Criminal Police sources running dry

Risto Berendson
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Photo: Toomas Huik / Postimees

Central Criminal Police is losing its capacity for analysis of tactical work. Therefore, analysts ought to be employed by Criminal Statistics Department.

Central Criminal Police (CCP) is dealing with aftermath of crimes, few are being prevented.

These are the two statements standing out in Bachelor’s thesis defended by Criminal Statistics Department head Märt Palo, in Estonian Academy of Security Sciences. Currently, the man is busy writing his Master’s thesis – on the same topic.

Mr Palo, with his working experience of a couple of decades, is responsible for the most covert police operations in Estonia. When a specialist of that calibre finds that things are bad with criminal intelligence, this is worthy of attention.

Where and what has gone amiss? Why does CCP, these past years, have no success stories to show – like sending some well-known crooks behind bars? These were the questions I asked of Raigo Haabu, the CCP head.

«In many aspects, I agree with what the thesis claims,» he admits. «Still, I would not over-amplify the current situation. There is such a thing as analysis paralysis... meaning a situation where too vast an amount of analytical data may start to hinder the decision making process.»

Crime as a project

Mr Palo embodying top quality in CCP inner circles, his boss, also, is a persona quite unique. Before landing on CCP chief chair in 2007, Mr Haabu had managed to spend 14 years working in Security Police (KaPo).

In KaPo, Mr Haabu’s latest tasks included directing counterintelligence and leading anti-corruption and -terrorism activities. So, speaking about prevention of events, Mr Haabu knows what he is talking about.

A sentence the man said sticks out: «Professionals always prefer raw and meaty surveillance info.»

To put it plainly: definite hints at crimes committed, or to be committed. Therefore, he would not over-emphasise analysts.

Not that they could be under-estimated. As the capture of Osama bin Laden, two years ago, also came as the tireless decade-long work of an analyst. Others dealing with under-cover meetings and raw intelligence data, the hiding place of the terrorist was still figured out by that lady, putting bits and pieces together.

Still, Mr Haabu is not swayed by such a claim by a journalist. «If there are too many options in addition to human sources, work with human sources may tend to be forgotten,» he says in defence of «agency work».

In other words, the value of a good surveillance official still lies in his sources of information. True: little by little, this value has depreciated. Crime has become more project-based, more conspiracy-like by nature. Informers no longer knowing definite stuff, at least when they are not directly involved.

The new trend in criminal intelligence is use of police agents. This is an investigative tactics where a police worker, with permission secured by court, will embody a criminal. From recent history, we have some resounding success stories – preventions of the planned kidnapping of Finnish entrepreneur Björn Wahlroos’ son and of paid murder of businessman Tullio Liblik.

«Had we not been able to use agents, both crimes would probably have been committed,» thinks Mr Haabu.

Estonia is small. Using a police agent does not necessarily mean working in the home country. Use of agents is easier in international joint operations. For example, in the murder story of Mr Liblik, Estonia used a colleague from abroad acting as hired murderer.

«But, for obvious reasons, we cannot further explain these tactics,» says Mr Haabu.

Every year, criminal police compiles a forward-looking hazards assessment on organised crime in Estonia, and its effects. The 50 pages long document is highly classified, a state secret not to be seen by ordinary eyes.

Occasionally, the assessment includes definite names of persons possibly linked to certain criminal trends. «In every region, information is being collected from secret co-workers of the police; it is sent here and we turn it into a forward-looking product,» says the CCP chief.

The analysis is no panacea. Not a holy writ to be adhered to, all year long, by criminal policemen in the counties. Once in a quarter, heads of organised crime agencies come together, talking about changes and sensitive investigations. Earlier, there were no such regular meetings.

In criminal intelligence, Estonia may boast with a system foreign partners do not have. We are talking about a part of the electronic data system POLIS, called KAIRI.

The system being unique in that it can be accessed by various investigative agencies, Security Police included. In the rest of the world, criminal investigators and intelligence, as a rule, are not inclined to share information like that.

Talking about crime, Mr Haabu draws three columns unto a big blackboard, dividing the CCP work up by its content and essence.

The largest part taken up by maintaining the records of and investigating the simpler known crimes – 85 per cent. The newt 9 per cent column contains «murders and robberies». The third column gets 6 per cent. These are the hardest-to-discover hidden crimes like drug and corruption cases.

«Understandably, in criminal police, the largest resource goes into the two small columns,» says Mr Haabu.

The first and biggest column, in his words, only takes up 20 per cent of the criminal policemen’s work. The bulk of it being paper work, not overly complicated.

Both police and prosecutors love to talk about the significant victory in hindering Lithuanian car thieves’ raids into Estonia.

«Behind these raids there lies the largest criminal group of Lithuania; and they had no idea we would start to untangle this the way we did, ending up at their doorsteps and bringing the people here,» says Mr Haabu.

True: the Lithuanian car thieves case, led by Southern prosecutor’s office, is significant in its appeals for international arrests – in Slovenia, Austria and Latvia, to name a few. The investigators racking their brains with each link in the chain.

Drugs bypassing Estonia

Still, it would be weird for the police not to have any success stories to tell, over the years. I put it more plainly: why have no larger drug labs been uncovered, these past years?

«The risk of being caught being too great to have these here,» says Mr Haabu. «In Estonia, punishments for drug related activity are very severe, therefore local criminals prefer, in their international business, to move the substance other ways, passing Estonia by.»

A good picture of drug business in Estonia is provided by final paper by former drug police chief Veiko Germann, graduating last year from Police College. Therein, the author brings many a figure. For instance: a kilogram of amphetamine, costing €3,000 on Estonian wholesale market, may be obtained for €1,200 in Holland.

Producing it locally, prices would definitely be lower. However, the added profits would not compensate for possible 15 years jail terms with assets confiscated. So it is easier to acquire the substance in Holland and sell it in Finland, multiplying the price. That explaining the lack of local labs.

Mr Haabu promises more success stories to come. Sure, criminal activities have become more refined; many have succeeded to make the money, once earned in robust criminal ways, to grow as investments. Still, the interests of such people partly lie in the criminal worlds.

Yes, on the European scale, Estonian criminals have – in these past years – become marginal. Car thefts in Germany and jewellery robbed in Italy are a thing of the past. This will not mean, however, that the crooks are nor resting on their laurels.

«We have reviewed out activities and we are trying to do more to survey movements of illegal money,» says Mr Haabu.

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