. Meanwhile, the fundamental weakness of Putin’s Russia is so evident as to make one tactically wonder, as worded above: will the weakness boost – or bridle – the aggressiveness?